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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Securing energy resources has become a key aspect of foreign policy-making 
since the 1970s. States have used military and economic foreign policy tools to secure 
the supply of energy to their domestic markets. With the fall of the USSR in 1991, 
political and economic competition for penetration into energy-rich regions spread 
through Eurasia. Inspired from the nineteenth century term to describe Russian-
British rivalry in the region, the current rivalry among great powers and their allies is 
called the “New Great Game”. This project analyzes three political conflicts that are 
shaped by such rivalry that can threaten global energy security. Empirical results 
from the expected utility model (Bueno de Mesquita 1985) suggest the rivalry among 
the Western (i.e.EU, US) and Eastern (i.e. Russia, China) powers about the Iranian 
nuclear program, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia conflicts is likely to continue 
and shows some Cold War characteristics. I have also found out the expected 
outcomes of these conflicts and foreign policy tools and obvious and unseen strategic 
moves available to actors. The major conclusion of the study is that the EU and US 
should pursue a coordinated foreign policy and balance the Russian and Chinese 
influence in the region to secure access to energy resources. Most effective foreign 
policy tools to achieve such aim appear to be the use of economic relations as 
leverage against Russia and China and support economic and democratic 
developments of the newly established republics in Eurasia.  
 
 xvi
 
“Now, more than hundred years later, great empires once again position 
themselves to control the heart of the Eurasian landmass, left in a post-Soviet 
power vacuum. Today there are different actors and the rules of the new 
neocolonial game are far more complex than those of a century ago: The 
United States has taken over the leading role from the British. Along with the 
ever-present Russians, new regional powers such as China, Iran, Turkey and 
Pakistan have entered the new arena… the New Great Game focuses on 
Caspian energy reserves, principally oil and gas.” (Kleveman 2003, 3) 
 
 “… our country has certain competitive and natural advantages as well as  the 
 technical opportunities to occupy a more significant position in the energy 
 market. We should use these advantages in the interests of the whole 
 international  community, but also keeping in mind our own national 
 interests. Russia's well- being in the present and the future directly 
 depends on the place we occupy in  the global energy market.” (Vladimir 
 Putin, December 22, 2005) 
 
 “Other actions by the Russian government have been counterproductive, and 
 could begin to affect relations with other countries. No legitimate interest is 
 served when oil and gas become tools of intimidation or blackmail, either by 
 supply manipulation or attempts to monopolize transportation. And no one 
 can  justify actions that undermine the territorial integrity of a neighbor, or 
 interfere with democratic movements.” (Dick Cheney, May 4, 2006)  
  
 
“EU officials admit that a key question facing the bloc is "what do we do 
with Russia?”… Europeans have been especially alarmed at China's 
aggressive courting of African oil-producing nations to meet its growing 
energy needs.” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur , June 14, 2006)  
 
 
“The orchestration of the use of the energy weapon against Ukraine and 
Moldova; the embargos of goods and services from Moldova and Georgia; the 
disruption of OSCE peacekeeping and peace resolution, from Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia to Transdniester -- coupled with essentially an economic 
bribery of European allies … all seem to be part of an overall strategy of 
recovering a sort of imperial status in the international system. And there 
does seem to be an overarching and very aggressive diplomatic campaign 
going on, [which] is clearly carefully thought-out, it's very aggressive, and it 
seems to me that Moscow's been reasonably successful in dividing America 
from its allies in Europe.” (Jackson Diehl, June 21, 2006) 
 
(All emphases are mine)  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: ENERGY AND SECURITY 
 
 
 
“The twentieth century was the century of energy” (Barton et al. 2004, p. 3).  
 
1.1 What Is Energy Security and Why Is It Important?  
Many aspects of modern life, economies and the relations between states are shaped 
by the development of energy resources and technologies. The reliance on energy in 
every field of life has made energy security tremendously important for states and 
societies. Especially for modern militaries, securing energy resources has become of 
utmost importance since the beginning of the twentieth century. Therefore, “second 
only to national defense”, energy security has become a primary concern for the 
survival and well-being of both developed and developing nations (Hamilton 2005, 
xxi). 
 For some historians, twentieth century history was greatly determined by First 
Lord of Admiralty Winston Churchill’s decision that the British Navy must switch 
from using coal to petroleum to maintain its hegemony before World War I. This 
decision shaped the course of the War; it also led the Allies to invade the oil-rich 
territories in the Middle East. Energy resources were even more important in World 
War II. One of the major reasons that Japan attacked the US was the latter’s oil 
embargo against the former’s empire. The Axis powers, lacking substantial energy 
resources, based their strategies on first gaining access to energy-rich areas, such as 
Romania and the Caspian Sea. The Allies, on the other hand, “floated to victory on a 
 2
sea of oil” and used nuclear power for the first time to conclude the war (Barton et al 
2004, 3).  
 The modern concern with energy security began with the Arab-Israeli war of 
1973-1974 and the OAPEC’s and OPEC’s1 use of the ‘oil weapon’. OPEC’s boycott 
of major energy-importing countries in Europe and the US has shown how important 
it is for modern societies to secure their supply of energy; it became clear that an 
energy crisis can hurt everyone in society, including government, business, and 
individuals. Consequently, securing energy resources has become a key aspect of 
foreign policy-making since the 1970s.  
 With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the concerns for energy 
security acquired a new dimension: The newly independent energy-rich ex-Soviet 
republics in the Caspian basin have become a playground for the great power rivalry. 
The US and EU, both having suffered from the dependency on Middle Eastern energy 
in the 1970s, have begun increasing their political and economic influence on the 
region to gain access to energy resources. “The New Great Game”2 was coined as a 
term to describe the rivalry between the Western powers and a weakened Russia for 
the control of the Eurasia region and its energy resources. Since energy hungry China 
has begun pursuing aggressive foreign policies to secure the supply of energy to its 
growing market, this rivalry has taken a “tripolar” shape. The major inquiry of this 
dissertation is to analyze three international conflicts in the region from the 
                                                 
1 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC).  
2 The term Great Game was coined in the mid-19th century to describe the power rivalry between 
Tsarist Russia and the British Empire for the domination of Afghanistan. Later, in the 20th century, the 
term was also used to describe the rivalry between the two states over the Eurasia region and oil 
resources in general (Kleveman 2003).   
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perspective of energy security and foreign policy analysis, which are said, in popular 
culture, to be part of this New Great Game.  
 Due to these current concerns in public policy, some academic research 
focused on studying the subject of energy security. These studies produced various 
definitions of the concept with differing components. I present a definition that is 
comprehensive and in conjunction with the latest developments on the global energy 
markets.  
 Energy security can be defined as a condition in which a nation and all (or 
most) of its citizens and industries have access to adequate energy resources at 
reasonable prices for the foreseeable future, free from serious risks of major 
disruption of service (Hancher and Jansen 2004). Insecurity can arise from various 
causes, such as geopolitical instability, natural disasters, terrorism, poor regularity 
designs or a lack of investments (Redgwell 2004). This dissertation’s focus is the 
geopolitical sources of energy insecurity.  
 The definition was also chosen because it underlines the integrated nature of 
national security and energy policy. In political science, this approach forms a bridge 
between security and IPE studies.  
 
1.2 Scope of the Study and Research Questions 
Stephen van Evera (1997) suggests there are seven types of dissertations produced in 
the political science field. According to his categorization, this project is what he calls 
a policy-oriented dissertation. I analyze the energy security policies of the EU and US 
from the perspective of the foreign policy analysis literature. My area concentration is 
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the Eurasia region3. The aim is to develop forecasts on the future of three major 
conflicts in the region that are likely to have an influence on global energy security. 
These conflicts are the Iranian nuclear program and the ethno-religious, territorial 
conflicts in Azerbaijan (i.e. Nagorno-Karabakh) and Georgia (i.e. South Ossetia).  
The project specifically focuses on the foreign policy options available to the EU and 
US and their competition against Russia, China and Iran on energy security policies.  
The literature on energy security suggests that different countries have 
developed different strategies for securing their energy supply. The UN mandated and 
US-led coalition’s campaign to secure Kuwaiti sovereignty in 1990 and 1991 can be 
understood within this context. The US and others prevented Iraq from becoming the 
second-largest oil producer in the world, control the Persian Gulf transit and threaten 
Saudi Arabia’s militarily, which is the largest oil producer.  
It is also argued that the US’ and UK’s military intervention in Iraq in 2003 
can be evaluated in this context. As the argument goes, especially after the 9/11 
attacks, the nature of US-Saudi relations has become ambiguous in ways that might 
have led the US and UK to unlock the Iraqi oil potential for the world markets by 
removing the Baath regime.  
Alternatively, the EU, perhaps owing to its lack of military power and a 
common foreign policy, has taken a more multi-lateralist, economic incentives-
oriented approach to the problem of energy security. The Green Paper of the EU 
Commission (2000) outlined an energy strategy for the following 20 years that aims 
                                                 
3 In the international relations literature, this area refers to ex-Soviet Republics, in particular, Russia, 
Transcaucasian  (i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and Central Asian Republics. I also prefer to 
include Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey in my analysis of Eurasia due to the past and present role of 
these three countries in the region. 
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towards ensuring the wealth of its citizens and economies and guaranteeing the 
uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market at an affordable 
price, while respecting environmental concerns and looking towards sustainable 
development (Hancher and Jannsen 2004).  
As the European Commission’s Green Paper (2000) suggests, there are two 
general problems associated with this long-term strategy: a. finding a balanced 
approach between controlling demand and economic development, and b. ensuring 
the supply from Russia, CIS and the Middle East that requires foreign policy 
initiatives by the EU.  
This project analyzes EU and US foreign policies - targeting the provision of 
energy security - on three conflicts in Eurasia and aims at finding answers to the 
following questions:  
1. What are the possible effects of political turmoil in Iran, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia on global energy security? 
 
2. What are the expected outcomes of the three analyzed conflicts?  
3. What are the foreign policy options for the EU and US (e.g. alliance 
building, cooperation, confrontation, negotiation, observable and 
unseen opportunities) in finding resolutions to these conflicts?  
 
4. How do (and will) these conflicts shape the re-emerging power-
rivalry in the region between the pairs of EU-US and Russia-Iran?   
 
1.3 Theory and Methodology  
To answer these questions, I review and employ various theoretical approaches of 
energy security, foreign policy analysis and the expected utility theory literatures. 
Theoretically, this dissertation can be said to be in a place where these three streams 
of literature meet.  
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 Methodologically, an expected utility model (EUM), developed by Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita (1985, 1994, 1997, 2002) will be applied to study the bargaining 
processes of the three conflicts. This method has been widely used in international 
relations and EU decision-making studies and has an established reputation of making 
accurate forecasts on various policy issues that involve bargaining (Kugler and Feng 
1997). 
 
1.4 Contribution to the Literature  
From the security studies and IPE perspective, there is a substantial vacuum in the 
literature dealing with energy security, in terms of the number of studies, theory 
development, and using advanced methodological approaches developed in the 
discipline. Energy security literature lacks the intellectual give-an-take both within 
political science and with other disciplines, such as economics. A review of the 
literature by Wilson (1987) shows only a few review articles and some monographs 
that discuss the question which IR paradigm most sufficiently explains processes of 
the world energy markets. The literature did not improve significantly since Wilson 
has written his review, especially because of the relative stability of the world oil 
markets in the 1990s and early 2000s.  
There is a void in the literature to be filled with new theoretical and 
methodological approaches to the study of energy security. This dissertation aims to 
partially fill this vacuum. With a new theoretical approach (i.e. expected utility 
theory) and the methodology that is attached to it (i.e. the formal modeling), this 
study will bring a new perspective to the literature on energy security. To the best of 
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my knowledge, there is no other study that combines theoretical and methodological 
principles from energy security and foreign policy analysis and expected utility 
literatures in the field. In this sense, this dissertation is eclectic and can be considered 
an original piece of research.  
Also, from the perspective of the ongoing methodology discussion in the 
political science field, this project is a modest attempt to combine the advantages of 
case studies, area expertise, and mathematical modeling. 
More generally, this research project is also where security studies and 
international political economy literatures meet. There are a few subjects in the field 
that are equally important for both security and economically oriented researchers and 
policy makers. Energy security is one of them and combining one’s training and 
research on both issues is also useful for the intra-field theoretical development.  
Lastly, the subject has a colossal practical importance for the survival of 
populations of the world. Considering that there has been dissatisfaction with social 
science and social research in terms of producing “usable knowledge” to solve real-
life problems (Lindblom and Cohen 1979), I believe this dissertation can make a 
contribution to the literature by focusing on such a practically important issue.   
 
1.5 Chapters of the Dissertation  
 
As a new theoretical and methodological approach to the energy security literature, 
this dissertation includes six more chapters. The second chapter consists of a review 
of the energy security literature. Studies from various fields, such as neoclassical 
economics, public economics, political economy and foreign policy analysis are 
reviewed in conjunction with an analysis of their most studied research questions, key 
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variables, policy prescriptions and contribution to the overall study of energy 
security. In the second part of chapter two, I review the expected utility literature and 
propose employing it as a theoretical approach in this study with justifications about 
its suitability for the research questions analyzed. This part also includes a discussion 
of the theoretical foundations, axiomatic basis and limitations of the expected utility 
theory and methodology.   
 Chapter three presents an account of the dynamics of the expected utility 
model, which is followed by an introduction to the three variables it uses. In the 
following part, the methodology based on the theoretical premises of the model is 
presented. The third chapter concludes with a discussion of the case selection, 
presentation of the issue questions, and data and measurement issues.  
 Chapters four, five and six are the empirical analysis chapters where the 
dynamics of three political conflicts are discussed from the perspectives of energy 
security and foreign policy analysis. Each empirical analysis chapter begins with an 
introduction to the producing (i.e. Iran and Azerbaijan) or transit (Georgia) country’s 
importance for global and particularly European and American energy security. This 
is followed by a presentation of the case study on the particular conflict at hand.  A 
discussion of the current bargaining positions of the actors precedes the data analysis. 
Each empirical chapter ends with a brief conclusion containing an assessment of the 
future of the conflict and its effects on energy security.  
 Chapter four presents the empirical results for the Iranian nuclear program 
case and possible effects of an escalated crisis on the issue. Chapter five is an analysis 
of the future of the Nagorno-Karabakh’s autonomy issue and its effects on the 
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diversity of energy supplies for the EU and US. Chapter six examines South Ossetia’s 
irredentist claims within the context of Georgian, Russian, EU and American 
involvement.  
 Chapter seven reviews the findings of the empirical analysis, points out policy 
recommendations and discusses the future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
ENERGY SECURITY LITERATURE, THEORY AND THEIR 
LIMITATIONS 
 
 
 
Plan of the Chapter 
This chapter presents a review of literature on energy security and introduces the 
theoretical approach, i.e. the expected utility theory, which is employed in this 
dissertation. It is rather difficult to categorize literature so unsystematic and desultory, 
lacking theoretical development in a cumulative way. Therefore, the following 
presentation does not claim to be strict or exhaustive.1 It aims to clarify the logic and 
contribution of different streams of literature and is organized according to the 
following criteria: 1. a summary of the major research questions, key variables and 
policy prescriptions of each approach, and 2. a threefold distinction between strictly 
economic, administrative decision-making and foreign policy-oriented studies, i.e. 
progressing from the micro to the macro level. I will first review economic theories, 
then decision making-bureaucratic politics approaches and lastly political economy 
and foreign policy-national security studies that emphasize macro structures as well 
as micro variables.  
  (Figure 2-1 about here)  
                                                 
1 There are a few other approaches to the problem that I do not present here because they are not the 
focus of this study, such as legal approaches and journalistic accounts.  
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 More specifically, based on a discussion of the energy literature and its 
limitations, the theoretical approaches that are suitable2 to answer the posed research 
questions will be discussed.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Joseph Nye (1982, p.121) suggests that “academic fashions in political science often 
reflect current concerns in public policy”.  The literature on energy security is an 
example for that. After the 1973-1974 and 1979 oil crises, political scientists and 
economists produced various works approaching the subject from different 
perspectives. However, this literature has been resistant to conceptual rigor and 
theoretical development. Various works based on different theoretical and 
methodological perspectives were not successful in adequately conceptualizing the 
issue at hand, which is fundamental to the new international patterns of power and 
economic relations. The literature on energy security has been unself-conscious and 
uncritical in the following regards pinpointed by Ernst J. Wilson: 
 
There is little if any sustained intellectual give-and-take in the 
field of international energy policy studies over the most 
appropriate ways to analyze the phenomenon. A thorough 
search of the literature reveals only a mere handful of review 
articles or monographs which seriously debate the relative 
explanatory power of competing paradigms for the world oil 
market. Given the immense practical importance of the subject 
and the interest shown by social scientists, and in light of 
potential intellectual payoffs, the quality of theoretical 
literature is meager at best. A void exists at what should be the 
center of the field (Wilson 1987, p.126). 
  
                                                 
2 This refers to approaches that can help overcome some of the difficulties that previous research has 
faced.  
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 This trend in the literature did not change since Wilson wrote that paragraph 
about two decades ago. Especially with the end of the Cold War and the relative 
stability of energy markets in the 1990s, there has been almost no theoretical 
development in the literature dealing with energy security. Therefore, there is a great 
opportunity for political scientists to contribute to the theoretical development. IPE 
literature studies trade, finance, aid, foreign investment and economic coercion, but 
the subject of energy from a security perspective has not been a priority in the field. 
 This leads to important intellectual consequences. First, the theoretical 
background of the field makes it impossible to measure intellectual progress beyond 
collecting raw data. Second, as a result of lacking self-criticism, the research agenda 
does not show progress as a “scientific research enterprise” in James’ (2002) terms. In 
other words, the disorganized nature of the research prevents scholars from 
prioritizing the issues to be studied (Wilson 1987). Despite the lack of organization of 
the literature, it can be split up into three general sections: neoclassical economics and 
public choice, policy and political models and political economy.  
 
2.2 Neoclassical Economics and Public Choice Literature 
Economists have studied energy markets extensively. The paradigm they worked with 
is based on the organizing principles of neoclassical economics. That is, the basic 
laws of supply and demand determine the behavior of energy markets: Supply and 
demand meet in the market and operate in equilibrium. The prices of oil, natural gas 
or other resources will be determined by where the forces of supply and demand 
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meet. Political variables are generally attributed to be intervening variables or to 
cause market externalities.  
 Externality refers to an external economy (diseconomy), an event that grants 
an appreciable benefit to a person or group of people who were not fully included in 
the decision process that led directly or indirectly to the event in question (Meade 
1973, Cornes and Sandler 1996). There is a substantial body of public economics 
literature that focuses on energy market externalities. Bohi and Toman (1995 and 
1996) classify literature that focuses on energy market externalities under four 
categories: studies dealing with OPEC and its market power, the US’ monopsony 
power, indirect costs of market power, and the relationship between oil import costs 
and military expenditures. (Monopsony refers to a market with many sellers and only 
one buyer.)   
 Adelman’s (1972) World Petroleum Market is a classic example of 
neoclassical economics literature on energy security. According to Adelman, the 
government has no say in providing oil markets with stable prices. The invisible hand 
of the market determines the prices and outputs. The government’s effort to stabilize 
prices is a waste of time and resources, according to this point of view, and exporting 
countries are less likely to cut back their production for political reasons (Wilson 
1987). This deterministic description and explanation of energy markets proved to be 
incorrect regarding two successive crises within six years during the 1970s.  
 Adelman’s other works (1974, 1980, 1990 and 2004) also extensively focused 
on OPEC's market power. In many of his articles he argues that the OPEC has 
exercised market power and acted as a cartel, although as a "clumsy" one, as he 
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acknowledges. Since the last two-and-a half decades he has been arguing that the real 
threat to the world oil market is OPEC's clumsiness and shortsightedness. He argues 
that there is an unexplainable gap between the oil prices and the marginal cost of oil 
supply. The difference is of course the monopoly profit. In his 1974 article, which 
was published about half a year after the 1973 oil crisis, he claims OPEC created a 
producers’ monopoly, which was possible due to the lack of cooperation from US 
allies. Ultimately, he does not believe in the idea of an ‘oil weapon’ but thinks that 
there is too little cooperation among consumers to contain the cartel. But he 
subscribes to the view that, producers and consumers cannot take the risk of 
alienating each other.3  His solution against attempts to blackmail the Western 
economies is simple:  
“We need only tell the Saudis their embargo on shipments to us 
is henceforth permanent, their status having been canceled by 
their own act” (Adelman 1974, 66)   
  
 It is obvious that the OPEC has the capability to influence oil prices. 
However, economists and political economists tend to disagree to what extent and 
how, because the OPEC does not act like a typical price-setting cartel (Bohi and 
Toman 1995). There is a disagreement on whether OPEC can really apply market 
power. MacAvoy (1982), for instance, suggests that the price crises of the 1970s 
could have happened even if OPEC had not acted the way it did, for those peaks were 
results of increasing demand and specific international political crises. Griffin (1985), 
                                                 
3 In a similar study, Kennedy (1974) argues the same way, but from a different point of view. Kennedy 
claimed that OPEC acts like a cartel but to a limited degree. He concludes that the price peak in 1973 
couldn’t be maintained because the largest producing region, i.e. Middle East and North Africa, would 
have a problem allocating the reduced production amounts among the member countries. In retrospect, 
his predictions turned out to be accurate.  
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on the other hand, tests alternative hypotheses about the question of OPEC’s market 
power and finds that the organization appears to be a partial market-sharing cartel. 
OPEC members’ outputs are sensitive to demands of individual consumers, but the 
output changes are not strictly proportional (Griffin 1985, Bohi et al. 1995).  
 The second type of market externality that Bohi and Toman (1995 and 1996) 
analyze is the US monopsony position in the market. They argue that the US as a 
whole can be a monopsony power. The question is whether the US can retaliate 
against OPEC if the latter uses its seller’s power. As the quotation above implies, 
Adelman thinks the US does have ways to exercise retaliation. Other economists 
argue such a step would not be efficient to decrease the price of oil (Broadman and 
Hogan 1988) 
 Third, the literature studied the indirect costs of market power. The argument 
is that higher oil prices turn into depreciation in dollar, and oil prices put pressure on 
inflation. Both ideas are discussed extensively and it there are examples from both 
sides of the discussion. James D. Hamilton (1983), for instance, suggests that in the 
period from 1948 to 1972, all but one of the recessions in the US were preceded by a 
dramatic increase in the price of crude oil petroleum. He shows that a correlation 
between the price of oil and recession is significant and that it is not spurious that oil 
shocks are contributing factors in at least some of the recessions the US faced prior to 
1972. Hubbard (1986) reaches the same conclusion: Even transitory shocks exhibit 
persistence effects on long-term prices, although he acknowledges that the persistence 
of shocks also depends on the structure of the given economy. On the other hand, 
other studies argued the effect of oil price shocks or increased inflation is 
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exaggerated. Eastwood (1992) shows that the oil prices’ effect on US inflation might 
be overstated. In a similar study, Kibritcioglu and Kibritcioglu (1998) argue the effect 
of crude oil price increases on inflation in Turkey is insignificant.  
 Fourth, it has frequently been argued that substantial military expenditures, 
such as in the Middle East, add to the social costs of oil imports. Although this 
argument is popular in mass media and public discourse, Bohi and Toman (1995) say 
it rests on several logical and practical mistakes. First, they argue, these expenditures 
are costs of mitigating energy security and not a cost of insecurity itself. Also, the 
expenditures are made to accomplish many security goals, not only the security of 
energy. Last, assigning premiums to oil imports is logically and mathematically 
wrong for different reasons: The military expenditures are made to prevent damage of 
the total energy consumption, so the unit cost should reflect a denominator that is so 
big. Also, the US’s military presence in energy-rich regions is good for many allies, 
not only for the US. For all of these reasons, Bohi and Toman (1995) argue that the 
cost of a military expenditure premium on oil should be sharply reduced and the 
subject should not be neglected.  
 Finally, some of the literature on energy economics is devoted to the 
examination of the relationship between oil price hikes and oil investment and 
developments (Brennan and Schwartz 1985,   Dixit and Pindyck 1994). This research 
focuses on the question what time is economically optimal for energy companies to 
invest. This question is related to the energy security of nations; more investment 
mean more spare capacity and more sellers in the market. In a very interesting study, 
Miller and Zhang (1996) argue that according to the theory of irreversible investment, 
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the development of an oil field should take place when a unique “price trigger” is 
passed. They study the 1990-1991 Gulf War and its effects on prices in England. 
They found that in order to conduct a more thorough analysis, they need to 
incorporate the large transitory price hikes (i.e. during the Gulf War), evaluate the 
profitability of an oil field contingent on war and peace and calculate separate triggers 
in both cases. They find that the switch between these two triggers is about three-
fourths of the price hike caused by the war. Therefore, they argue that only a quarter 
of the price hike should be accounted for calculating the cost of an oil field, because 
the prices fall back to about three fourth after the wars. 
 A general evaluation of energy security externalities and neoclassical 
economics literature on energy is that they advanced our knowledge of identifying 
different externalities that cause energy markets to fail to internalize all costs and 
benefits. However, empirical evidence on these externalities is not dependable and 
more research is required to observe the causal effects of externalities on energy 
market fluctuations and trade (Bohi and Thoman 1995). Although this literature is 
useful with respect to capturing the dynamic nature of energy markets, the occasional 
exclusion of political and institutional variables constitutes its weaknesses. In the 
long-run, the main element determining energy prices and supply is most probably 
the market; in terms of short-term influences, however, political variables proved to 
be of utmost importance (Wilson 1987).  
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2.3 Bureaucratic Politics Model and Public Administration Literature 
Bureaucratic politics (Miller 1977, Greenberger 1983) models represent the second 
group of studies analyzing energy security.  These models are concerned with where 
markets and domestic politics meet. Authors focus on elite decision making, 
emphasize the role of power, leadership, interests and the markets, short-term 
volatilities, production levels, prices, and the decisions shaping them (Wilson 1987).  
 Stephen Krasner (1979), for instance, explains whether the short-term push 
and pull of business interests shapes the national interest of the US in the energy 
policy sector. He claims that the White House and State Department are relatively 
independent of societal pressures when it comes to determining the raw materials and 
energy resources that are allowed to be imported. Similarly, Moran (1978, p. 264; 
quoted from Wilson 1987, p.138) argues the models of economic maximization are 
not realistic and misleading when applied to OPEC decision-making; the most 
complete and powerful explanations were those acknowledging that “political and 
security concerns wag the economic tail, and not vice versa; where they conflict, the 
former prevail”. 
 The contribution of this line of literature, I argue, is in the field of US policy-
making. The authors illuminate how foreign policy-decisions regarding energy 
markets in the US and OPEC countries are made. Their accomplishment is the 
combined analysis of political and economic factors that shape foreign policy 
decisions. The weakness of the literature is that, unlike regime theorists or structural 
realists, the research is not concerned with the overall distribution of power and 
capabilities in the international system. This, of course, allows researchers theoretical 
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rigor, since they only conceptualize political processes. However, excluding the 
positions of states vis-à-vis in the international system weakens their analysis. 
 A second group that studied energy security from the perspective of domestic 
politics is public policy literature. These studies focused on practical problems when 
it comes to federal and state government policies concerned with energy security. 
Researchers analyzed various policy questions, like the nature of energy security 
policy-making in the US’ or EU’s political system (Moe 1979, Matlary 1997); the 
tension between federalism and state level policy-making in the energy policy context 
(Light 1976 and 1979); the nature of the relationship and negotiations between 
different federal agencies and inter-organizational conflicts on energy issues (Molnar 
and Rogers 1979, Burkardt et al. 1997); science and federal funding issues for energy 
research (Lambright 1998), and more at the macro level, discussions about expanding 
federal agencies and creating new organizations (e.g. High Energy Administration or 
the Energy Commission) to coordinate energy policies (Keenan 1968, Tribus 1975). 
These studies focus on domestic decision making, the administrative, coordination 
and financial sides of the issue and tend to ignore the international side of the energy 
security coin.  
 
2.4 Political Economy Literature  
2.4.1 Regime Theory 
The regime theory focuses on political rules that shape economic relations and create 
the environment in which states and markets operate. The IPE literature has produced 
some important works that attempt to capture the political economic nature of energy 
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security. The main premise that guided such analyses is the notion that economic 
systems do not emerge spontaneously but rest on a particular political order and 
exercise of power (Gilpin 1975, 2001).  
 The regime model presents energy crises and energy security issues from a 
perspective of international regimes, in which certain values, norms, expectations and 
interdependent relations change the behavior of the actors. The most powerful actor 
in the regime (like a principle actor in the rational choice literature) provides public 
goods and positive benefits to the actors operating in the regime. According to this 
model, regimes change because the heft of the most powerful actor, or hegemon, has 
changed. Regime theorists, such as Keohane and Nye (1977), conceptualize the 
energy market crises of the 1970s in this context. Nye (2005) characterizes the pre-
1973 international oil regime as one of a private oligopoly with close ties to the 
governments of the major industrialized consumer countries. After 1973, a major 
change took place in the international regime that governed oil. With the OPEC 
embargo and oil crisis, the producing countries set the level of production, which 
gave them a huge leverage on international politics and economics. According to Nye 
(2005), this led to an enormous shift of power and wealth from the industrialized 
world to the relatively poor members of the international system. Nye (2005) does not 
think it was the OPEC act that led to this change, because OPEC had been established 
in 1960 and did not use the production and exports as a weapon until 1973. Such a 
major change in the international oil regime can be explained with three factors: the 
overall balance of power, the balance of power concerning the oil issue and the 
influence of international institutions (Nye 2005).  
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 First, the stability of the regime is altered due to the decline of American 
power. For Nye (1981 and 2005), the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and 
the US’ reluctance - or incapacity - to fill the power vacuum in the region led to the 
breakdown of the international oil regime: 
“In summary, the loose regime that governed the oil market 
broke down in 1970s under the influence of catalytic political 
events and long-term shifts of power, not because of OPEC’s 
formation or because of market forces alone” (Nye 1981, p. 
12).  
 
 Nye argues America’s reluctance to replace British forces in the ‘East of 
Suez’ and trying to get foreign policy objectives done via regional powers like Iran 
were mistakes that led to the 1973 and 1979 events. This is indeed a realist 
explanation of the 1973 and 1979 oil crises.  
 His second explanation employs a more modified realist account that solely 
focuses on the distribution of power within the oil issue itself, not only the overall 
military balance. This line of argument suggests that the international oil regime went 
through substantial changes: The US was the largest oil producer until 1971 when its 
production peaked, leading to a substantial increase in its oil imports. During the 
1956 and 1967 wars, the Arab states attempted to pursue an embargo that failed 
because the US was able to supply Europe with its surplus oil when the Arab states 
did not supply oil. Once the US began importing oil in substantial amounts, the power 
balance was changed in favor of Saudi Arabia. 
 Lastly, Nye (2005) argues that international institutions, specifically 
multinational companies and OPEC, could be the reason for the change of the oil 
regime. That is, multinational companies (e.g. the seven sisters) lost power because 
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local workers, engineers and staff in the producing countries learned how to run the 
oil business. Therefore, multinational companies, influenced by Western 
governments, lost their bargaining power against oil producing nations. OPEC’s price 
control also became more influential because oil was not as abundant as in the 
preceding two decades. This gave OPEC more bargaining leverage and room to act 
like a genuine cartel.  
 Regime theorists also carried out an analysis of the effects of domestic actors  
on international regimes. Keohane (1984) demonstrates in what ways domestic actors 
prevented the inclusion of cheap Middle Eastern oil on American markets, which led 
the US to be more vulnerable to the price shocks of the 1970s. This is a clear example 
of how domestic factors can affect international regimes, or how oil independents4 
harmed the energy security of the US.  
 The strength of this literature lies in its emphasis on the political influences on 
energy markets. As Gilpin suggests (2001), markets do not operate in a vacuum. This 
literature successfully shows that there are rules and regulations that adjust market 
behavior and also that states intervene in the markets when they perceive market 
failures.  
 This line of literature, however, can be criticized, as well, because it fails to 
draw analytic linkages between markets and regimes. Deese (1980) and Wilson 
(1987) argue more attention should be paid to identifying and analyzing specific 
political mechanisms that affect energy markets. Also, the boundaries between 
markets in general and energy markets in particular are not clearly drawn. This 
                                                 
4 I.e. smaller independent companies that are involved in wholesale sales, distribution and retail of 
products such as oil, gas and diesel fuel other than the major oil companies and refineries.  
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objection appears legitimate, especially if one takes into account the specific 
arrangements of energy markets and the security dimension for the states. 
 
2.4.2 Resource Conflict Literature  
In the early 1980s, with a decline of various resources in the world and the problems 
associated with the markets distributing them, literature on global resource scarcity 
has begun to emerge. These studies are of course not the first to theorize about 
resource scarcity. Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), a British political economist, 
wrote more than two centuries ago in An Essay on the Principles of Population 
(1798) that the "population increases in a geometric ratio, while the means of 
subsistence increases in an arithmetic ratio."5 Exponential population growth and 
environmental degradation, in his opinion, will lead to inevitable conflicts over 
natural resources between nations: 
“For the principle of population will still prevail, and from the 
comfort, ease and plenty that will abound, will receive an 
increasing force and impetus. The number of mouths to be fed 
will have no limit; but the food that is to supply them cannot 
keep pace with the demand for it; we must come to a stop 
somewhere, even though each square yard, by extreme 
improvements in cultivation, could maintain its man. In this 
state of things there will be no remedy; the wholesome checks 
of vice and misery (which have hitherto kept this principle 
within bounds) will have been done away; the voice of reason 
will be unheard; the passions only will bear sway; famine, 
distress, havoc and dismay will spread around; hatred, 
violence, war and bloodshed will be the infallible consequence; 
and from the pinnacle of happiness, peace, refinement and 
                                                 
5 Thomas Malthus. An Essay on the Principle of Population, as It Affects the Future Improvement of 
Society with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers. London, 
Printed for J. Johnson in St. Paul’s Churcu-Yard, 1798. Rendered into HTML format by Ed Stephan, 
10 Aug 1997: http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~stephan/malthus/malthus.0.html 
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social advantage we shall be hurled once more into a 
profounder abyss of misery, want, and barbarism that ever by 
the sole operation of the principle of population!" (Malthus 
1798) 
 
 In such euphoric times about the future of mankind (i.e. during the 
Enlightenment Revolution), Malthus’ view was rather pessimistic but perhaps more 
realistic, for towards the end of the twentieth century, the world witnessed famines 
(e.g. in Africa or Asia), resource crises, such as the energy crisis in the 1970s, and 
serious environmental problems like global warming.  
 The literature on transnational resource conflicts focused on the reasons and 
remedies for resource conflicts. Researchers showed that there is yet another form of 
non-violent conflict but also pointed out that they can turn violent in the near future 
(Choucri 1974, Choucri and North 1975, Russett 1981-1982, Kemp (1977-1978), 
Bannon and Collier 2003, Trolldalen 1992, LeBillon 2005, Klare 2001).6  
 Robert Mandel (1980 and 1988) suggests that global resource scarcity has led 
to an increase of nonviolent resource conflicts on the international level. He focuses 
on a wide range of resource conflicts, not only related to fossil fuels but also to other 
resources, such as whaling (between the US, Japan and USSR), food (grain conflict 
between the US and USSR), strategic non-fuel minerals (such as chrome, manganese, 
cobalt), and environmental pollution and nuclear disasters (e.g. Chernobyl).  
 Mandel (1980, 101) describes a framework of factors that determine the 
occurrence of transnational conflicts:  
                                                 
6 There is also literature on resource conflict at the domestic level that substantially contributed to our 
understanding of resource conflicts in general, such as Ted Gurr’s (1985) On the Political 
Consequences of Scarcity and Economic Decline, or Reuveny and Maxwell’s (2001) Conflict and 
Renewable Resources.  
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1. A decreasing and inelastic resources supply on the global, rather than 
national or local level, 
2. an increasing or constant inelastic demand for these resources on a global, 
rather than national or local level, 
3. a change of global resource access compared to the earlier period where 
unrestricted access to resources by some nations caused their inequitable 
distribution,  
4. an increasing significance of collective or common pool resources, rather 
than private or nationally monopolized resources, 
5. an increase in spillover effects of one nation’s resource policy on others, 
6. an increase in the complex structures of international interdependence 
when extracting, processing and distributing resources, and 
7. an increased impact of transnational and non-governmental forces, such as 
Greenpeace, in determining the use of resources.  
 
 According to Mandel (1980, 1988), Choucri and North (1975), Kemp (1981-
1982), Campbell (1977) and Russett (1981-1982), the fact that the markets cannot 
distribute resources as well as they used to causes different patterns of conflict in 
international politics. These patterns can be evaluated by analyzing the interests and 
strategies of different stakeholders. First, as a result of the conflict, industrial states 
with more military capabilities tend to use those capabilities for economic gains. That 
is, powerful industrial states tend to initiate conflicts to satisfy their citizens’ 
insatiable demands and maintain economic growth. Second, the weaker producing 
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states start bonding to counteract the impact of industrialized countries or their 
companies with the goal of achieving a redistribution of scarce resources. Third, the 
non-state actors, like conservationist groups, become involved in natural resource 
policy-making.  
 This line of literature can take credit for facilitating the definition of the 
problem of transnational resource conflicts. It effectively highlighted the problem in 
the early 1970s and brought to attention the way it evolved by theorizing about the 
relationship between markets, states and non-state actors. However, the literature’s 
skeptical propositions about the industrialized states’ conflict initiation cannot be 
confirmed when reviewing wars in energy-rich regions in the last three decades. 
Other than the 2003 Iraq War, the conflicts in these regions were generally started by 
an industrializing state or states. Their hypothesis that industrialized states will 
initiate conflicts to maintain their economic growth rate does not correspond with 
these cases.  
 
2.4.3 National Energy Security and Foreign Policy Literature  
The examples from this line of the literature are fairly similar in their 
conceptualization of the subject; however, there are fine differences in their scope and 
emphasis of prescriptions. One branch of this literature is military security-oriented 
and focuses on the implications of energy security on armed conflict, while another 
branch emphasized regional and global proactive foreign policy-making to ensure the 
security of supply.  
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 Russett7 (1981-1982) asks the important question whether history will repeat 
itself if security and resources decline. He draws parallels between 1914 and 1984 
and speculates about the possibility of a military confrontation between the US and 
USSR in the Middle East over natural resources, especially the oil. He argues that the 
risks of a confrontation of international great powers over resources will be fairly 
possible in the 1980s. In retrospect, his predictions did not exactly come true, owing 
to the decline of the Soviet Empire in the late 1980s. The 1990s witnessed a fairly 
stable international oil regime, as well. However, in the new millennium, the demand 
for energy hit a peak that caused a great power rivalry, if not a conflict, in the 
Caspian, Eastern and Central European regions between the US and Russia, as well as 
the EU and Russia. A substantial part of this dissertation in fact focuses on the rivalry 
in the Caucasus and Caspian regions among Russia, the EU and US.  
 Similar studies (Kemp 1977-1978 and Campbell 1977) focused on changes in 
the balance of power and producer-consumer relations in the Middle East. John C. 
Campbell (1977) argues that the events of the 1970s made Iran and Saudi Arabia 
much more powerful than they ever expected to be, which changed their relations 
with the Western industrialized world. Although he stresses the changed dynamics of 
the relations between those two groups of countries and asserts that Western 
economies are defenseless against producers, he correctly points out the internal, 
regional and international vulnerabilities of the producing nations and does not 
forecast a full scale confrontation. He suggests Western nations cannot use force to 
take over oil fields without causing a great stir in the Middle East, while producers 
                                                 
7 Copaken (1995) makes an excellent explanation of oil as a strategic commodity, similar to Russett’s, 
by evaluating the cases of Japan (1930-1941) and World War II for all actors involved, especially 
focusing on Japan, Germany and the Middle East since the outbreak of World War II.  
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cannot push consumers too much without harming themselves. In retrospect, his 
analysis holds valid: Since the 1973 oil crisis, there was not a single concerted effort 
from OPEC to substantially disrupt the flow of oil or gas.  
 Geoffrey Kemp (1977-1978)8, on the other hand, evaluates the energy 
security-foreign policy relationship from a military intervention point of view and 
categorizes the possible types of military interventions needed to ensure energy 
security for the US. He argues that there are three major types of military 
interventions that might be required:   
 First, military conflict to control, destroy or protect a given resource, such as 
 an oil field, a watershed, fishing areas, arable land or precious mineral areas; 
 second, military deployments to annex or protect a land or sea area believed to 
 contain or to be close to potentially valuable resources such as offshore 
 islands near oil-bearing rock formations; third, military conflict that affects 
 access routes  to and from sources of supply –sea, air and land lines of 
 communication,  especially straits, and airstrips, railroad systems and 
 ports. (Kemp 1977-1978, 413) 
 
 Kemp argues that the sources of contention in each case might or might not be 
energy resources per se. He distinguishes between cases where resource conflict is the 
primary reason for disagreements, like in the Anglo-Icelandic Cod War, and cases 
where oil is a secondary concern for both parties, albeit potentially catalytic, as in the 
Greek-Turkish conflict over Aegean Sea oil exploration. Charles Doran, one of the 
pioneers of energy security research, challenges the myths surrounding the 
relationships between the oil industry, markets, OPEC, governments, militaries and 
the Middle East (Doran 1977, 1980 and 1991). In his well-known book, Myth, Oil 
and Politics: An Introduction to the Political Economy of Petroleum, he refutes six 
                                                 
8 In a similar study, David L. Weimer (1995) reaffirms the importance of the relationship between 
petroleum and national security and proposes specific remedies to diminish US military dependence by 
strategic stockpiling.   
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different “myths” that surround oil as a strategic commodity. These myths include: 
the existence of inequitable (or unfair) oil prices; Israel and Middle Eastern wars 
being reasons for high oil prices; obscene corporate profits due to high prices; the 
necessity of divesting major oil companies to break their power; the idea that the 
International Energy Agency created a consumer program capable of making a stand 
against OPEC and others, and that OPEC members will act cohesively as a cartel to 
control international market prices. Doran successfully disproves these myths by 
showing that they are based on inaccurate and incomplete information and false 
assumptions about the politics and economics of oil. However, Doran is not quite 
clear about who actually subscribes to these myths (e.g. governments, media, 
consumers, international actors), how they affect US policy-making, and the remedies 
he suggests (such as international cooperation to replace the IEA). I think the most 
important achievement of this book is that it falsifies the six outlined myths and 
makes a sound introduction to the political economy of oil markets. That is, Doran 
successfully combines political and economic variables in addressing the research 
question.  
 The last section of this subchapter is devoted to the literature that theoretically 
inspired this dissertation the most. This line of the literature emphasizes the 
importance of foreign policy making in achieving energy security goals. These 
studies, of course, do not exclude domestic factors that are major components of the 
energy security of a country, such as domestic investments, deregulated markets, and 
strategic reserves. However, they strongly emphasize the role of foreign policy-
making (both for the EU and US) to guarantee the supply for their domestic markets 
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(Stobaugh and Yergin 1979, Bahgat 2003, Schlesinger 2005, Hamilton 2005, Kalicki 
and Goldwyn 2005a, Siemenski 2005, Yergin 2005, Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005b).  
 The incorporation of both the domestic and foreign side of the energy security 
coin in their analysis is one of the greatest strengths of this literature. Its 
conceptualization of energy security is more comprehensive than that of any other 
stream of literature discussed above. Daniel Yergin (2005), for example, proposes 
that energy security has ten key principles of importance. These can be briefly 
summarized as follows: 1. Diversification of supply, 2. stability of the global energy 
markets, 3. spare capacity (e.g. Strategic Petroleum Reserves), and 4. freer market - 
less regulations, 5. building cooperative relations with producer and exporting 
countries, 6. dialogue and cooperative relations with consumer nations, 7. a proactive 
security framework, including foreign policy that prevents disruptions of the entire 
chain of supply, 8. a well-informed public, 9. a healthy, technology-driven energy 
industry and 10. a commitment to research, development and innovation across a 
broad spectrum. This dissertation deals with the seventh of the ten principles that 
concern energy security, focusing on proactive foreign policy-making to prevent 
disruptions of the supply chain.  
 In a large volume, Energy Security: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy, 
the editors Kalicki and David Goldwyn (2005) brought together the leading 
authorities on the subject in US. The main conclusion of the volume is that energy 
concerns must be integrated into US foreign policy. They argue the energy tail should 
not wag the foreign policy dog. The authors recommend that fundamental US 
policies, such as defense against threats like terrorism and the promotion of 
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democratic, economic and humanitarian objectives around the world should not 
change. They rather suggest that energy is a growingly important vehicle to advance 
these and other objectives.  
 Kalicki and Goldwyn (2005b, 570) describe the “positive relationship among 
energy, foreign policy and national security” as concentric circles, as shown in Figure 
2-4-3-1. The core circle symbolizes the defense against the physical disruption of 
supply. The US economy and society depend on this supply. The second circle shows 
the strategic reserves to guard the domestic market under extreme pressures from 
producers or other disruptions, such as natural disasters. The next circle illustrates the 
use of energy resources to spur development, promote transparency and help resolve 
conflicts. The fourth and last circle suggests using energy as an instrument to promote 
regional foreign policy objectives in producing regions in a way that reinforces - and 
is reinforced by - the other three circles.  
 (Figure 2-4-3-1 about here) 
 This framework of analysis suggests that the US will face four major 
challenges in foreign policy issues related to energy security, which are “building 
alliances, strengthening collective energy security, asserting its interests with energy 
suppliers, and addressing the rise of state control in energy.” (Kalicki and Goldwyn 
2005b, 571) These foreign policy challenges will require solid responses from the US 
government. Kalicki and Goldwyn (2005b) explain the necessary foreign policy 
responses in detail. They determine eight specific foreign policy responses that are 
required to overcome the explained challenges. Due to space constraints not all of 
them can be discussed in detail. I will present the most important two, as they are 
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exactly the foreign policy responses that are analyzed in the three cases of this 
dissertation. 
 The authors suggest the first component of the new foreign policy described is 
“candor and respect” for the producer countries. They argue that US policy makers 
avoid criticizing producer governments for fear of threatening their relations with 
them and therefore put the US’ energy security at risk. The authors claim that the US 
has been too silent on Africa’s kleptocracy, Russia’s trespasses on rule of law, and 
repressive, undemocratic governments in the Middle East. Their suggestion is to 
criticize the producing countries in the international arena and penalize them if 
necessary. This aspect of foreign policy most concerns the Middle East. Most 
governments in the Middle East repress their people and some of them, like Iran, 
threaten the stability in the region. American foreign policy, according to the authors, 
should challenge these kinds of threats.   
 Second, America needs foreign policies that promote the stability and security 
of its suppliers. This second goal is related to the Azerbaijan and Georgia chapters of 
this dissertation. That is, the US should intervene in regional conflicts to provide 
stability and security to the ally suppliers. The three analyzed cases fall into the first 
and second most important foreign policy objectives that US can use. 
 Similarly, the European Union has become concerned with energy security in 
the last five to seven years. The research conducted and funded by the EU 
Commission and the EU Council produced various important documents and studies 
that benefited this dissertation.9 In Study on Energy (2004, 15), the primary result of 
                                                 
9 Such as Study on Energy Supply Security and Geopolitics (2004), Green Paper – Towards a 
European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply: Technical Document (2000), Green Paper: 
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the research is fairly similar to the one described by Kalicki and Goldwyn’s (2005b) 
energy security strategy for the US: “… energy must become an integral part of EU 
external trade and foreign and security policy-making. EU foreign and security policy 
and external trade policy are crucial energy policy tools to achieve future security of 
supply.” 
 Figure 2-4-3-2 and table 2-4-3-3 show that when a producer country or region 
is unstable, the primary tool for the EU is prevention by foreign policy making.  
 (Figure 2-4-3-2 and table 2-4-3-3 about here) 
 Therefore, we can conclude that both streams of literature suggest that energy 
security must be a fundamental part of US and EU foreign policies, and the most 
efficient way to handle threats to the supply chain is the application of proactive 
international policies that prevent instability in energy-rich regions.  
 
2.4.4 A Summary of Theorizing  
Table 2-4-4-1 shows how different theories in the existing energy security literature 
conceptualize the most important variables for providing energy security for a state. 
The neoclassical economic approach asserts that markets are the sole factors shaping 
energy market stability; it also recognizes the domestic and international side of the 
issue and argues state intervention is useless. Policy models are the most useful 
regarding the analysis of political and economic factors in a synthesized way and 
identifying the influence of states and diplomacy. This approach, however, does not 
                                                                                                                                           
Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Supply. European Commission (2000), 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Final Report on 
the Green Paper (2002).  
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incorporate how systemic characteristics of international relations at the time of 
decision-making contribute to policy-making. Regime theorists, on the other hand, 
incorporate domestic and structural realities of foreign policy decision-making, yet, 
cannot incorporate the influence of market actors into the analysis of decision-
making. 
 The literature on transnational resource conflict is most useful in terms of 
defining the nature of the problem; however, their propositions about the behavior of 
great powers, both among themselves and against the developing producer countries, 
did not appear to be valid. Their emphasis on the increased role of non-governmental 
organizations does not reflect the realities of international politics.     
   (Table 2-4-4-1 about here) 
 Alternatively, the literature on the relationship between energy, national 
security and foreign policy incorporates the most important variables that energy 
security research should include, as Table 2-4-4-1 indicates.  
 Still, the problem with this literature lies in its exclusive dependence on case 
studies, personal accounts and policy prescriptions from professionals. That is, these 
studies do not seem to benefit from the advancements regarding foreign policy-
domestic policy connections and analysis in the political science literature. They 
focus on some specific foreign policy goals that they believe the industrialized states 
should pursue. They lack advanced theoretical and methodological analyses. As a 
result, I propose using the expected utility theory of foreign policy and the related 
methods for energy security-related foreign policy analyses. Figure 2-4-4-1 is a 
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symbolic representation of where the eclectic theoretical approach of this project10 
fits in the literature. A more detailed discussion of why I chose to use expected utility 
theory is presented in the following section.  
 (Figure 2-4-4-1 about here) 
 Before dwelling on the expected utility theory and literature, I present the 
assumptions I borrow from the energy security literature discussed above. The 
literature on energy security, albeit its problems, has its strengths that will benefit this 
analysis. They are briefly outlined below.  
Assumption 1: Important externalities exist in the international energy 
markets that create problems for the functioning of the markets without 
intervention. (Cornes and Sandler 1996). 
 
Assumption 2: Government intervention is necessary to mitigate the effects of 
these externalities in the energy markets (Bohi and Toman 1996). 
 
Assumption 3: Foreign policy as a necessary and integral part of the EU’s and 
US’ energy policies must be used proactively to prevent disruptions of the 
entire chain of energy supply (Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005a and 2005b). 
 
Assumption 4: Until 2020, there will not be physical shortages of oil and gas 
in the global energy markets; any disruption will arise from political problems 
for trade, production and investment in oil and gas industries (Study on 
Energy 2004).  
 
Assumption 5: In the next twenty years, it will not be possible for the US and 
EU to replace the existing energy trade and security links with Middle Eastern 
producing nations (Kalicki and Goldwyn (2005a). 
 
Assumption 6: Russia and the Caspian regions can provide Western 
economies with supply diversity. Thus the US and EU should prevent political 
turmoil in the region by proactive foreign policy (Nanay 2005, Study on 
Energy 2004).   
 
 
                                                 
10 I.e. a combination of various axioms from the energy security, foreign policy analysis and expected 
utility literatures.   
 36
2.5 An Expected Utility Theory of Energy Security 
2.5.1 Game Theory and the Expected Utility Model 
This literature review was guided by one major question: Can one theory incorporate 
all of the important factors, i.e. political actors, economic actors, and the international 
system, that shape the energy security policies of nations and explain the influence of 
both domestic and systemic pressures on policy-makers? Another important question 
is whether a theory and its methodological approach can explain the participation of 
different actors in decision-making processes accurately and be employed to answer 
questions such as ‘What groups of society influence certain policies to what degree?’. 
I suggest an expected utility approach to energy security issues to provide this project 
with tools that can help overcome some of the difficulties that the previous 
approaches have faced.11  
 The expected utility theory was being developed to explain decision making 
processes under uncertain conditions. The most basic hypothesis suggests that the 
expected utility of an actor facing a decision under uncertain conditions is the utility 
in each state discounted by the actor’s estimate of the probability of each state. 
Developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), this theory has been 
extensively used by social scientists studying human behavior under uncertainty.  
 In international relations literature, game theoretic analysis begins with 
Thomas Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict (1960). Since then, studies using this 
type of reasoning have burgeoned and contributed to the international relations 
                                                 
11 Game theory is a theory of interdependent decisions and based on the expected utility theory. Both 
theories are parts of a broader approach called rational choice theory and more an elaboration of 
applied mathematics than a type of economic analysis (Booth et al. 1993).  
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literature (Nicholson 2002). A minuscule sample of the important works from this 
literature includes Ellsberg (1963), Russett (1963), Bueno de Mesquita (1983 and 
1985), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Martin (1992) and Brams (1994). 
 There are various benefits of using this approach. The strategic approach 
“coupled with its explicit logic, transparency in assumptions, and reasoning and 
propositions has led to substantial progress in knowledge.” Most importantly, using 
game-theoretic approaches to international problems increased our understanding of 
substantive issues such as deterrence, alliance formation, international cooperation 
and economic sanctions, democratic peace and conflict initiation, escalation and 
termination (Bueno de Mesquita 2002, 382).   
 Likewise, a handful of international relations theories used a combination of 
game theory and expected utility theory. One of the pioneers of this literature is Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita. In War Trap (1983), he develops a marginal utility theory of 
initiating wars. His works in this particular field of study include Forecasting 
Political Events: The Future of Hong Kong (1985); European Community Decision 
Making: Models, Applications, and Comparisons (1994); and Predicting Politics 
(2002). Bueno de Mesquita uses the expected utility model (EUM) to forecast the 
future of various international issues, ranging from the Chinese control over Hong 
Kong to prospects for democratization of Russia and the bargaining on taxing 
emissions in the EU.  
 The EUM has become more accepted among international relations scholars 
in the last decade, as its predictive power is supported by empirical evidence. In a 
special edition of International Interactions, edited by Kugler and Feng (1997), the 
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model was used by leading international relations scholars on issues such as Russian 
political succession (Abdollahian and Kugler 1997), Quebec’s economic and political 
future (James and Lusztig 1997), NAFTA’s approval and implementation (Fuchs, 
Kugler and Pachon 1997), economic reform in China (Feng 1997), the status of 
Jerusalem (Organski and Lust-Okar 1997), and the settlement in Bosnia (Friedman 
and Gizelis1997).  
 This approach (i.e. the conflict approach to IR) has also proved to be more 
successful in making accurate predictions than some other approaches (e.g. Frans 
Stokman’s cooperation approach) in explaining the European Community’s decision-
making procedures (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994). There has been a 
growing interest in applying this model to the EU’s legislative decision-making that 
was articulated in European Union Politics journal’s special issue edited by Stokman 
and Thomson (2004). The conclusion of the volume suggests that the overall testing 
of the models has shown that bargaining models (i.e. Bueno de Mesquita’s conflict 
and Stokman’s cooperation models) do much better than procedural models in 
generating accurate predictions of EU policy outcomes (Stokman and Thomson 
2004).  
 Due to its proven success in making predictions in the literature, to analyze 
the energy security policies of the EU and US, I take the perspective outlined by 
Bueno de Mesquita in European Community Decision Making (1994) and Predicting 
Politics (2002) that individual decision-makers consider domestic and international 
repercussions they can expect to follow from their actions. This approach to 
understanding future policy decisions implies “ to identify tools that shed light on 
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individual incentives and on strategic maneuvers designed to alter or operate within 
those incentives, taking institutional constraints into account as appropriate” (Bueno 
de Mesquita 2002, 8). The theory states that the international system is shaped by the 
actors who act strategically in their relations to each other. The advantage of using 
this approach is that it allows taking into account both the domestic factors (e.g. 
political or economic actors, firms, public opinion, business and interest groups) and 
systemic pressures (e.g. bipolarity and multipolarity, a balance of power or 
preponderance of power in the hands of few, liberal or authoritarian rules and norms) 
that decision makers face in everyday foreign policy-making.  
 This approach also offers other advantages in analyzing energy security 
policies of nations or supranational bodies, such as the EU. It allows the researcher to 
test counterfactual views of foreign policy making. In future research, an expanded 
version of this dissertation will test alternative rational strategic paths and alternative 
systemic scenarios to predict under what conditions the EU or US can secure their 
energy supplies. By using the EUM, for example, I will be able to make predictions 
about the EU’s energy security under multilateralist and unilateralist systemic 
possibilities. Second, game theory is specifically designed to address the logic of 
strategic action. That is, it captures the essence of international relations in which the 
actors take into account how other parties will respond to their actions. 
Interdependencies between states, events, individual choices and strategic 
maneuvering are the characteristics of energy security issues, as well as many other 
foreign policy decisions. Therefore, this theory is particularly well-fit to the subject 
matter at hand. Lastly, the literature shows that game-theoretic analyses have enjoyed 
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considerable success in the areas of explanation and prediction (Ray and Russett 
1996; Bueno de Mesquita 2002).   
 
2.5.2 Theoretical Foundations of the Model  
 The model uses Black’s (1958) median voter theorem and Bank’s (1990) 
theorem of the monotonicity between certain expectations in asymmetric information 
games (where a player has some information other players do not have) and the 
escalation of political disputes (Bueno de Mesquita 2002). These theorems are the 
fundamentals of the quasi-dynamic political model Bueno de Mesquita developed. 
They also facilitate the analysis of the players’ decisions, such as compromise, 
bargain, exercising power or compel.  
 The median voter theorem suggests that in a majority voting system, the 
parties will converge to the views of the median voter in a given political continuum. 
It is assumed that the issues are uni-dimensional and the farther the outcome is from 
one’s preferred position, the preferences for that outcome will steadily diminish for 
that player. Although many political activities do not involve voting, Bueno de 
Mesquita (2002) suggests that the exercise of power by mobilizing political influence 
is the nonvoting analogue of voting. Bueno de Mesquita’s model adds another 
assumption to the median voter theorem. Black assumed that everyone is free to vote 
and that they do so according to their preferences. However, in Bueno de Mesquita’s 
model, decisions can be ‘coerced’, which makes perfect sense when the nature of the 
international relations is concerned. This means the actors can be compelled or 
compel others and thus, can shift the median voter outcome. Even without being 
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compelled, the players can shift their positions to reach a deal (Bueno de Mesquita 
2002). 
 The second basis of the model is derived from Bank’s (1990) monotonicity 
theorem. It provides an understanding of what kinds of debates are expected to 
produce negotiated settlements and what is expected to lead to more conflicts in the 
negotiations. The basic premise of the monotonicity theorem entails that in any 
asymmetric information game, the more a player expects to gain from challenging a 
rival perspective, the more likely is he to undertake the challenge (Bueno de Mesquita 
2002). By including this assumption, the model gains an advantage of accounting for 
the coerced decisions in spatial analysis.  
 The model combines the insights of the median voter and monotonicity 
theorems and allows estimating and simulating the perceptions and expectations of 
decision makers. The forecaster software creates a game in which actors make 
proposals to each other in order to influence the others’ policy choices. The expected 
utility calculations of the players give the analyst insights about whether the 
negotiations will continue, and if so in what direction and at what point the 
negotiations will end with what kind of outcome. 
 
2.5.3 Assumptions of the Expected Utility Model   
Some basic assumptions of the model need to be mentioned at this point. The model 
assumes that the policy makers try to maximize their expected utility with regards to 
both policy and personal satisfaction. That is, the policy maker chooses between an 
alternative policy and personal outcomes. Bueno de Mesquita (2003) asserts that there 
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is a trade-off between policy and personal outcomes for a leader. Changing a policy 
position to make a deal with an adversary, for instance, might bring satisfactory 
political outcomes, such as the gains from the positive public image as a deal maker; 
however, the same move can also bring lower personal gains, i.e. the leader’s support 
from his constituency can decrease due to the concessions given to the rivals to reach 
the deal. The actors in the game try to maximize their utility with respect to policy 
and personal satisfaction.  
Another assumption is that the players’ information consists of what the player knows 
about the preceding round and expects to happen next. The negotiation rounds run 
until it is calculated that the cost of continuing negotiations exceeds the anticipated 
benefit. At this point, the simulation ends. The predicted policy outcome is the 
position of the median voter in the last round of the negotiations. However, if there 
are veto players in the game, the outcome is the position of the veto player in the last 
round. The model does not always predict an agreement: If the players do not 
converge on an issue, the outcome does not provide an agreement.  
 
2.5.4 Limitations  
 The model has limitations as well as strengths. One limitation arises from its 
imprecision in predicting the exact timing of the decisions made. Another problem is 
that there is no ‘objective’ data for many of the issues at hand. Because of that, the 
knowledge of experts about the issues of concern is required (Bueno de Mesquita 
2002). Lastly, creating a model to predict complex political events requires 
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simplification. This does not mean the model is not rigorous; however, it should be 
noted that such a model cannot be built without such a simplifying effort. 
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Figure 2-1 Energy Security Theories (from strictly economic to decision making 
oriented)
Neoclassical Economics 
Public Choice/Economics 
Bureaucratic/Political Model 
Public Administration Literature 
Regime Theory 
Resource Conflict Literature 
Foreign Policy/Security Literature 
Expected Utility Theory of Foreign Policy 
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Table 2-4-3-3 The European Union’s energy security risks and policy    
                        responses  
 
 
Risk Policy Tools 
Country or Region Stable Prevention 
Country or Region uncertain Prevention 
Containment 
Deterrence 
Country or region turmoil Containment  
Crisis Management 
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           Key Variable(s)           Policy Implications 
 
Table 2-4-4-1 Theoretical and policy implications of three models. (Policy 
implications part is adapted from Wilson (1987)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Markets 
Political 
Processes, 
Elite decision 
making, 
Domestic 
actors. 
Structural
Foreign 
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c Issue 
Influence
(of states) Tools 
Neoclassical 
Economics Yes No No 
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Regime Theory No Yes Yes Foreign policy 
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non-oil 
Policy/Political 
Model Limited Yes No Both 
Potentiall
y large 
Diplomacy, 
persuasion 
Resource 
Conflict Lit. Yes Yes 
Depends 
on study Both 
Potentiall
y Large 
Variety, 
international 
cooperation 
emphasized 
Foreign Policy 
Energy Sec. 
Connection 
Lit. 
Yes Yes Yes Both Potentially Large 
Variety, 
mainly 
foreign 
policy 
Strategic 
Approach 
(EUM) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Both; 
more 
foreign 
Large Various 
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Figure 2-4-4-1 Figurative Representation of the Theory in the Literature 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN CHAPTER 
 
 
 
Plan of the Chapter  
 
This chapter begins with an account of the dynamics of the expected utility model 
(EUM), and is followed by a discussion of three variables employed by it. The third 
part presents the methodology used. Then, measurement and data, preparation of the 
questionnaire, inter-coder reliability and the software programs employed are 
addressed.  
 
3.1 The Model  
The model used to analyze the three important international conflicts that have the 
potential to threaten the EU and US’s energy security was developed by Bruce Bueno 
de Mesquita (1994, 2002 and 2003). This model, sometimes also referred to as the 
Expected Utility Model (EUM), can be described as a dynamic median voter model 
with coercion. It is an example of applied modeling designed to analyze real world 
foreign policy bargaining processes (Bueno de Mesquita 2002).  
 As discussed in the theory section, this model is based on Black’s (1960) 
median voter theorem and Bank’s (1990) monotonicty theorem on expectations and 
conflict escalation. It forecasts an expected outcome of a policy issue (usually a 
foreign policy issue) “as a function of competition, confrontation, cooperation and 
negotiation” (Kugler and Feng 1997, 233). The editors of a special volume of 
International Interactions dedicated to the expected utility model suggest that it is a 
robust tool for policy analysis. The model is able to delineate possible solutions that 
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the actors are not aware of by providing the researcher with alternative paths of 
strategic action that can produce different resolutions of the issue at hand (Kugler and 
Feng 1997). The model is also used in academic fields of political science, economics 
and sociology because of its axiomatic foundations and rigorous specifications of the 
various dimensions of the issue.  
 The expected utility model has also been a confirmed success in both 
interstate bargaining issues and EU legislative processes. Bueno de Mesquita and 
Stokman (1994), in European Community Decision Making (1994), employ Bueno de 
Mesquita’s expected utility model (confrontation model) and Stokman’s logrolling 
model (position exchange model) to analyze European Community policy decisions. 
The overall conclusion of the volume is that the EUM performed better in terms of 
explaining and predicting the EC decisions. Also, Bueno de Mesquita’s model is 
reported to produce accurate results in 90% of the interstate bargaining situations it 
analyzed (Bueno de Mesquita 2002). Therefore, this study will use the EUM for the 
analysis of the three conflicts that concern the EU and US’s energy security.   
 The model defines policy choices as a product of competition between 
political actors who make policy decisions. In this sense it is a non-cooperative game. 
The game is constructed in such a way that different actors suggest diverse policy 
proposals to each other to induce support – or opposition - from other players. 
Sometimes the actors are powerful enough to make credible proposals and to change 
other players’ positions, sometimes they are not. In such cases the cost of trying to 
change the others’ position may be very costly. It is assumed that the actors, in each 
round of bargaining, make expected utility calculations.  
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 According to the model’s logic, the bargaining rounds continue as long as the 
players think continuing negotiations is better – or less costly - than giving up. If a 
player encounters a situation in which continuing negotiations will generate more 
costly results, maintaining the status-quo appears to be a better alternative than 
making more proposals to change the other actors’ positions. While engaging in 
bargaining, there are two basic factors that affect decision makers: estimates of the 
expected utility to be gained from choosing (a) alternative policy proposals, and (b) 
the policy satisfaction to be gained from making such a deal plus the personal cost of 
such a political move to the leader as the leaders calculate how reaching such an 
agreement will affect their reelection or staying in power. Their decision about 
maintaining the status-quo, or making further policy proposals results in predictable 
policy decisions for the issues in question or in failure to reach an agreement (Bueno 
de Mesquita 2003). 
 
3.2 The Three Variables: Capabilities, Policy Position, Salience   
 The model is a game in which the actors simultaneously make policy 
proposals to each other to influence the others’ decision. Proposals are different 
points on the policy continuum. Players evaluate other policy proposals and they are 
assumed to create coalitions by shifting positions on the issue in question. The 
analysis is carried out by evaluating each round that players are engaged in. The 
rounds are played sequentially until the issue is resolved, i.e. a player or players shift 
position, make a deal etc.- or maintaining negotiations becomes more costly than the 
benefits one can achieve. In each game, each player knows three factors: (1) the 
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potential influence (capabilities) of each actor on the issue examined; (2) the current 
stated policy position of each actor on each issue examined; and (3) the salience each 
actor associates with the issues in question. The actors do not know what each actor 
associates with alternative outcomes or their perception of risks and opportunities. As 
in many international relations games, each actor has his own perceptions about the 
other actors and makes his moves based on these perceptions, sometimes in error 
(Bueno de Mesquita 2003).  
 A player’s potential influence (capabilities) on the issue depends on how 
much power and resources this actor can allow on the issue concerned. If the actors 
are nation states, for instance, the power or potential influence of the country on the 
issue might not include all of the resources the country has available. It is rather the 
pool of resources that a country can allocate to the specific issue. However, if the 
issue is related to an international crisis that can lead to a full scale war, then all the 
resources of the country might reflect that country’s potential influence.  
 Second, the current stated policy position represents the actors’ chosen 
position between policy satisfaction and personal security for that actor. Therefore, it 
is not the best or most preferred position for the actor nor is it the outcome that the 
policy maker expects to achieve. Third, the salience scores show how important the 
issue is to the actor. In other words, the players decide how to distribute resources 
across issues according to their preference (Bueno de Mesquita 2003).  
 The current policy statement represents the actor’s position on a given 
continuum about a policy issue. This continuum can be defined in several ways. One 
way would be a continuum of zero to one hundred. The value of one hundred 
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represents full commitment, zero a total disapproval, and fifty a neutral position about 
the issue. The capabilities, or the potential influence of an actor in the game, can be 
measured in different ways: Objective measures like GDP, armed forces personnel, or 
steel production can be employed; or the indicator can take on a range from zero to 
hundred, which only reflects the relative political influence of the actors on a given 
issue. 
 The salience score indicates how important the particular issue is for the actor 
compared to other issues. Bueno de Mesquita (2003) suggests that assigning high 
values of 90-100 for the salience indicates an issue is of utmost importance; 50-60 
would mean the issue is one of the several important ones, and 10-20 stands for an 
issue of minor importance to the actor.1  
 The forecaster program requires these three values to be defined for each actor 
in order to run an analysis. Bueno de Mesquita (2002 and 2003) suggests drawing on 
the knowledge of area experts to determine the values.  
 
3.3 Methodology  
 
 The expected utility theory developed by Bueno de Mesquita (1985, 1997 and 
2002) uses formal modeling as a methodological approach. The software used to 
analyze the cases makes complex calculations about: 1. “votes”2 cast by each actor in 
comparison of alternative policy proposals in each game; 2. the aggregate “votes” 
comparison between two alternative policy proposals; 3. expected utilities of each 
                                                 
1 Operationalization of the three variables is discussed in detail in Appendix 1, which contains the 
comprehensive explanation of how to assign values to the three variables. This document was sent to 
the coders to facilitate their understanding of the variables and increase reliability of the coding.  
2 I use quotation marks when I use the word “votes” because in international bargaining, most of the 
time there are no actual votes –unless the voting is held in an organization such as the UN. In this text, 
“votes” are used to describe an exercise of power by mobilizing resources, which is a non-voting 
analogue of votes in political interaction (Bueno de Mesquita 1997).  
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actor based on their perceptions of challenging or not challenging alternative 
proposals; 4. a general estimation of the model based on the subjective probability of 
success for each actor i in comparison with j’s proposal.  
 A comprehensive explanation for all equations that the model employs is a 
vast undertaking, beyond the scope of this exposition. Due to space constraints, I refer 
the interested reader to Bueno de Mesquita (1985, 1997 and 2002) for detailed 
accounts of the calculations of the model. However, I will elaborate on the two key 
equations in order to provide an idea of how the “votes” are calculated. This is very 
important because all other calculations are based on the “votes” cast by the actors.  
 When alternative proposals are pitted against each other,3 each group of has a 
total number of potential “votes” equal to its capabilities. So the “votes” cast by an 
actor i in comparison of alternatives xj and xk equal to:  
 
 (vjkia│xj, xk) = (ci) (si) (uixj-uixk)    
 (1) 
 
 So, the vote or influence mobilized by actor i in comparison between two 
alternatives (xj and xk) is equal to the potential capabilities of the actor i [i.e. (ci)], 
discounted by the salience the actor i attach to the issue [i.e. (si)] and by how much 
actor i prefers one proposal to the alternative [i.e. (uixj-uixk)].  
 The expectation that a proposal will succeed is assumed to depend on how 
much support that proposal can garner from the actors in comparison with other 
                                                 
3 For example, take the issue in Chapter four. Alternative proposals on Iranian nuclear program are: 1. 
Pro-Iranian position (continue enriching uranium); 2. Moderate, Russian, position; 3. IAEA position 
and 4. Israeli position.  
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proposals. The model calculates this as sum of “votes” across all actors in an 
evaluation between xj and xk. This equals to: 
  n 
 vjk = Σ vjk        
 (2) 
        i=1 
 
 If this summation is greater than zero, one can infer that xj defeats xk because 
the coalition for xj is more powerful and motivated than the coalition for the xk 
proposal. If it is less than zero, then xk is likely to defeat xj. If the summation equals 
zero, then stakeholders’ “interests are collectively indifferent between the two 
alternatives” (Bueno de Mesquita 1997: 240).  
 
3.4 Measurement and Data 
 
 There are a small number of dissertation theses that have used similar or 
identical theory and methods. I have examined one that was supervised by Frans N. 
Stokman of the University of Groningen. Javier Arregui’s dissertation, Negotiation in 
Legislative Decision-Making in the European Union (2004),4 is used as a model for 
research design purposes.  
 The next section will discuss case selection, selection of the area experts, 
specification of the actors involved, and the operationalization of the three variables.  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Arregui’s dissertation was supervised by Frans Stokman and Robert R. Thomson and read by Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita. I have chosen this dissertation’s research design section as a model since it was 
guided by the developers and promoters of this research agenda.  
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3.4.1 Selection of the issues  
 
 Three cases that examined in this dissertation. These are the Iranian nuclear 
program, the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and 
the Georgia-Russia conflict over the South Ossetia region of Georgia. My case 
selection depends on two criteria that are strictly related to the energy security 
policies of the EU and US. These are: 1) The volume of a disruption to the supply of 
energy, and 2) The influence of the crises on diversity of supply. That is, the 
economies of the EU and US will be most harmed if: 1) political factors (such as 
domestic turmoil or interstate war) disrupt a producer country with a substantial 
volume of supply to the global energy markets, 2) political factors disrupt the 
production and transportation of energy resources that provide diversity of supply to 
the EU and US.  
 Iran has the second largest oil and gas reserves in the world. Iran was the 
fourth largest producer of oil and sixth largest producer of natural gas in the world in 
2005. It is also the second largest oil producer in OPEC, with an output of 4 mbbl/d5 
(BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006). Its current oil production is estimated 
to be the fourth largest in the world, with more than 4 mbbl/d or about 5 percent of 
total global daily production. Given the scarcity of spare capacity in the global oil 
markets, which is estimated to be only one and a half mbbl/d, a disruption in Iran’s 
supply can cause extreme reactions in the markets and are discussed in chapter 4. 
Since the other three larger producers –Saudi Arabia, Russia and the US- are 
relatively more stable, Iran is the least stable country among the largest oil and gas 
producers.  
                                                 
5 Million barrels per day. 
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 About 90 years ago Winston Churchill said that the key to oil supply security 
is diversity and diversity alone (Yergin 2005). The most relevant criterion for energy 
security of the EU and US is the diversity of the supply. As will be discussed in 
chapters 5 and 6, Caspian energy developments are perceived as a great opportunity 
for the EU and US to diversify their energy supplies. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
pipeline -which will carry Azeri oil from the Caspian to the Southern Turkish port of 
Ceyhan- is hoped to provide one of the few diversity options that passes through 
countries that are relatively ‘friendly’ to the EU and US, i.e. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Turkey. Any political instability in the region that the pipeline passes through is a 
security risk and should be prevented by diplomacy and military means. The southern 
Caucasus is such a problematic region: there are seven conflict regions around the 
BTC pipeline. I have selected the two political conflicts, Nagorno-Karabakh and 
South Ossetia, which are geographically closest to the BTC pipeline, 15 km and 55 
km respectively.  
 The three issue questions that were asked to the area experts in the 
questionnaires are as follows:   
 Issue 1: What are the attitudes of stakeholders toward Iran’s uranium 
enrichment?  
 Issue 2: What are the attitudes of stakeholders toward autonomy in Nagorno-
 Karabakh?  
 
 Issue 3: What are the attitudes of stakeholders toward autonomy in South 
 Ossetia?  
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3.4.2 Selection of the area experts  
 
The model’s calculations and the accuracy of its predictions depend on the area 
experts’ knowledge and the reliability of their coding. Expert estimations and coding 
for this model are generally regarded as authoritative and solid (Bueno de Mesquita 
2003). These experts are the primary source of information on the issues at hand since 
they have studied these countries and the political conflicts they are involved in for a 
long time. That is, they possess first hand information on the relative policy positions 
of the actors involved in bargaining, the salience they attach to the issues and their 
capabilities relative to each other (Arregui 2004).  
 The first area expert who coded data for this project is Dr. Mark Gasiorowski 
from the Louisiana State University. Dr. Gasiorowski has studied Iran for about 25 
years. He is one of the leading experts on Iran and has written various books and 
articles on the country. He served as a consultant for the US government on Iran6 and 
he has taught at the Tehran University.  Dr. Gasiorowski coded the three variables 
that the EUM uses on the Iranian Nuclear Program issue.  
 The second expert that coded data is Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever of the Middle 
East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey. He received his PhD from the School 
of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London. His research interests 
are Russian politics and foreign policy, regional politics in the Caucasus,  
state-building and nation-building in the Post-Soviet space, and the politics of 
nationalism and ethnicity. Combined with his various publications on the Caucasus 
                                                 
6 Statement of Mark Gasiorowski to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States: “Iranian Support for Terrorism”. July 9, 2003 
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region, Dr. Tanrısever’s knowledge on the region made him an excellent choice of 
area expert for the Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia issues.  
 Finally, Balkan Devlen, a graduate student in the Department of Political 
Science at the University of Missouri-Columbia coded the three issues for inter-coder 
reliability concerns. Mr. Devlen specializes in foreign policy analysis and his area 
focuses are the Balkans and the Eurasia region.  
 I have evaluated each expert’s coding. All three codings were in line with 
what I have studied about the region. Also, the experts were contacted whenever 
necessary to support their numerical assignments of values with qualitative 
arguments. That is, after they completed the coding, they were asked various 
questions such as: Why they include actor A but not actor B? Why actor C’s position 
is different from its stated position? Why did actor A, B and C perceive the issue as 
more important than the others?  
  
3.4.3 Specifying actors involved in the bargaining 
 
After selecting the cases, I conducted extensive research on the conflicts at hand. 
Grounded in this research, I identified all the relevant actors that might have a stake 
in the issue. These actors were included in the questionnaire. However, since the area 
experts are the ones who have the final say on coding, they were given the following 
instruction in the questionnaire:  
To facilitate the coding processes, I have included the 
following actors who might have a stake in the bargaining 
processes. Please feel free to add and subtract actors. For 
example if any actor below have no relevance, please simply 
delete it, or leave data cells blank for the actor. 
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 To give a couple of examples, Dr. Gasiorowski subtracted some actors 
such as the former Iranian President Khatemi because he has no effective 
influence on the issue anymore. Another example was that Mr. Devlen chose 
to exclude British Petroleum as an actor from the bargaining in the coding on 
Nagorno-Karabakh issue on the grounds that the company’s position is 
already represented by United States.  
 
 
3.4.4 Definition and operationalization of the variables  
 
Definitions of the variables have been made in section 3.2. A thorough account of 
what exactly these variables measure and how they were coded are explained in 
Appendix 1, “Operationalization of the Variables.”7 To avoid repetition, details of the 
definitions and operationalization of the variables will not be discussed here. I refer 
the interested reader to section 3.2 and Appendix 1. In the next section of the chapter, 
I will provide some particular information regarding the specification of the positions, 
salience, and capabilities of the actors.   
 
3.4.4.1 Specifying policy positions 
 
The accurate predictions by the expected utility model depend on pinpointing the 
positions of the actors relative to each other at the time the coding was carried out. 
Therefore, the area experts were asked to code the “present” bargaining positions of 
the actors at the time of coding. Hence, the values assigned to the three variables 
represent the actors’ position on the last week of December 2005. 
                                                 
7 The experts received this document with the questionnaires.  
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 The area experts were asked to code policy position on a continuum from 0 to 
100 by considering the bargaining stance of the actor that does not necessarily 
represent that actor’s preferred position. In some cases, the coder stated some actors 
that look like being involved in the bargaining have little or no interest or preference 
on the issue. These actors were excluded from the analysis.  
 In some cases, the expert coded policy position and salience for the actor but 
(0) for the capabilities value. In these cases, those actors were also excluded from the 
analysis because mathematically their “vote” is nil. Dr. Gasiorowski coded (0) for the 
power of Turkey, Iranian Guard Council and Revolutionary Guard. These actors were 
excluded from the analysis.  
 Another point about the coding is that among two or more actors who share 
the same policy position and capabilities, only one of them is included in the analysis 
so as not to inflate their influence on the bargaining. To give an example, Ali Larijani 
is the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran. He is one of the 
two representatives of Supreme Leader Khamanei on the Council and also the chief 
negotiator on the Iranian nuclear program issue. Larjani represents the Iranian 
Supreme Leader’s view on the issue and has no effective capabilities and his policy 
position is the same as that of the Supreme Leader. Hence, in order not to inflate the 
Supreme Leader’s position, Ali Larijani was excluded from the analysis as an actor 
even though he is actively engaged in the bargaining process.  
 
3.4.4.2 Specifying salience 
 
Area experts were asked to code the level of importance that each actor associates 
with the issue. The coders were informed that the salience variable can have two 
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meanings (Arregui 2004). First, it is the share of total political influence that the actor 
prefers to apply on the issue. Second, “salience can be viewed as the extent to which 
actors experience utility loss from the policy outcomes that differ from the decision 
outcomes to which they give preference. When actors attach a high level of salience 
to the issue, they are considerably sensitive to small deviations from their most 
preferred policy alternatives” (Arregui 2004, 20). 
 The experts were asked to code salience for each actor on a continuum from 
(0) to (100). A salience score of (0) means no importance to the actor while (100) 
means utmost importance. A score of (50) means the issue is one of several important 
issues. A more detailed explanation of the salience score scale can be found in 
Appendix 1.  
 As noted earlier, the coders were asked to justify their numeric estimations 
with qualitative arguments.   
 
3.4.4.3 Specifying capabilities  
 
There are two ways to measure the relative capabilities of actors in the game. First, 
one could use the objective power measures from the Correlates of War (COW)8 
National Material Capabilities (v3.02) dataset (Singer et al. 1972) or the Shapley and 
Shubik Index for the EU’s capabilities. The problem with using this kind of data is 
that it only contains the capabilities of nation states. The expected utility model, 
however, is capable of including many other types of actors that are involved in the 
bargaining processes. For example, different political actors in a polity can be divided 
on an international policy issue. For example, during the Kosovo air campaign in 
                                                 
8 Correlates of War project was established by David Singer in 1963 to accumulate systematic 
scientific knowledge about wars.  
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1999, President Clinton and the Congress were divided on the issue. A study that 
focuses on the future of Kosovo coded President Clinton and Congress separately 
(Bueno de Mesquita 1999). Datasets like COW does not contain capability variables 
for non-state actors.  
 Therefore I had to rely on the second method of measuring power that 
Stokman (1994 and 2004) reported to be highly dependable. That is, the area experts 
were asked to code the relative capabilities of actors involved in bargaining on a 
continuum from (0) to (100). In fact, coding the capabilities of actors based on expert 
judgment can be even more reliable in some cases where informal resources that 
actors have and use (such as intelligence, efficiency, experienced bureaucracy, 
financial resources or access to other resources) play a role (Arregui 2004).   
 After the coding was completed, the experts were asked to justify their 
decisions qualitatively.  
 
3.5 Questionnaires  
The questionnaires that area experts received are based on the instructions and 
explanations stated in James and Lusztig (1997), Stokman and Thomson (2004) and 
Arregui (2004).  
 The questionnaires consisted of two major parts. The first part includes a 
synopsis of the issue at hand as well as the stated positions of the actors. The second 
part begins with the statement of the issue question. This is followed by three steps 
that the coders followed to complete the coding. In Step 1, the coder was asked to fill 
in the policy position scale where specific positions on the policy continuum and their 
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meanings are stated. In Step 2, the coders were asked to identify all the actors 
involved in the bargaining processes. In Step 3, the experts were asked to assign 
numeric values, ranging from (0) to (100), for the three variables in each actor’s row. 
In each questionnaire, the experts were specifically reminded of the following: 
“Please note there may be more than one actor with resources, salience and position 
equal to 100.”  
 Questionnaires for the three issues can be found in Appendix 2.  
 
3.6 Reliability  
 
For inter-coder reliability purposes, a University of Missouri-Columbia Department 
of Political Science graduate student, Balkan Devlen was asked to provide coding for 
the three issues. Mr. Devlen’s coding was run with the online software. The results 
did not differ from the simulations conducted with the data from the two senior area 
experts. That is, the simulations run with the data coded by Mr. Devlen produced the 
same results that are pro-Iranian (i.e. Chapter 4), pro-Azeri and pro-American (i.e. 
Chapter 5) and pro-Russian (i.e. Chapter 6).  
 
3.7 Software Programs Used  
 
The expected utility software is copyrighted. The data for the analysis was run by Dr. 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita in January 2006. Output files were sent to me that same 
month. All other texts, tables, figures and graphics were produced and calculations 
were made with Microsoft Office Word 2003, Microsoft Office Excel 2003 and 
Microsoft Office Access 2003 database programs.  
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CHAPTER 4 
IRAN AND GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY 
 
 
Plan of the Chapter  
This chapter analyzes the future of Iranian nuclear crisis and its effects on 
international energy markets. Section one presents a brief discussion of why Iran is 
important for energy markets stability. Section two discusses the history of the 
conflict and the EU’s diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis in 2005. Section three 
includes information about the expert generated data, presents a discussion of 
positions of the actors on the issue, power distribution among the actors and statistical 
information about the simulations. Section four presents a discussion of the results, 
position shifts of the major actors during the simulation and perception and stability 
analysis of the simulation. Section five discusses the future of the conflict based on 
the simulation and analysis in this chapter.  
4.1 Introduction 
Iran’s vast oil and gas resources are very important for the security of the 
energy supply to the EU and the rest of the world. Two reasons that make Iran’s role 
so vital for global energy security: the volume of its resources and production, and its 
geographical position in the center of energy transport routes.  
Iran holds the second largest oil reserves (after Saudi Arabia with 11.4% of 
total), as well as gas reserves (after Russia with 15.2% of total) in the world. In 2003, 
Iran was the fifth largest producer of oil and sixth of natural gas in the world (BP 
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Statistical Review of World Energy 2003). It also is the second largest oil producer in 
OPEC with an output quota of 3.18 mbbl/d (million barrels per day) (Study on 
Energy Supply, 2004). Its current production is estimated to be at 3.8 mbbl/d (about 
5% of the world production). and there is more oil and gas potential that has not been 
revealed. 
Second, many see Iran as the most attractive route for the Caspian oil and gas. 
It also has the potential to supply oil and gas to the Central and Eastern Asian 
countries. It even controls the Hormuz Strait and thus the transportation route for a 
substantial amount of Middle Eastern oil resources.  
Using force or imposing sanctions can seriously threaten global oil and gas 
prices. According to a recent study by the Center for Global Energy Studies, crude oil 
prices could hit 100 dollars per barrel if sanctions are imposed on Iran due to tight 
demand-supply balance in the oil markets (Tait 2006). Another study does not rule 
out prices as high as 130 dollar per barrel in the case of sanctions against Iran (Isidore 
2006). Being aware of these circumstances, some Iranian clerics recently threatened 
to use the oil weapon should the UNSC sanction Iraq.   
 
4.2 Background  
4.2.1 Early History of the Iranian Quest for Nuclear Energy  
Iran’s pursuit for gaining nuclear capability goes as far back as to the 1960s. In fact, 
the United States was the first country to help Iran gain nuclear technology. It 
supplied a 5-megawatt research reactor to Iran that began operation in 1967. Iran 
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signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratified it in 1970 
(IAEA 2006).   
 The Iranian nuclear program was ambitious since its beginning. Oil prices 
soared especially after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, which allowed the Iranian 
government to invest more in nuclear energy development. By the mid-1970s, Iran 
aimed to reach a capacity of producing 23,000 megawatts of electrical power in the 
following two decades (Benedict 2005). 
Under Shah Muhammed Pahlavi’s administration, the Iranian government 
made deals with German and French contractors. Kraftwerk Union (a subsidiary of 
Siemens) of Germany agreed to build two 1,200 megawatt nuclear reactors at 
Bushehr, and a French company agreed to supply two 900 megawatt reactors. The 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) also signed a contract with the Atomic 
Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) to train the first cadre of Iranian nuclear 
scientists in 1975. The domestic nuclear cycle of Iran included an advanced nuclear 
research center and advancement of research to develop uranium mining and ore 
processing (Sahimi 2003).  
The United States also supported Iran’s plans for building a nuclear energy 
capacity. According to declassified confidential US government documents1, the 
Shah’s government planned to purchase eight nuclear reactors from the US for 
electricity generating purposes. In July 1978, only seven months before the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, the final draft of the US-Iranian Nuclear Energy Agreement was 
                                                 
1 National Security Study Memorandum 219, US-Iran Agreement on Cooperation in Civil Uses of 
Atomic Energy (March 14, 1975); National Security Decision Memorandum 292, US-Iran Nuclear 
Cooperation (April 22, 1975); National Security Decision Memorandum 324, Negotiation of a Nuclear 
Agreement with Iran (April 20, 1976); National Security Study Memorandum 238, U.S Policy Toward 
the Persian Gulf (February 13, 1976).  
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signed. This agreement was designed to facilitate Iranian-American nuclear 
cooperation that included Iran’s purchase of equipment and material from the US and 
acquiring help to search for uranium deposits (Sahimi 2003).  
The political upheaval preceding and following the Islamic revolution gave a 
halt to the Iranian nuclear program. By 1979, a nuclear reactor, Bushehr 1, was 90% 
complete and 60% of its equipment was installed; Bushehr 2 was 50% complete. The 
first prime minister after the revolution, Mehdi Bazargan, concluded Iran did not need 
nuclear energy and discontinued the project at Bushehr (Sahimi 2003). It did not seem 
likely that the German firm would continue completing the site, even if PM Bazargan 
pushed for it - due to security reasons they left the country immediately after the 
revolution.  
The second factor that prevented Iran from developing nuclear capacity earlier 
was the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. During the war, Iraq bombed Iran’s nuclear 
reactors and research centers. Iraqi forces hit the two reactors being built in Bushehr 
six times.  
With the end of the war, Iran’s young population and therefore its need for electricity 
significantly expanded. This led President Hashemi Rafsanjani’s government to 
review the nuclear energy policy and continue with the quest for nuclear energy 
development projects (Sahimi 2003).  
Rafsanjani’s government first attempted to make a new deal with the 
Kraftwerk Union in order to complete the Bushehr reactors. However, given the 
hostile relationships between the Iranian government and the US, the latter pressured 
the German firm not to finish the reactors (Chubin 2002).  
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Consequently, Iran asked the German government to allow Kraftwerk Union 
to ship reactor pieces and technical documentation that Iran had already paid for. 
When this request was turned down, as well, Iran appealed to the International 
Criminal Court in 1996 for 5.4 billion dollars in compensation.   The court has not 
ruled the issue as of yet (Sahimi 2003). 
Germany was not the only country considered by Iran to supply the missing 
pieces of the reactor at Bushehr. In the late 1980s, a consortium of companies from 
Argentina, Germany and Spain submitted a proposal to the Iranians to complete 
Bushehr 1. In 1990, the Spanish National Institute of Industry and Nuclear Equipment 
considered completing Bushehr 1. Iran’s attempts to get the missing parts for the 
reactor from Italian, Czech and Polish companies and the two previous attempts 
mentioned above were all prevented by the United States (Sahimi 2003).  
After all these unsuccessful attempts to acquire the necessary technology from 
European dealers and Argentina, Iran finally signed agreements with the Soviet 
Union (later Russia) and China in the early 1990s. The 1990 agreement with the 
USSR to complete the Bushehr 1 was not realized due to financial difficulties in Iran. 
In 1991, China provided Iran with different amounts of uranium compounds that are 
used to enrich uranium (Cordesman 2005).  
In 1995, the most honored of the Iranian-Russian agreements were made. This 
included finishing the reactors at Bushehr, which will be under supervision of IAEA 
safeguards and will be capable of producing a maximum of 180 kg of plutonium in 
their spent fuel per year. According to the agreement, the Bushehr 1 was supposed to 
be finished by 1999, but it still has not been completed. IAEA predicts unit 1 at 
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Bushehr will reach its first criticality in 2006 (Cordesman 2005). The agreement also 
included that Russia would provide a 30-50 megawatt thermal light-water research 
reactor, 2,000 tons of natural uranium and the training of fifteen Iranian nuclear 
scientists per year by the Russians. Iran and Russia also started negotiations regarding 
the construction of a gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment facility in Iran. The US 
intervened and announced that it had convinced Russia not to supply uranium 
enrichment facilities to Iran. The US also tried to convince Russia not to honor its 
1995 agreement with Iran, but was not successful. Currently, it is estimated that some 
600-1,000 Russians are working on the project and some 750 Iranians trained by 
Russians will take their place as the sites are completed (Cordesman 2005). 
A point of interest is that the completion of the Bushehr reactors by Russia is 
an immensely complex task. Back in the 1970s, the Kraftwerk Union did not provide 
any technical documents as to the installment of the reactors with Iran. Therefore, it is 
difficult for Russian firms to install the reactors. The Russian and German reactors 
significantly differ in technology, which makes the job for the Russians even more 
difficult. The Iranian nuclear program is highly dependent on foreign technology 
transfer, and it seems like it will be this way in the near future (Chubin 2002). 
 
4.2.2 The Current Crisis  
The current crisis began in August 2002. An Iranian exile opposition group, the 
National Council of Resistance, accused Tehran of hiding a uranium enrichment 
facility at Natanz and a heavy water plant at Arak. The existence of the sites was 
confirmed by satellite photographs. This was followed by Iran’s announcement that 
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its nuclear program has peaceful aims and that it would allow IAEA inspections 
(RFE/RL 2005).  
In November 2003, Iran suspended its nuclear program and announced it 
would allow tougher IAEA inspections. IAEA concluded that there was no evidence 
for Iran’s nuclear program. The United States insists that Iran’s nuclear program 
ultimately aims to produce nuclear weapons. The Iranian nuclear program casts 
serious doubts due to the fact that the country already possesses enormous fossil fuel 
reserves and does not necessarily need nuclear energy in the short and middle terms.    
In October 2003, France, Germany and the UK (the EU3) foreign ministers 
visited Iran. The ministers asked Iran to stop enriching uranium and suggested Iran 
should sign an additional protocol to the NPT and provide full cooperation with the 
IAEA. The EU3 offered economic concessions to Iran if these conditions were met. 
The rest of the world, including the United States, supported the EU3 initiative and a 
diplomatic solution to the problem.  
More specifically, the EU3 offered Iran the following incentives:  
1. Granting Iran access to the international nuclear technologies market where 
Iran was barred with certain controls;  
2. a EU-Iran Trade and Cooperation Agreement and a Political Dialogue 
Agreement; 
3. an assurance to supply nuclear fuel from Russia for Iranian nuclear facilities; 
4. supporting the Iranian civilian nuclear program and negotiations between Iran 
and EURATOM;  
5. supporting Iran’s regional security building arrangements, and  
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6. continuing support for Iran’s accession to the WTO (Ingram 2005).  
In return for these rather vague incentives, the EU3 demanded specific actions from 
the Iranians.  
1. Iran should make a binding commitment not to pursue fuel cycle activities 
other than light water reactors and research plants where it is almost 
impossible to develop weapon grade material. This meant Iran would produce 
no uranium enrichment or conversion, no fuel reprocessing and the shutting 
down of the heavy water reactor at Arak. The EU3 recognized this would 
mean a huge loss of capital investment for Iran and therefore promised to 
establish a group to find out alternative uses of these facilities.  
2. The EU3 demanded Iran to comply with all IAEA inspections, and the 
resolution of all the problems rose under Iran’s safeguard agreement and the 
Additional Protocol.  
3. Iran should ratify the Additional Protocol by 2005 and fully comply with its 
conditions.  
4. Iran should agree to arrangements that nuclear fuel supplies should be 
provided from international sellers and be returned to the suppliers after suing 
them;  
5. strict national exports control under UN Security Council 1540,and  
6. legally binding assurance that Iran will never leave the NPT (Ingram 2005). 
In August 2005, Iran rejected the EU3 proposal and the talks were stopped. In the 
fall of 2005, Iran has resumed uranium conversion at its Isfahan plant, and an IAEA 
resolution declared Iran in violation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. As of 
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early December 2005 when the coding for this study was completed by area experts, 
the talks between the EU3 and Iran had not resumed and the latter was reportedly 
continuing its nuclear program.   
 In January 2006, Iran broke the IAEA seals in its Natanz nuclear facility and 
IAEA referred Iran to the UN Security Council over its nuclear activities. Iran also 
declared that it resumed its uranium conversion at Natanz. On March 30th 2006, the 
UNSC, not both warned Iran and demanded it should suspend uranium enrichment 
within thirty days (BBC News Website 2006).  
 
4.3 Analysis with the Expected Utility Model 
4.3.1 Expert-Generated Data 
Two experts, one specializing on Iran for more than two decades and the other 
focusing on Middle Eastern politics, independently produced the coding of actors, 
positions, capabilities and issue salience scores for the Iranian nuclear crisis issue. 
The coding took place in December 2005. The experts received detailed instructions 
are explained in the research design section of this dissertation. Also, the actual 
instructions the coders received can be found in the appendix. The coding by the 
senior analyst is as follows:  
  (Table 4-3-1-1 about here) 
 
4.3.2 Positions of the Actors  
Various Iranian and international actors with diverse policy positions are involved in 
this issue: The IAEA declared that the real aims of the Iranian nuclear program are 
 75
ambiguous. The United States administration has repeatedly suggested referring the 
issue to the UN Security Council and initiating economic sanctions against Iran. 
Israel seems to agree with the US position for the time being. However, Israel also 
suggested using the military option to disable Iran’s nuclear program. There are some 
serious difficulties associated with this approach. Learning from Iraq’s mistakes2, 
Iran successfully dispersed the sites where it conducts nuclear research. Therefore, 
there are many sites that Israel would have to bomb. That makes it is difficult to 
destroy these nuclear research reactors at once, without the risk of being harmed by 
the Iranian air force. Also, geography creates a problem. Israel can attack Iran only by 
using Iraqi or Turkish airspace. The United States does not seem to favor allowing 
Israeli air force to use Iraqi airspace for fear of further Shiite uprising in Iraq. Turkey 
on the other hand, has a limited military cooperation (a loose alliance) with Israel and 
would be pushed by the US and Israel to allow its airspace to be used. However, since 
1639, Turkish-Iranian relations have been peaceful. Therefore Turkey does not seem 
to be willing to be directly involved in such an operation.  
Russia and China have extensive cooperation and trade with Iran, which 
effectively eliminates a UNSC decision against this state. Russia declared its 
determination to continue transferring nuclear technology to Iran, while it also 
proposed returning the spent nuclear fuel to Russia for reprocessing and storage, so 
that it cannot be used to produce nuclear weapons. The Russian position is attributed 
to be the “moderate” one, which would allow the Iranian administration to get a face-
saving resolution, while the US and the EU would prevent Iran from achieving 
                                                 
2 Israel bombed Iraq’s nuclear reactors in 1981. Iraqi nuclear research was concentrated at one place, at 
Osirak, which made Israel’s destruction of Iraqi nuclear capabilities easier.  
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nuclear weapons technology. Based on that, the United States and the EU have 
backed the Russian position since late 2005.  
China, on the other hand, maintains a more pro-Iranian position. China 
supplies its market with Iranian oil and gas. About 13% of Chinese oil imports are 
from Iran (Study on Energy 2004). Therefore, the stability of Iran is extremely 
important for Chinese energy security. As an important regional and perhaps a future 
global power, China projects power on this issue; perhaps it is the biggest obstacle for 
a UN Security Council resolution against Iran. Chinese officials repeatedly suggested 
they will veto economic sanctions at the Security Council and are completely opposed 
to a military solution to the problem. China claims it is in favor of a “diplomatic 
solution”.  
The Iranian views on the issue seem to be less divergent. The so-called ‘hard-
liner’ President Ahmedinejad and his administration seem to be more determined to 
continue the nation’s nuclear program than their predecessors, i.e. President Khatemi 
and his team. President Ahmedinejad is weak at home, and he used the nuclear 
program as a tool to consolidate his power, i.e. to create a rally-effect for the new 
government. The Iranian parliament (the Majlis) also supports the continuation of the 
nuclear program. The parliament matters, because it has some control over the 
President. However, the most influential leader in the Islamic Republic of Iran is the 
Supreme Leader Khamanei. He is the ultimate deal broker in the country’s political 
system. He has been in favor of the nuclear program and his policies are the most 
important and influential ones in the whole bargaining process.  
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Some other regional actors, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, also stated 
that a nuclear Iran could negatively affect the precarious stability in the region. The 
Gulf Cooperation Council includes Saudi Arabia as the most influential actor of this 
organization. Saudi Arabia, to maintain a regional balance and stability, has shown 
some efforts to reconcile the issue between the US and Iran and proved to be capable 
of maintaining a shuttle diplomacy. Of course, Saudi efforts to find a diplomatic 
solution to the problem failed like others.  
Lastly, India and Pakistan, as the new members of the nuclear club, do not 
want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. However, they are not in favor of economic 
sanctions on Iran, either. Especially Pakistan is alleged to help Iran with its nuclear 
program. For economic reasons it is in favor of Iran’s development of nuclear 
technology, especially transferred from Pakistan.  
 Figure 4-3-2-1 represents the Iranian nuclear program issue with the actors 
associated with it on a linear continuum. The positions’ values and actors are 
determined by the area experts. Only one of the coding results is used here, since the 
area experts produced fairly similar results (That’s why only the coding by the more 
senior analyst is used in this chapter).  
  (Figure 4-3-2-1 about here) 
The values on the continuum represent the full range of positions and 
outcomes on the issues. On the left hand side, Israel’s position is the total dissolution 
of the Iranian nuclear program, e.g. by a military action. This position has a value of 
0. For Israel, Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is an existential issue, and the area 
expert’s coding represents this point right on target.  
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On the opposite side of the continuum, the positions of the Iranian leadership 
are given. Iran’s leadership maintains a fairly united opinion about the nuclear 
program for different reasons. All three leaders are in favor of the continuation of the 
Iranian nuclear program as it is. That is, they want the nuclear reactors to be finished 
by Russia and achieve a full nuclear cycle that can provide uranium enrichment for 
Iran, which can be used for weapon making. Their position value is attributed to be 
100 by the area experts.  
The most subscribed position in this bargaining is the so-called moderate 
position. The moderate position (70) is one and the same with the Russian position. 
Russia proposed Iran and the international community that it would not stop 
transferring nuclear technology to Iran, i.e. it would continue building up the reactors 
in Bushehr and sell nuclear material to Iran. However, to reduce the US’ and EU’s 
pressures to halt the cooperation with Iran, it proposed to complete a part of the 
nuclear cycle at Russia in return for a charge of one billion dollars a year. This way, 
Iran would continue developing nuclear technology but could not achieve a full 
nuclear cycle that would allow the production of nuclear weapons. When the EU3 
proposal failed, the EU members and the United States had no other chance but to 
support the Russian proposition. If the latter were agreed upon, Iran could continue its 
civilian nuclear program without further intervention, Russia would continue selling 
nuclear technology to Iran and the US, and the EU and the regional actors would be 
sure Iran’s program was at least “controlled” for the time being. Some other regional 
powers, such as India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council also 
support this proposal.  
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The positions of China and the International Atomic Energy Association are a 
little different from the rest of the actors. The Chinese position (85) suggests a pro-
Iranian leaning that will certainly prevent any UN Security Council resolution on the 
issue. China’s top priority is the continuation of the oil and gas flow from Iran to its 
markets. Therefore, China is against any measure that can threaten Iran’s stability.  
The IAEA’s position (60) is the most difficult to determine for the area 
experts, for the IAEA does not have any official political opinion or preference on 
issues. The institution’s job is technical and it serves as a technical aid to world 
governments. This leads the IAEA to be extremely careful about publicly revealing 
its position on the issues discussed; due to their power to carry out inspections, their 
actions matter in the bargaining processes. The IAEA’s position was coded as 60, 
which indicates their position is slightly stricter than the Russian position. But it is 
still a moderate position in favor of the reinstallation of full IAEA inspections on 
Iranian nuclear sites.  
Yet, considering these circumstances, I have simulated the IAEA’s position 
ceteris paribus. That is, the data was run with an IAEA position value of 30, 40, 50, 
70 and 80, all other values being the same. The end results of the bargaining did not 
change significantly. The reported results are based on a simulation in which the 
IAEA position was assigned a value of 60. 
 
4.3.3 Power Distribution  
 Realist theories of IR suggested that the outcome of international affairs is to a 
great extent determined by the power distribution in the international system (Waltz 
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1979). Most basically, the realist literature proposed that the most powerful actors 
(usually referring to military power) are likely to achieve the policy they favor more 
easily than the less powerful actors. However, various empirical studies showed that 
international affairs are not only determined by power. If they were, the superpowers 
would always achieve whatever they seek. 
So, what does this discussion tell us? I argue that the powers of nations and 
other actors should be discounted by other relevant factors. One of the advantages of 
using the expected utility model is that the absolute powers of the actors are 
discounted by the salience they associate with it.  
Figure 4-3-3-1 shows the absolute power distribution of the actors in this 
subsystem. The most influential actors are the Supreme Leader of Iran and the US 
with each having 18% of the total power, and the IAEA having 12%. The Iranian 
Government and the Parliament, EU3, Russia and China each bear the same amount 
of influence that each holding the eight percent of the total power.  
(Figure 4-3-3-1 about here) 
The salience scores that each actor associates with the issue are presented in 
Figure 4-3-3-2. Salience scores are important because they discount the absolute 
power of each actor. Therefore, they allow the analyst to take into account the amount 
of influence one can have on an issue. In Figure 4-3-3-2, it appears the actor that 
attached the most salience to the issue is the IAEA. This is of course exactly what one 
would expect, since the issue is the IAEA’s primary concern. The second actor who is 
most ready to give up other policy issues when the matter at hand comes up is the 
Iranian Supreme Leader. A salience value of 90 is assigned to the Supreme Leader 
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Khamanei. For the United States and the EU, this issue is slightly less important than 
it is for the IAEA and the Supreme Leader of Iran. Each of their salience score is 75.  
 (Figure 4-3-3-2 about here) 
 To analyze how the distribution of capabilities affects the bargaining for the 
Iranian nuclear crisis one should take the discounted power of the actors into account. 
This can be done by comparing the actors’ effective power. To observe the effective 
powers of the actors, I use an effective power variable that is created as such: 
 Effective Power = Resources*Salience     (1) 
 Figure 4-3-3-3 shows the effective power distribution in this game. The three 
most important power centers in this bargaining are the Iranian Supreme Leader, the 
United States and the IAEA, respectively, followed by Russia, EU3 and the Iranian 
domestic actors. Considering the dynamics of the current crisis, one can conclude that 
Supreme Leader Khamanei, the US and the IAEA are truly the most influential 
actors. A control of the effective power variable confirms the coding was done 
properly. Note that the Iranian Supreme Leader’s absolute power is 18% while 
effective power is 21%. This is because he associates very high salience with the 
nuclear program issue compared to the others. The same is true for the IAEA: 
Although the IAEA has the 12% of the total absolute power in this subsystem, it has 
sixteen percent of the total effective power due to high salience of the issue to the 
IAEA. The Chinese case, on the other hand, shows the reverse effect. China has 8% 
of the total power while its share in the distribution of total effective power is only 
5%, because it associates a relatively lower value of salience to the issue. 
 (Figure 4-3-3-3 about here) 
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 Lastly, let us examine the effective power distribution by position groups. The 
first group is the biggest one (the moderate group); it is composed of the US, the 
EU3, the EU Commission, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the GCC, Russia and the 
IAEA. The second biggest group is the Iranian position, including the Iranian 
Supreme Leader, the government, the parliament and also China. Lastly, Israel 
represents its position as a single actor.  
 The results show that the group that has the most power is the moderate 
position group with 55%, while the actors close to the Iranian position represent only 
the 42% of the total power. A realist account of international politics would expect 
the moderate group to deter Iran from enriching uranium. However, the strategic 
interactions between actors result in different conclusions than one would expect by 
observing the mere power distribution. The more powerful actors do not necessarily 
have their favorite policy achieved in international politics, as the following 
discussion will illustrate.  
 (Figure 4-3-3-4 and 4-3-3-5 about here) 
 
4.3.4 Position Min-Max and Averages 
The expected utility analysis for the Iranian nuclear issue was completed in eleven 
rounds. That is, after the eleventh round, for all actors the status quo appeared to be 
more preferable than offering more proposals to other actors and continuing the 
bargaining process. The experts were asked the same question: “What are the current 
attitudes of stakeholders toward Iran’s uranium enrichment?”  
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The simulated position maximum did not change. The Iranian actors who 
began the bargaining with a position of 100 finished at the same position. On the 
other hand, the Israelis started at 0 and ended at 52.8. The position range at the 
beginning of the analysis was 100 and narrowed down to 47.1 at the end. This can be 
interpreted as a forecast of a form of consensus, even including the Israelis, about the 
inevitability of Iran achieving some kind of nuclear program. 
(Figure 4-3-4-1 about here) 
 On the other hand, the average position value steadily increased during the 
simulation. The average position in round 1 one was 71.9 and increased to 84.1 at the 
end of round 10. This also shows how the bargaining processes evolved in favor of 
Iran: note the difference between the end result of the bargaining discussed below and 
the average policy value. Considering that the model uses median voter theory 
assumptions, the average policy position of about 85 indicates the prediction of an 
outcome that strongly favors the Iranian position.  
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 The Bargaining Process  
The expected utility analysis concluded that the bargaining on Iran’s nuclear program 
in this time period would result in an outcome that strongly favored Iran. At the end 
of the last round, Round 10, the estimation of the model is 97.3, which comes close to 
the Iranian position at 100.3 The analysis therefore indicates that Iran will not give in 
                                                 
3 In fact, this simulation was run with Iranian Supreme Leader Khatemi coded as a “veto player” actor. 
According to the model’s logic, if there is a veto player in the game, this veto player’s position wins 
the game when the bargaining is finished, no matter what the discounted forecast is. In fact, the first 
discounted  policy position forecast in this game is a (60) at round 3. However, since Iranian Supreme 
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to international pressures and will continue developing its nuclear program as it was 
planned. The data were received from the senior area expert on December 29th 2005, 
at the height of the crisis, some weeks before the Iranian government declared it was 
going to restart its nuclear program. Therefore, the expected utility model predicted 
the end of the bargaining correctly.  
 The question one might ask immediately is how stable this conclusion proves 
to be. Table 4-4-1-1 below shows the stability summaries of the bargaining. These 
results do not lead to a definite conclusion, because none of the categories of 
perceptions is very dominant. The interaction of the perceptions suggests that the 
actors are more likely to reach a compromise solution.  
(Table 4-4-1-1 about here) 
 Figure 8 shows how the bargaining evolved over time. At the end of round 1, 
2 and 4, the forecast was 70, which is the moderate (Russian proposal) position. 
However, in round 6, the Iranian position picked up and the forecast steadily 
developed towards the Iranian position after this point, note the slope of the linear 
trend line in figure 9. As the time of the bargaining extended, some actors shifted 
closer to the Iranian position and a continuation with the nuclear option prevailed.  
(Figure 4-4-1-1 and 4-4-1-2 about here) 
This rather abstract mathematical demonstration of the diplomatic bargaining 
draws parallels to the actual dynamics of international politics. In such circumstances 
as the nuclear bargaining, the more extended the bargaining the better will be the 
outcome that is likely to appear for the defensive side. A very similar outcome was 
                                                                                                                                           
Leader who is the veto player did not change his position (100) during the rounds, the model’s 
prediction is strongly favor of Iran [i.e. policy position (100)].  
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observed in the United States-North Korea relations regarding the nuclear 
proliferation issue in the last fifteen years. Despite all the diplomatic efforts from the 
US, the UN and the IAEA, North Korea is reported to achieve nuclear weapons 
(James and Özdamar 2004).  
More specifically, the Iranian Supreme Leader, government and parliament 
did not change their policy position during the bargaining. They kept their 
uncompromising position on continuing the nuclear program as they planned to. None 
of the actors could make any credible offer to the Iranian actors. On the other hand, 
the US and the European Union both appeared to favor the Iranian program less at the 
end of the bargaining. That is, their policy position at the end of round 10 was 60. 
IAEA did not change the same position (60) that proposes strict controls over Iranian 
research sites during the rounds. On the other hand, the Russian and Chinese 
positions approximated the Iranian position towards the end of bargaining. This is an 
interesting result, for from the more comprehensive outputs of the model one can see 
that the model forecasted moderate positions of 70 and 60 at the ends of rounds 4 and 
5, respectively. In both these rounds, the Russian and Chinese positions were 
moderate. As the Russians and Chinese switched positions and came closer to the 
pro-Iranian position, the whole dynamics of the issue favored Iran. An analysis of the 
stakeholders’ position shifts can explain what credible proposals changed the 
outcome of this bargaining.  
 
4.4.2 Position Shifts 
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 One of the advantages of using the expected utility model is that it not only 
provides a forecast about the issue at hand, but it also allows the researcher to study 
the strategic interactions between the actors during the bargaining. The vast number 
of calculations the model makes can be studied step by step using the original output. 
These outputs results show what actor put forward what kind of (credible or non-
credible) proposals to the others.  
 The US initially supported the diplomatic solution that EU3 has tried to 
achieve. When this did not work, both the EU3 and the United States supported the 
Russian moderate position. This is the initial position area experts coded for this 
simulation. At rounds 1 and 2, the IAEA makes two credible proposals to the EU3 
and the US to shift from 70 to 60, respectively. That is, when the European and 
American actors could anticipate a less cooperative Iran, they switched to a more 
hard-liner position.  
As I have mentioned above, the significant moves that changed the outcome 
of the bargaining came from Russia and China. These two are key actors both 
economically (due to their trade ties with Iran) and politically (due to their UNSC 
status), and they were both given credible proposals by the Iranian Supreme leader 
and the Iranian Government. At round 5, the Iranian Supreme Leader and the Iranian 
government propose Russia for more support. Russia switches from a moderate 
position (60) to a strong pro-Iranian position (100). At round 10, the Iranian Supreme 
Leader makes a similar proposal to China. China accepts the proposal and shifts from 
the moderate position (60) on Iran’s nuclear issue to a strong pro-Iranian position 
(99).  
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The Chinese shift here is not very surprising. The Chinese foreign affairs elite 
have declared many times that they do not believe the Iranian nuclear program is for 
military purposes. Even if it were, they do not believe the program would be a direct 
threat to China. For the Chinese, uninterrupted energy trade with Iran is more 
valuable than other policy options. This indicates that the predictions of the model are 
plausible. However, Russia surprisingly moved away from its own proposal to 
Iranians by the Iranian actors. The Russian proposal to enrich uranium in Russia and 
to allow Iran to continue its nuclear program was not accepted by Iran. It might seem 
unexpected that Russia is moved by its own position. However, this is possible given 
the condition of the Russian economy and its dependence on income by the 
technology transfer to Iran. Russia may eventually accept a nuclear Iran just to be 
able to continue selling nuclear technology to it.   
Finally, the biggest change of an actor’s policy position in the simulation was 
made by Israel. In round 1, Israel had the completely opposite position of Iran; it does 
not want Iran to develop any nuclear capacity and is perhaps the most willing actor to 
bring about a policy change by use of force. The model predicts that Israel will not 
come closer to the moderate position. But it shows a change from position 0 to 52.8 at 
the end of the simulation. Most of this change was brought about by Russia in rounds 
1, 2, 3 and 5. Credible Russian proposals deterred Israel from its completely 
antagonistic position to Iran’s nuclear program and led to a shift towards a more 
moderate position. This could also be interpreted as Russia’s desire to prevent any 
Israeli military action. Considering the Middle Eastern international politics in the last 
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six decades, these kinds of antagonistic relations between Russia and Israel appear to 
be plausible. 
 
4.4.3 Analysis of Perceptions and Stability 
Once the actors have estimated their expected utilities, the model allows the 
researcher to study the relationships between each pair of stakeholders (Bueno de 
Mesquita 2003). That is, one can analyze how pairs of actors perceive each others’ 
intentions, both numerically and verbally. Visual representations of the numeric 
accounts of some important actors in are presented Figure 4-4-3-1; Table 4-4-3-1 
shows the verbal summaries of all actors’ perceptions.   
The employed model is based on certain logical conditions regarding the 
inferences about the behavior of actors and the end of the bargaining. If a player 
believes that challenging a rival is gainful for him and also believes the rival agrees 
with this assessment, then the former expects the latter to either compromise or give 
in to coercion. A compromise occurs if the challenger’s demand is greater than what 
the rival thinks is necessary to give. Coercion occurs if the challenger’s demands 
appear to be a smaller utility loss to the rival than the rival expected them to be.  A 
continuation of the status quo or stalemate occurs if a player and his rival believe 
making further proposals to each other will induce losses.  And finally, if a player and 
his rival believe they will gain from challenging the other and expect to win, then 
conflict is expected between the parties (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). A visual 
representation of these relationships is given in Figure 4-4-3-1.  
(Figure 4-4-3-1 about here) 
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A verbal summary table can also be employed to study the perceptions of the 
actors. The first column presents what kind of a relation the challenger is expected to 
have with the rival actors listed. The second column shows what the challenger 
believes the rival thinks. In the third column appears what the predictive model 
proposes about the type of relationship that will appear as a result of the interaction 
when everyone acts according to these expectations (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). In 
every round of the model there is one verbal summary table. The one used below here 
summarizes the last round of the bargaining.   
(Table 4-4-3-1 about here) 
 Note that a “+” sign indicates that the focal group is expected to have 
advantage while “-“ indicates the rival is expected to have an advantage. “Conflict” 
means both actors expect to gain from challenging each other. “Compromise” means 
either the rival “+” or the focal group “-“ is expected to shift its policy stance toward 
the other. “Compel” indicates either the rival “+” or the focal group “-“ is expected to 
acquiesce by accepting the policy stance of the other player. “Stalemate” indicates the 
status quo will continue (Bueno de Mesquita 2003).  
  Let us analyze the perceptions at the end of the bargaining (Round 10). 
Figures 4-4-3-2 to 4-4-3-6 show the perceptions of the Iranian Supreme Leader, 
Government, IAEA, EU3 and the United States.4 
(Figures 4-4-3-2 through 4-4-3-6 about here) 
                                                 
4 Note that the perceptual analysis can include a category called “no issue” between the actors. This 
means these actors’ stance is the same in this bargaining. In other words, their policy position is 
identical; therefore, they perceive “no issue” with the actors who holds the same view.  
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 The Iranian Supreme Leader Khamanei and the Iranian Government’s 
(President Ahmedinejad) perspective show clear similarities. This is plausible 
considering that their stance on the nuclear issue is very similar, with the only 
difference that the Supreme Leader has more power than other Iranian domestic 
actors. The figures that show their perceptions on the issue are almost identical.  
 At the end of bargaining round 11, the model predicts that conflict is not 
likely. IAEA, US, EU3 and Israel are in the stalemate area regarding their perceptions 
on Iran. That is, they do not come any closer to the Iranian position on the issue. 
However, they also think making more proposals will induce losses. The Iranian 
actors think the same way, so the model predicts a stalemate for the nonce. On the 
other hand, the Iranian Supreme Leader and the Government appear to be successful 
in terms of convincing India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China about their nuclear 
program. In the described figures, these four countries are in the upper part of the 
lower right quadrant. That means they are likely to have a compromise solution with 
Iran. This also goes in line with what has really been happening since December 
2005. These four countries maintain a neutral or pro-Iranian position and are least 
likely to support a diplomatic or military action against it. The most surprising result 
is that the model predicts the European Union Council to support the Iranian nuclear 
program. So far, it looks like the expected utility model does not appropriately predict 
the Council’s actions. 
 IAEA, EU3 and the United States’ perceptions are very similar, as well. 
Figures 4-4-3-4 to 4-4-3-6 show that all three actors do expect a stalemate with the 
Iranian Supreme Leader, Government and the Parliament. Russia, in all three figures, 
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is right at the border between “losses” and “gains” for the IAEA, EU3 and the US. It 
can be concluded that the Russian position is highly volatile and can still go both 
ways (i.e. Western and Iranian) in the future. A very interesting point in these three 
actors’ perceptions is that they all think China, India, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are 
still convincible. This means that the US, EU3 and the IAEA still perceive these 
countries as being persuadable to support sanctions against Iran.  
 Lastly, the perceptions analysis shows that all three actors against Iran’s 
nuclear proliferation will have a tense and conflict-prone relationship with Israel. At 
first, this might not seem obvious, since Israel is also opposed to Iran’s nuclear 
program. In my opinion, however, this conclusion shows how plausible the expected 
utility model’s predictions can be: Israel’s position on this issue is an extreme; their 
publicly announced position suggests they are in favor of immediate military action 
against Iran, although it is not unlikely that this is a bluff. Therefore, Israel does not 
favor the slow-going diplomatic efforts of the IAEA, US and EU. Israel is still 
challenging all three of them to take a harder line against Iran. Considering the 
history of Israeli wars in the Middle East the model makes a very plausible prediction 
here. Israel did not avoid using force for the sake of its security even when its allies 
did not approve. The 1956 Suez crisis and the 1967 war are great examples of similar 
Israeli behavior. That is, Israel is likely to push for a more hard-liner policy against 
Iran.  
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4.5. Discussion  
The following discussion focuses on the implications of the presented results and 
analysis. It will also address the advantages and shortcomings of this model as a tool 
to investigate the issue at hand. Finally, it will be discussed how the Iranian nuclear 
crisis might develop in the future.  
Most generally, the model correctly predicted the outcome of the bargaining 
that Iran would not give in to the international pressure. The area expert was asked to 
code the data on the issue as of December 2005, and in January/February 2006, Iran 
resumed the work at its nuclear facilities. More specifically, the analysis correctly 
predicted all of the actors’ moves but one. The expected utility model does not seem 
to predict the European Union Council’s behavior correctly. The Council did not and 
is not likely to shift toward the Iranian position.  
 One shortcoming of the model is its imprecision in predicting the exact timing 
of the decisions made. Also, the model does not provide any information on how long 
this outcome will be stable. Instead, it gives with a stability estimate based on the 
perceptions. Figures 4-5-1 and 4-5-2 show how aggregated perceptions (from any 
actor i’s perspective) in the simulation evolved over time. Figures 4-5-3 and 4-5-4 
demonstrate how shared perceptions (i.e. the joint view on the issue) developed. Note 
that both i’s perspective and the joint view perception suggest a compromise solution 
rather than further conflict. However, the model does not tell us how long this 
situation is likely to continue. Therefore, many studies using this model have repeated 
their simulations over time with new data to control for changes in the bargaining 
conditions and external shocks or developed alternative (counterfactual) scenarios 
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(Organski and Lust-Okar 1997; Fuchs et al.1997; Kugler et al. 2003). Hence, in the 
next steps of this research I will continue to collect data and run more simulations in 
order to achieve many forecasts on the issue over time.  
 (Figures 4-5-1 to 4-5-4 about here) 
 One advantage of using this model for international conflict issues is that it 
allows the analysis of strategic moves by actors. An examination of such moves can 
lead to important policy recommendations. This simulation concludes, for example, 
that getting the support of Russia and China are the most crucial steps in dealing with 
Iran’s nuclear program. During the bargaining, when Russia, China or both switched 
to the moderate position (i.e. between 60-80), the outcome of the bargaining favored 
the moderate position. When China and Russia began to change sides and accepted 
the Iranian position, especially after round 5, the balance was changed in favor of 
Iran. This demonstrates the importance of a multilateral approach to the issue of 
Iran’s nuclear program. Iran could probably not resist extreme international isolation 
in case Russia and China joined the US and the EU. But when the EU and the US are 
balanced by Russia and China, Iran’s bargaining power increases.  
 Also, the analysis suggests that China, Pakistan, India and Saudi Arabia can 
still be co-opted by the US and the EU on this issue. According to the perceptions at 
the end of round 11, for the United States and the EU, those four governments are still 
to be negotiated with. The likely outcome the model predicts is that the latter four will 
be compelled in favor of the US and the EU.     
 More specifically, I suggest that further economic sanctions and the use of 
force against Iran are extremely costly options for the United States to bear. The 
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reasons for this can be summarized under three headings. First, given the present high 
oil prices and inflexible excess capacity of oil production (only about two million 
barrels a day), it is difficult to put at risk the energy prices at this point. Second, the 
US is already having a difficult time controlling the violence in Iraq. Use of force 
against Iran may cause more turmoil in southern Iraq where Shiites are dominant. 
Third, domestically there is less support for the Iraq war and more criticism for 
military spending and budget deficits in the US, which will make a military option 
even more difficult for the US.  
 On the other hand, it does not seem likely that Iran is will use its “oil weapon” 
unless the issue becomes totally out of control. The Iranian government has long been 
struggling with macroeconomic difficulties like huge budget deficits, and the lack of 
oil and gas incomes will only exacerbate the situation. According to an IMF analyst, 
the macroeconomic balance could only be maintained if the oil prices were to be 
above 15 dollars per barrel (Amuzegar 2003). The current oil prices and income 
derived from oil are necessary for Iran to maintain its precarious financial balance5. 
Hence, Iran is not likely to use oil production as a weapon.  
 A diplomatic solution seems remote, the US is not apt to use military force, 
and Iran is not likely to further provoke the US and the EU. What will the situation 
look like in the near future? Is the compromise solution plausible or should we expect 
big changes?  
 I think the situation will continue to be a controlled or limited crisis. The US 
and the EU will keep threatening Iran but will not necessarily take any harder-line 
                                                 
5 Revenues from oil exports are projected to reach about $45bn dollars this year to March that is about 
50% of Iran's annual budget (BBC 2006).   
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actions. Iran will continue “misbehaving” to improve its international legitimacy. 
That is, by pursuing misconduct Iran is likely to improve its bargaining leverage. 
Especially by altering the perceptions of other actors and fostering uncertainty, 
weaker countries can create more room for their negotiations capabilities. This is 
exactly what North Koreans did in 1994 (James and Özdamar 2004, Bueno de 
Mesquita 2003). By altering the perceptions that they have a more advanced nuclear 
program than the international community imagined, the Iranians will increase their 
international legitimacy. In 1994, before the Clinton administration started 
negotiations with North Korea, many analysts did not think North Korea had 
advanced nuclear technology. By altering the perceptions of the US and the rest of the 
world, North Korea gained more international legitimacy, substantial economic 
assistance with the Agreed Framework, and acceptance of a greater nuclear role 
(Bueno de Mesquita 2003).  
I suggest Iran is trying to do the same and will continue misconduct to gain 
leverage. Some analytical tools might help us understand this better. Figure 4-5-56 
shows the Iranian, American and European positions on the issue and possible win 
sets. By changing the perceptions of other actors Iran may try to move from lesser 
outcomes (i.e. the EU-US status quo position at the lower left of part of the graphic) 
to better outcomes (to the upper right side of the graphic). The longer the negotiations 
will take the more leverage it will gain from this bargaining.  
(Figure 4-5-5 is about here) 
 
 
                                                 
6 Based on Bueno de Mesquita’s (2003, 364) discussion on North Korea’s nuclear program.  
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4.6 Appendix to the Chapter: Information on Involved Iranian Actors  
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei: 
 Khamanei was appointed for life in 1989 and has held the post since then. In 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Supreme Leader holds the largest power in the 
country. He appoints the many important officials such as the national security 
advisors, the head of the judiciary branch, military officials, the head of national radio 
and TV and Friday prayer leaders. He also selects six members of the Guardian 
Council that “protects” the Islamic Republic approving all legislation and vetoing any 
possible election candidates (BBC 2006). He is usually on the “conservative” side of 
the Iranian political continuum.  
 
President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad: 
  
 The ultra-conservative mayor of Tehran has become the president in August 
2005 after eight years of moderate President Khatemi’s rule. He is the first non-
clerical president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since his election, Ahmadinejad 
consistently announced that Iran will continue with its nuclear program as it planned 
to. The Iranian president can serve two terms, four years each. Although the president 
is the second highest ranking official in the country, their powers are circumscribed 
by the clerics, conservatives and the Supreme Leader. Supreme Leader Khamanei is 
the ultimate authority responsible for the military, security and nuclear policy (BBC 
2006).  
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The Majlis:  
 There are 290 members of the Iranian parliament who are selected by popular 
vote every four years. The parliament has the power to introduce and pass laws and 
summon and impeach presidents (BBC 2006). The current Majlis is mostly composed 
of conservatives who support Iran to continue its nuclear program and not give in to 
foreign pressure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 98
 
Table 4-3-1-1 The expert generated data.  
 
 
 
Resource 
(1-100) 
Position 
(0-100) 
Salience 
(1-100) 
EU (3) 
(Represented by 
France, Germany 
and UK) 
 
50 70 75 
EU Council 
(High 
Representative 
Havier Solana) 
20 70 60 
Russia 50 70 70 
United States 100 70 75 
Israel 20 0 75 
China 50 85 40 
India 10 70 40 
Pakistan 10 70 40 
Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf 
Cooperation 
Council 
10 70 40 
IAEA 70 60 100 
Iranian Government 
(President 
Ahmadinejad and 
MFA Mottaki) 
50 100 75 
Supreme Leader 
Ali Khamanei 
100 
veto player 100 90 
Iranian Parliament 50 100 75 
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Table 4-4-1-1 Stability Summary Tables for Round 10 
Perceptions (percent): Expected proportion by the model for relationship between 
actors based on perceptions.  
No Issue7 Conflict Compromise Status Quo Compel 
15.38461 14.74359 26.92308 20.51282 22.4359 
 
 
Interaction of Perceptions (percent): Predicted proportion by the model for 
relationship between actors based on interaction of perception.  
No Issue Conflict Compromise Status Quo Compel 
15.38461 8.974359 33.33333 15.38461 26.92308 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 No issue denotes the percentage of relationships in that actors already agree on policy positions and 
see no conflict issue.  
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Table 4-4-3-1 Verbal Summaries of the Perceptions at Round 10.  
 
FocalGroup RivalGroup FocalView RivalView JointView 
IranSL     IranGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
IranSL     IranPar       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
IranSL     Russia        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
IranSL     China       + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
IranSL     EUCouncil   + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
IranSL     India       + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
IranSL     Pakistan    + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
IranSL     SaudiArab   + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
IranSL     IAEA        - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
IranSL     USA         + Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
IranSL     EU3         - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
IranSL     Israel      + Stalemate    - Conflict     - Compromise  
IranGov    IranSL        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
IranGov    IranPar       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
IranGov    Russia        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
IranGov    China       + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
IranGov    EUCouncil   + Compromise   + Compromise   + Compromise  
IranGov    India       + Compromise   + Compromise   + Compromise  
IranGov    Pakistan    + Compromise   + Compromise   + Compromise  
IranGov    SaudiArab   + Compromise   + Compromise   + Compromise  
IranGov    IAEA        - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
IranGov    USA         - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
IranGov    EU3         - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
IranGov    Israel      - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Compromise  
IranPar    IranSL        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
IranPar    IranGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
IranPar    Russia        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
IranPar    China       + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
IranPar    EUCouncil   + Compromise   + Compromise   + Compromise  
IranPar    India       + Compromise   + Compromise   + Compromise  
IranPar    Pakistan    + Compromise   + Compromise   + Compromise  
IranPar    SaudiArab   + Compromise   + Compromise   + Compromise  
IranPar    IAEA        - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
IranPar    USA         - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
IranPar    EU3         - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
IranPar    Israel      - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Compromise  
Russia     IranSL        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Russia     IranGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Russia     IranPar       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Russia     China       + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
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FocalGroup RivalGroup FocalView RivalView JointView 
Russia     EUCouncil   + Compromise   + Compromise   + Compromise  
Russia     India       + Compromise   + Compromise   + Compromise  
Russia     Pakistan    + Compromise   + Compromise   + Compromise  
Russia     SaudiArab   + Compromise   + Compromise   + Compromise  
Russia     IAEA        - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
Russia     USA         - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
Russia     EU3         - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
Russia     Israel      - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Compromise  
China      IranSL      - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
China      IranGov     - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
China      IranPar     - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
China      Russia      - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
China      EUCouncil   + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
China      India       - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
China      Pakistan    - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
China      SaudiArab   - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
China      IAEA        - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
China      USA         - Give In      - Compromise   - Give In     
China      EU3         - Give In      - Compromise   - Give In     
China      Israel      - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Compromise  
EUCouncil  IranSL      - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EUCouncil  IranGov     - Compromise   - Compromise   - Compromise  
EUCouncil  IranPar     - Compromise   - Compromise   - Compromise  
EUCouncil  Russia      - Compromise   - Compromise   - Compromise  
EUCouncil  China       - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
EUCouncil  India       - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
EUCouncil  Pakistan    - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
EUCouncil  SaudiArab   - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
EUCouncil  IAEA        - Stalemate    - Give In      - Give In     
EUCouncil  USA         - Stalemate    - Give In      - Give In     
EUCouncil  EU3         - Stalemate    - Give In      - Give In     
EUCouncil  Israel      - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Compromise  
India      IranSL      - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
India      IranGov     - Compromise   - Compromise   - Compromise  
India      IranPar     - Compromise   - Compromise   - Compromise  
India      Russia      - Compromise   - Compromise   - Compromise  
India      China       + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
India      EUCouncil   + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
India      Pakistan      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
India      SaudiArab     No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
India      IAEA        - Give In      - Compromise   - Give In     
India      USA         - Give In      - Compromise   - Give In     
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FocalGroup RivalGroup FocalView RivalView JointView 
India      EU3         - Give In      - Compromise   - Give In     
India      Israel      - Give In      - Conflict     - Compromise  
Pakistan   IranSL      - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
Pakistan   IranGov     - Compromise   - Compromise   - Compromise  
Pakistan   IranPar     - Compromise   - Compromise   - Compromise  
Pakistan   Russia      - Compromise   - Compromise   - Compromise  
Pakistan   China       + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
Pakistan   EUCouncil   + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
Pakistan   India         No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Pakistan   SaudiArab     No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Pakistan   IAEA        - Give In      - Compromise   - Give In     
Pakistan   USA         - Give In      - Compromise   - Give In     
Pakistan   EU3         - Give In      - Compromise   - Give In     
Pakistan   Israel      - Give In      - Conflict     - Compromise  
SaudiArab  IranSL      - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
SaudiArab  IranGov     - Compromise   - Compromise   - Compromise  
SaudiArab  IranPar     - Compromise   - Compromise   - Compromise  
SaudiArab  Russia      - Compromise   - Compromise   - Compromise  
SaudiArab  China       + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
SaudiArab  EUCouncil   + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
SaudiArab  India         No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
SaudiArab  Pakistan      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
SaudiArab  IAEA        - Give In      - Compromise   - Give In     
SaudiArab  USA         - Give In      - Compromise   - Give In     
SaudiArab  EU3         - Give In      - Compromise   - Give In     
SaudiArab  Israel      - Give In      - Conflict     - Compromise  
IAEA       IranSL      + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
IAEA       IranGov     + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
IAEA       IranPar     + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
IAEA       Russia      + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
IAEA       China       + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
IAEA       EUCouncil   + Compel       + Stalemate    + Compel      
IAEA       India       + Compromise   + Compel       + Compel      
IAEA       Pakistan    + Compromise   + Compel       + Compel      
IAEA       SaudiArab   + Compromise   + Compel       + Compel      
IAEA       USA           No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
IAEA       EU3           No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
IAEA       Israel      + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
USA        IranSL      + Stalemate    - Stalemate    + Stalemate   
USA        IranGov     + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
USA        IranPar     + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
USA        Russia      + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
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FocalGroup RivalGroup FocalView RivalView JointView 
USA        China       + Compromise   + Compel       + Compel      
USA        EUCouncil   + Compel       + Stalemate    + Compel      
USA        India       + Compromise   + Compel       + Compel      
USA        Pakistan    + Compromise   + Compel       + Compel      
USA        SaudiArab   + Compromise   + Compel       + Compel      
USA        IAEA          No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
USA        EU3           No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
USA        Israel      + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
EU3        IranSL      + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
EU3        IranGov     + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
EU3        IranPar     + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
EU3        Russia      + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
EU3        China       + Compromise   + Compel       + Compel      
EU3        EUCouncil   + Compel       + Stalemate    + Compel      
EU3        India       + Compromise   + Compel       + Compel      
EU3        Pakistan    + Compromise   + Compel       + Compel      
EU3        SaudiArab   + Compromise   + Compel       + Compel      
EU3        IAEA          No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
EU3        USA           No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
EU3        Israel      + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
Israel     IranSL      + Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
Israel     IranGov     + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compromise  
Israel     IranPar     + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compromise  
Israel     Russia      + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compromise  
Israel     China       + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compromise  
Israel     EUCouncil   + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compromise  
Israel     India       + Conflict     + Compel       + Compromise  
Israel     Pakistan    + Conflict     + Compel       + Compromise  
Israel     SaudiArab   + Conflict     + Compel       + Compromise  
Israel     IAEA        - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
Israel     USA         - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
Israel     EU3         - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
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CHAPTER 5 
THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CRISIS AND THE BAKU-
TBILISI-CEYHAN (BTC) PIPELINE 
 
 
 
Plan of the Chapter  
This chapter focuses on the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict about the autonomous 
region of Nagorno-Karabakh and this conflict’s possible influences on the BTC 
pipeline’s security. Section one discusses Azerbaijan’s energy resources and the 
importance of the pipeline for energy security. Section two introduces the Nagorno-
Karabakh crisis with its brief history and various dimensions. In the next section, I 
present the expert-generated data and a discussion of positions of the actors and their 
capabilities. Section four is a discussion of the results derived from different methods 
of analyses. In the last section, forecasts and policy implications are discussed.  
 
5.1 Azerbaijan’s Energy Resources and the BTC Pipeline 
5.1.1 Introduction  
Azerbaijan is a nation with a Turkic and Muslim majority population located in the 
South Caucasus. It was briefly independent from 1918 until 1920. In 1920, the Red 
Army invaded Azerbaijan, which remained part of the USSR until its independence in 
1991.  
 Oil has been an integral part of Azerbaijan’s economy for more than a 
millennium. Ninth century Arab traveler Baladzori (Al Belazuri Ahmad, died ca. 892) 
wrote that the economy and daily life of Absheron (a part of Azerbaijan very close to 
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the capital Baku) have been integrated with oil production for a long time (Mir-
Babayev 2002). In the Western literature, Marco Polo wrote in the fourteenth century 
that oil from Baku was being used for lighting and as an unguent for therapeutic 
healing that was exported to Near Eastern countries. In 1846, more than a decade 
before oil was discovered in Pennsylvania, Azerbaijan began drilling oil on the Bibi-
Heybat field. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Azerbaijan produced more 
than half of the world’s oil reserves (Yergin 1991, Mir-Babayev 2002).  
 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Azerbaijani parliament declared its 
independence in 1991. After becoming independent, the country found more 
opportunities to realize its vast hydrocarbon resources. In 1994, the Azeri government 
signed what is called “the contract of the century”, a deal worth 7.4 billion US dollars 
with a Western consortium led by British Petroleum (BBC News 2006). 
 Azerbaijan’s energy resources are mostly located at its Caspian Sea basin. Its 
GDP grew by 10.2 percent to 8.5 billion US dollars in 2004 due to foreign investors’ 
projects for tapping the country’s oil and gas resources. Foreign direct investment in 
Azerbaijan rose by 30 percent to 4.4 billion in the same year, and 97 percent of those 
investments was made in the hydrocarbon sector (Energy Information Agency [EIA] 
2005).  
 According to a report by the United States Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) (2002), the whole Caspian region holds 18 to 34 billion barrels of oil, which 
roughly corresponds to 1.8 to 3.3 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. This 
amount roughly equals to US oil reserves of about 22 billion barrels. Azerbaijan holds 
the second-biggest share with estimated resources of 4 to13 billion barrels 
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(Kupchinsky 2005). According to EIA statistics, Azerbaijan’s oil production averaged 
319,000 barrels per day in 2004. Until 2004 the production had risen by 
approximately 4 percent per year (EIA 2005).   
Azerbaijan also has vast natural gas resources. Its proven gas reserves are 30 
trillion cubic feet (Tcf), and it has a potential for larger reserves. In 2004, the country 
reported 177 billion cubic feet of natural gas production (EIA 2005). This sizeable 
amount of gas and oil production and further capabilities to boost it make Azerbaijan 
an important player on the global energy markets. 
 (Figure 5-1-1-1 and 5-1-1-2 about here) 
 
5.1.2 The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline 
Before the collapse of the USSR, the only way for Caspian oil and gas to reach 
Europe and other markets was via the Russian pipeline system. The EU and US 
supported the principle of multiple export routes for Caspian countries to stop their 
dependence on Russia regarding energy matters (EIA 2004). One way to achieve that 
goal was building pipelines that pass through the territories of ‘friendlier’ 
governments. The countries in the Caucasus region that maintained good relations 
with the EU and US have been Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Through the territory 
of these three countries passes the BTC pipeline. Map 1-2-1 shows where the BTC 
pipeline passes through while Map 1-2-2 presents another pipeline that carries natural 
gas to the EU market.  
 (Map 5-1-2-1 and 5-1-2-2 about here)  
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 The idea of building such the BTC pipeline was based on strategic 
considerations. The oil and gas from the region had been exclusively transported 
through Russia and Iran, which are both nations with an uneasy relationship to the 
Western world. Moreover, reducing the dependence on OPEC energy has emerged as 
a major policy tendency in the EU and US in the past decade (Study on Energy 2004). 
Hence, this pipeline is essential when it comes to securing the world markets’ energy 
supply, which is especially true for Western countries. Consequently, the US 
supported a British Petroleum-led consortium to build a pipeline carrying Azeri oil 
from the Caspian to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan while crossing 
Georgia’s capital Tbilisi. The 1762 kilometers pipeline cost about 4 billion US dollars 
and was inaugurated in May 2005 (Peuch 2005).  
With the BTC, Azerbaijan will be able to export 1 million barrels of crude oil 
from the Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli offshore oilfields in the Caspian Sea. At first view, 1 
million barrels do not seem to be very significant as measured by the world 
production of 80+ million barrels a day. However, given the rigid supply and demand 
balance in the oil markets in the last years, the BTC may prove to be an important 
tool in reducing Western dependence on Middle Eastern energy.  
 
5.1.3 BTC Pipeline Security  
The Caucasus has been a volatile region since the collapse of the Soviet Empire. It 
has always been populated by numerous ethnicities and religious groups living 
together in a relatively small area and holding territorial claims against each other. 
This led to various ethno-religious conflicts between the end of the Ottoman rule and 
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the beginning of Soviet influence in the early twentieth century. These conflicts, 
which were frozen for about 70 years, reappeared after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union at both the domestic and interstate levels. Azerbaijan and Georgia, where the 
BTC passes through, have been involved in these conflicts.  
 These two countries also face major terrorist threats. Both of them are 
American allies in the war on terrorism. International terrorist groups, such as al-
Qaeda, are reported to plan attacks on the BTC pipeline. According to Azerbaijan’s 
national security minister Namiq Abbasov, their intelligence services have obtained 
information that regional insurgents and al-Qaeda are planning attacks on the pipeline 
(Luft 2004).  
 State actors in the region may pose a threat to the security of the pipeline, as 
well. Luft (2004) suggests of all countries in the region Iran is probably the state actor 
with the strongest motivation to harm the operation of the pipeline. Iran is extremely 
agitated by the United States’ presence in two of its neighboring countries, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and perceives the US war on terror as an attempt to penetrate 
into the region in order to diminish Iran’s clout and control Caspian oil and gas. It is 
suggested that Iran may use its web of proxies or some terrorist groups that it 
supports in order to achieve its aims. This scenario appears to be even more plausible 
when considering that in the last decades the PKK bombed some other pipelines in 
southern Turkey several times.   
 On the other hand, Russia has been exceptionally critical of the BTC pipeline 
ever since its early planning stages and used a lot of political capital to prevent its 
creation, for it sees the BTC pipeline as a tool to gain control over the relationship 
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between Moscow and the former USSR states. This economic project is another step 
against the reunification of the former Soviet states. Hence, Russia might consider 
supporting groups that can sabotage the pipeline or might even ally with Iran to push 
for an alternative route southward out of the Caspian to the Persian Gulf.  
 But the already existing ethno-religious conflicts in the region appear to be a 
more probable threat to the BTC’s security compared to less likely scenarios like e.g. 
Iran’s or Russia’s support for terrorist organizations to bomb the pipeline. Many area 
experts criticized the building of a pipeline in a region so volatile. Amineh and 
Houweling (2004) suggest the BTC pipeline is closely positioned to seven conflict 
areas in the region (distances from the pipeline are given in parentheses):  
1. Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict (15 kilometers), 
2. Georgia vs. South Ossetia (55 kilometers), 
3. North Ossetia vs. Ingushetia (220 kilometers), 
4. Georgia vs. Abkhazia (130 kilometers), 
5. Russia vs. Chechnya (110 kilometers), 
6. Russia vs. Dagestan (80 kilometers), 
7. Turkey vs. PKK (The pipeline comes close to the areas where the PKK is 
influential).  
Among these conflicts, the following analysis focuses on the two that are 
positioned closest to the pipeline - the Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia-South Ossetia 
conflicts. Due to the fact that the pipeline goes through several conflict areas, it was 
argued that when economic efficiency and a state’s strategic concerns collide, the 
latter will prevail (Amineh and Houweling 2004). That is, even though building a 
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pipeline in such a dangerous area did not seem efficient, the Bush administration still 
pushed for the project due to the US’s and EU’s goal to diversify resources and 
diminish the Russian and Iranian influence in the region. All in all, the BTC pipeline 
requires protection by both Western powers, like the EU and US, as well as local 
people to remain a viable option for Western energy security.  
 
5.2 The Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis 
   Nagorno-Karabakh is an Armenian-dominated part of Azerbaijan. The 
conflict over the region is the oldest of the post-Soviet era conflicts. It began in 1988 
with inter-communal violence between Christian Armenians and Azeri Muslims in 
the region. Many parties are involved in conflict resolution processes. Russia has 
been a natural player in the negotiations; also, the OSCE’s Minsk Group has been 
actively involved in conflict resolution efforts. Especially states with closer ties to 
Azerbaijan and France, which has historically close relations with Armenia, have 
been active in the Minsk Group. On the other hand, Turkey has been a staunch ally of 
Azerbaijan ever since the beginning of the conflict and took a hard line against 
Armenia by freezing all economic and diplomatic relations and closing borders 
in1988. Hopes for a resolution were at the highest point in the mid-1990s, but at that 
time no results were achieved. Since the early 2000s, the US and Russia have been 
pushing Armenia and Azerbaijan for a long-term resolution.  
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5.2.1 Early History of the NK Crisis 1988-1996 
In the late 1980s, with Perestroika’s freedom being felt significantly in the Soviet 
republics, Karabakh Armenians began to express their grievances against the Azeri 
government. Their accusations included that the Azeris denied them cultural rights, 
resettled Muslims in the territory shifting the demographic balance, and suspicions 
that the region was not given enough resources due to its predominantly Armenian 
ethnic make-up. Consequently, the Armenians began requesting to make the region 
part of Armenia instead of Azerbaijan in the USSR system. The Armenians of the 
Union Republic of Armenia supported this suggestion and attempted to convince the 
Soviet leadership and specifically Michael Gorbachev. But Armenian demands to 
unite with Nagorno-Karabakh were decisively rejected by the Gorbachev 
administration (Matveeva 2002). As a result, the nationalist Armenians in the 
Karabakh region formed the Karabakh Committee and pressured the government of 
the Union Republic of Armenia. Under that pressure, the Armenian Supreme Soviet 
supported Karabakh Soviet’s (the local assembly in the region) call for unification. 
But to counter possible international pressure, Armenia did not formally unite with 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Instead, the regional government declared independence in 1991. 
Nagorno-Karabakh is not recognized by any state in the world, including Armenia, 
and remains as a secessionist territory (Matveeva 2002). Its status has not been 
determined as of yet.  
 On its way to independence the region witnessed one of the bloodiest ethno-
religious conflicts in the ex-Soviet republics. As early as February 1988, inter-
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communal violence began erupting. First, some 200,000 Armenians (340,000 
according to Armenian sources) fled Azerbaijan to Armenia and Russia. In 1989, 
185,000 Azeris and 11,000 Muslim Kurds were expelled from Armenia to Azerbaijan 
(Matveeva 2002).   
 The Soviet administration first attempted to mediate the conflict by sending 
peacekeeping troops and setting up an administration in the region ruled directly from 
Moscow. The Soviets also supported the Azerbaijani cause and provided military 
assistance because they perceived the conflict as an act of aggression by the 
Armenians. Until the spring of 2002, Azeri forces supported by the Soviet military 
gained the upper hand, but in the take-over struggle of the strategic corridor between 
the region and Armenia (Lachin corridor), Armenians gained the upper hand again. In 
late 1992 and early 1993, Armenian forces gained most of the territories of Nagorno-
Karabakh, including the districts of Agdam, Fizuli, Jebrail, Kelbaijar, Kubatly and 
Zangelan. In 1993 and 1994, Azeri forces made a last effort resulting in a humiliating 
defeat that caused 500,000-600,000 Azeris to flee their homes. In 1994, Moscow 
brokered a cease-fire between the parties. The number of deaths caused by inter-
communal violence and war is estimated to be about 20,000 to 30,000, and more than 
one million became internally displaced people (IDPs) (BBC News 2006).  
 
5.2.2 The Situation Since 1994 
The situation after 1994 benefited the Armenian cause in the region. Since then, the 
Nagorno-Karabakh is under Armenian control. The Republic of Armenia built strong 
ties with Karabakh Armenians. Even the first president of independent Armenia, 
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Levon Ter-Petrosyan is from the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Armenians built a 
highway that connects Armenia and the region. Economic and political ties are being 
strengthened. Even the conscripts of the Armenian army have to spend half of their 
duty time in Nagorno-Karabakh (Matveeva 2002).  
 Also, the change of the Russian position has helped Armenia to keep the 
territory under control for such a long time. In the post-Soviet period, the Russian 
elite switched sides and provided Armenia with large amounts of military equipment 
that shifted the balance of power between Armenia and Azerbaijan to the favor of the 
former. Azerbaijan did not dare to attack the region again to retake the control.  
 The Armenian economy, however, has been hampered by the blockades of 
Azerbaijan and Turkey in the last twelve years. Armenia, as a landlocked country, has 
connections with the outside world only through Iran and Georgia. Azerbaijan has 
excluded Armenia from every energy development and transportation project in the 
Caspian Sea region, including the BTC pipeline.  
 In December 1996, the OSCE’s Minsk group drafted a settlement that 
suggested protecting Azerbaijani territorial integrity and providing the highest degree 
of autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenians rejected the proposal, which was a 
diplomatic victory for Azerbaijan. By the late 1990s, foreign direct investment and 
energy resource development in Azerbaijan benefited the Azeri cause. The growing 
influence of the oil lobby on Western governments balanced out the power of the 
Armenian Diaspora in the US and Europe, especially in France. The US and France 
became more involved in the resolution of the conflict and have become co-chairs of 
the OSCE Minsk Group along with Russia. Their efforts to make a peace agreement 
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in 1997 were halted by the negative view Armenian public opinion had of the OSCE 
resolution, which suggested a self-governing status for Nagorno-Karabakh and the 
protection of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. The Armenian President Levon Ter-
Petrosyan had to resign in February 1998 due to public pressure against his support of 
the resolution (Matveeva 2002).  
 The OSCE Minsk Group further facilitated the talks between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan in the early 2000s. In 3-7 April 2001, the so-called Key West talks were 
held in the US. The Azerbaijani leader Heidar Aliyev and the Armenian leader Robet 
Kocharian met under the mediation of the US, France and Russia. Although the Key 
West talks gave momentum to the peace efforts, the final result of the talks was 
disappointing. Considering the domestic political implications, i.e., pressure from 
hardliners in both countries, the two leaders did not succeed in making a 
comprehensive arrangement (BBC News 2006). 
Issues of contention between the parties are diverse but can be briefly 
summarized as follows:  
1. Azerbaijan publicly announced it will grant the highest degree of 
autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh. The position of the Armenians and 
Karabakh’s de facto government on the issue is that they will not accept 
the region’s subordination to Baku. They insist on complete sovereignty of 
the region.  
2. Azerbaijan demands that Armenia withdraw from the territory around the 
region (other than Nagorno-Karabakh) that belongs to the former. 
According to Matveeva (2002), Armenia accepts the return of most of the 
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territories it is currently occupying in principle but wants to keep those 
territories as a bargaining chip for Nagorno-Karabakh’s security.  
3. The Armenian side demands security guarantees in case they withdraw 
from the region, such as the right to return its military whenever 
necessary, long-term presence of international peacekeepers and the 
permanent maintenance of the Lachin corridor that connects Nagorno-
Karabakh to Armenia.  
4. Azerbaijan insists all IDPs, especially the ones expelled from the 
predominantly Azeri city of Susha in Nagorno-Karabakh, must be allowed 
to return. According to various sources, Susha’s population was 
predominantly Azeri before the 1992 war; however, for Armenians it is a 
historically Armenian city that has a symbolic meaning.  
5. There is a disagreement over the schedule for resolving the crisis. The 
Minsk group advocated a phased approach that was accepted by 
Azerbaijan. However, the Armenian side favors what it calls a “package” 
solution and argues that the phased approach will only benefit Azerbaijan, 
given that Armenia has to give up territory at the first stage. There is a 
huge lack of trust between the parties that makes the resolution of the 
conflict more difficult Matveeva (2002).  
 
These issues are still debated today. The presidents of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan have announced their plan to meet yet another time this June to discuss 
the status of the region (Khachatrian 2006).  
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5.3 Analysis with the Expected Utility Model 
5.3.1 Expert-Generated Data 
Two experts, one specializing on ex-Soviet Republics in the Caucasus and the other 
focusing on politics in the region in general independently produced the coding of the 
actors, positions, capabilities and issue salience scores for the Nagorno-Karabakh 
issue. I have received the coding from the senior academic on December 27, 2005. 
The detailed instructions the experts received can be found in the research design 
section and appendices of this dissertation. The experts were asked the following 
question: What are the attitudes of stakeholders toward Nagorno-Karabakh’s 
autonomy issue? The coding by the senior analyst is as follows:  
  (Table 5-3-1-1 about here) 
 
5.3.2 Positions of the Actors  
According to the area experts, various Azeri, Armenian and international actors are 
involved in the bargaining process about the future of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
According to the senior expert whose coding I used for this analysis, there are 17 
actors who are all stakeholders and actively involved in the conflict resolution 
processes. Figure 5-3-2-1 presents the policy positions of these actors about Nagorno-
Karabakh’s sovereignty on a continuum.  
  (Figure 5-3-2-1 about here) 
 First of all, let us evaluate the Azeri and Armenian actors’ position that matter 
most due to the salience they naturally associate with the issue. Since the Nagorno-
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Karabakh region was lost to the Armenians in the 1994 war, the current Azeri 
government of Ilham Aliev came to power with the promise of retaking control over 
the region at all costs. However, this appears to be a rhetorical tool used for domestic 
political purposes. President Aliev has suggested Azerbaijan supports a more 
moderate position on this issue that proposes a high degree of autonomy for the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region. One can verify President Aliev’s position after his latest 
visit to Washington D.C. in April 2006. In his meeting with the Bush administration, 
Aliev made it clear that Azerbaijan will never allow its territory to be partitioned, yet 
also added that the region’s people have the right to some form of sovereignty:  
“The residents of Nagorno-Karabakh have the right to high 
sovereignty in the framework of the territorial wholeness of 
Azerbaijan which is apparent in many other countries including 
the European countries. They must be given distinct political 
guarantees that the peace in the region will be everlasting.” 
(Armenian News Agency, 27 April 2006) 
 
 
 What this stance means in the real conflict resolution processes is not 
extremely obvious due to the secretive nature of bargaining between the two 
countries’ presidents led by the OSCE Minsk group. However, some sources and our 
area experts verified that the Azeri government’s position implies the following 
clauses.  
 According to the EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit)1, although the official 
details of the meetings of fall 2005 were not released, a “credible scenario” suggests 
that Azerbaijan’s position is to take back six (or all seven) territories that Armenia 
holds, in return for agreeing a plebiscite in Nagorno-Karabakh in 10 or 15 years. 
Azerbaijan also is speculated to agree on bringing peacekeeping forces to the region 
                                                 
1 Country Report on Armenia. November 1, 2005.  
 138
from countries, in addition to the OSCE Minsk Group members. The government’s 
position value for this simulation is (60) in a continuum where (100) equals full 
independence and (0) denotes no sovereignty for Nagorno-Karabakh.  
 While President Aliev’s position aims to reach a resolution, the Azerbaijani 
opposition parties, at least in rhetoric, are against making any concessions to Armenia 
or the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. Currently, Azerbaijan’s political system is 
not considered a democracy.2 According to the 2005 Freedom House Report on 
Azerbaijan, the country is considered to be “not free” with extremely low scores for 
democratic rights3 civil rights4: 
“Throughout 2004, Ilham [Aliev] attempted to put his stamp on 
Azerbaijani politics and consolidate his position among the 
country's ruling elite, but his rule did not reflect any significant 
change in governance. The level of official control of key 
institutions remained high, while the political opposition, 
which was weak and splintered, provided little serious 
challenge to the country's leadership.  … More than 40 political 
parties are registered. However, most opposition parties are 
weak and are based on personalities rather than political 
platforms, and they have been unable to unite in lasting 
alliances to challenge the government. Hundreds of opposition 
activists and leaders were detained by police in the weeks 
surrounding the October 2003 presidential election. The 
repressive posture of the authorities continued throughout 
2004.” (Freedom House 2005) 
 
 
Despite their weaknesses, the opposition in Azerbaijan uses strong rhetoric 
against the government on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The opposition parties5 
                                                 
2 A brief presentation of less-known actors involved in this bargaining such as Azerbaijani Opposition, 
Armenian Opposition and Nagorno-Karabakh Government and Opposition can be found at the 
appendix of this chapter.  
3 In a continuum from 1 to 6, 6 being least free, Azerbaijan got 6 (Freedom House 2005). 
4 In a continuum from 1 to 6, 6 being the least civil rights granted to the people, Azerbaijan got 5 
(Freedom House 2005). 
5 Two main opposition groups in Azerbaijan are Azadliq (Freedom) Bloc and YeS (Yeni Siyaset [New 
Politics]).  
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generally direct their criticism against the Aliev administration’s possible approval of 
a referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh. Leader of the YeS opposition alliance and 
former presidential aide Eldar Namazov argued that agreeing to a referendum 
conflicts with Azerbaijan’s national interests:  "There is no way to conduct a 
referendum in the occupied territories and every single attempt to do so is doomed" 
(Abbasov 2005). The Azeri opposition has a point in their criticism of the government 
that the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh had already voted for secession and that 
there is no reason they would vote against it in a future referendum. That is, agreeing 
to a referendum might mean the permanent loss of the territory. Also, the opposition 
leaders suggest that the constitution of Azerbaijan does not allow for partial 
referenda. Any held referendum must be voted on in all Azerbaijan, not only in 
Karabakh. Most of the opposition parties are also against granting substantial 
autonomy to the region. Therefore, their position value was determined as 20 in this 
simulation, which refers to a withdrawal of Armenian troops from all occupied 
territories, the return of refugees to Nagorno-Karabakh and granting limited 
autonomy to the region.  
The position of the Armenians and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians are very 
close to one another. The stated position of the Armenian government suggests that 
the people of Nagorno-Karabakh must be given a right to exist within safe borders 
and that a link to the Republic of Armenia (i.e. the Lachin corridor) must be 
maintained. Although in recent years their position appears to be slightly less rigid 
than it used to be, the Armenian government supports full sovereignty of the region. 
However, the Armenian government also seems to accept that a legal union with the 
 140
region is very difficult despite the de facto union that is already established. For that 
reason, the position of the Armenian government equals (90), which refers to 
supporting an independent Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the Armenian opposition 
takes a more nationalist stance and supports full unification with Nagorno-Karabakh, 
which the value of (100) refers to on our continuum. Especially the idea of a 
plebiscite within the next 10 to15 years is harshly criticized by the opposition due to 
the fear of a population change with the return of refugees, as well as higher birth 
rates on the Azeri side.  
On the other hand, the aim of Nagorno-Karabakh’s de facto government is to 
unite with the Republic of Armenia. The government, composed of Armenian 
nationalists, has been supportive of this idea for more than a decade. One of the few 
points of disagreement between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia might concern 
Nagorno-Karabakh’s participation in negotiations as a party. Naturally, the Nagorno-
Karabakh government does not want to accept any solution that does not involve the 
government itself in the bargaining. On the other hand, the opposition in the country 
criticizes the government for being so rigid about their stance on unification and 
suggests full independence is enough for the time being. The Nagorno-Karabakh de 
facto government’s position is represented by a 100 while the opposition’s position 
takes the value 90 on the policy continuum.  
All Muslim countries in the region support the position of the Azerbaijani 
government (i.e. 60). These countries include Turkey, Iran, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan. Among these four, Turkey and Iran are more important than the other 
two due to the power they can use in the region. Turkey is the staunchest supporter of 
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Azerbaijan for a number of reasons. First and foremost, Turkey sees Azerbaijan as a 
great opportunity for securing its own energy. The BTC pipeline provides Turkey 
with more energy than it can use in the immediate future. Second, cultural and 
religious ties are extremely strong between the two countries. This affects public 
opinion and thereby respectively the Turkish governments’ support for Azerbaijan in 
its efforts to keep its territory intact. Third, Turkey also has its own problems with 
Armenia. Mass killings of Armenians during World War I are labeled as ‘genocide’ 
by Armenia while Turkey defines these deaths only as casualties of war. Hence, 
Turkey has both politically and militarily supported Azerbaijan in its efforts to solve 
the problem and maintained a blockade against Armenia that has been very harmful 
to the Armenian economy.  
Iran, on the other hand, has a more complex stance. It appears to support 
Azerbaijan, however, this support is not as stable as Turkey’s. First, Iran has always 
been concerned about Azerbaijan’s expansion, given that more Azeris live in 
Northern Iran (or Southern Azerbaijan) than in Azerbaijan. Second, due to the 
effective blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia had to approach Iran for trade 
reasons, given that it is one of two exits (along with Georgia) left for the country with 
the outer world. Third, Iran is alarmed about the close relations between Azerbaijan  
and the US and America’s growing influence in the region. Therefore, Iran’s support 
for Azerbaijan can change in the future as it did in the past.  
Being embargoed and blockaded by the energy-rich Azerbaijan and Turkey, 
which has the only dynamic economy in the region, resulted in Armenia having no 
one to turn to but Russia. Russian firms penetrate into most of the civilian and 
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defense industry deals in Armenia at the expense of the latter. The Russian position, 
however, is not one of the pro-Armenian. Although there exist cultural and religious 
ties, as well as economic relations between the two, Russia pledged neutrality in the 
conflict during recent years. This is not surprising at all considering the Russian 
policy on ethnic conflicts in the ex-Soviet republics after the breakup of the Union. 
Russia gains from the status quo in the region and therefore does not use its weight to 
favor either one of the actors. That means the area expert correctly identified the 
Russian position as the status quo position with a value of 80. The Russian position 
on the issue might change depending on the specific conditions of future events in the 
region. If Russia feels even more displeased with the US’s control over the region, it 
might support Azerbaijan in order not to lose it to America as an ally as it did Georgia 
in the Rose Revolution.  
All Western countries and institutions (France, the EU [other than France], the 
EU Council, US) and the UN Secretary General support a more median position 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The European countries and the US are very 
concerned about stability in the region, mostly due to its energy resources and its role 
as a diverse source other than the Middle East. For the EU, the conflict also has a 
regional security dimension. Especially the US supports the Aliev government despite 
its human rights violations and fraud elections, because it perceives Azeri oil as one 
way to reduce the dependency on Middle Eastern oil. Since the mid-1990s, the US 
has used enormous political capital to make BTC possible with British Petroleum, 
despite Russia’s and Iran’s opposition, economic difficulties and criticism that 
building the pipeline was economically inefficient.  
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The position of these four actors (i.e. 70) suggests that they do not approve 
Armenia’s involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the 1990s and the 
annexation of territory by conquest. However, they do support self-determination 
rights for the Armenian population in the region.  
Lastly, Georgia’s position on this issue is remarkable. The expert assigned a 
position value of 45 to Georgia. Georgians and Armenians are culturally close 
communities. However, this affinity does not turn into full support for Armenia. In 
fact, Georgia is closer to the Azeri opposition, which favors control of the region by 
Baku. This is because of the economic ties with Azerbaijan, as well as Georgia’s own 
ethnic problems. In a small country like Georgia, the government has had to deal with 
three different ethnic secessionist groups ever since its independence. Consequently, 
Georgia does not want Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence to serve as an example for 
its own ethnic minorities. But Georgia also has its own Armenian minority in 
Javakitha, which makes it to have a more balanced position. For fear of Armenia’s 
possible provocation, Georgia supports Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity with some 
form of autonomy granted to Nagorno-Karabakh.  
 
5.3.3 Capabilities Distribution 
    
The absolute and effective capability distribution figures represent one major reality 
of international politics in the Caucasus: the rivalry between Russia and the US. 
Figure 5-3-3-1 shows the absolute capability distribution, both Russia and US have 9 
percent each of the total capabilities in this bargaining situation. Due to the energy 
resources in the Caspian Sea, a rivalry similar to the Cold War continues between the 
two superpowers in the region. Their power share is even bigger than that of the 
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actors whose territory is at stake, such as Azerbaijan or the Nagorno-Karabakh 
administration. Considering how small these countries and territories are, it is not 
surprising they have less capabilities than Russia or the US. The only other country 
with an equally high degree of capability is France owing to its role in the OSCE 
Minsk Group. The UN Secretary General has 7 percent of the total absolute 
capabilities.  
 (Figure 5-3-3-1 about here) 
 The Azerbaijani, Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh governments hold the 
second-biggest share of capabilities, each having 7 percent. A further group of actors 
that have a considerable amount of influence in this bargaining process includes the 
EU, the EU Council and Turkey. The EU and the EU Council, due to their rather new 
and weaker foreign policy institutions, have only 6 percent each of the total power. 
Turkey has 6 percent of the total power, as well, for it is so closely located to the 
conflict region and has good relations with Azerbaijan.  
 In this case, effective capabilities are fairly similar to absolute capabilities. 
The reason is that the salience of the issue is extremely high for many of the actors 
involved. The salience scores in Figure 5-3-3-2 show that the issue is of highest 
importance to the natural actors such as Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, 
as well as to the actors that are concerned with energy security, like the US, EU, 
Russia and Turkey. Therefore, the discount effect of salience does not cause as much 
variance as it did in the Iranian case discussed in the previous chapter. The US, 
Russia and France have 10 percent each of the capabilities, while Azerbaijan, 
Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh hold 8 percent, respectively. Figures 5-3-3-3 and 5-
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3-3-4 show the effective capability distribution in this bargaining. Russia and US 
appear to be the most influential actors. Figure 5-3-3-4 shows that the most influential 
six actors, i.e. Russia, US, France and Azeri, Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh 
governments, hold the 54 percent of the capabilities compared to the other eleven 
actors who hold 46 percent of total capabilities.     
(Figures 5-3-3-2, 5-3-3-3 and 5-3-3-4 about here) 
 Lastly, in this section a discussion of the effective capabilities distribution by 
positions is relevant. The positions of all actors involved in this bargaining process 
can be summarized under the following five general standpoints: pro-Azerbaijani, 
pro-Armenian, status quo, hardliners (against the autonomy of the region) and 
moderate positions.  
 (Figures 5-3-3-5 and 5-3-3-6 are about here) 
 Figures 5-3-3-5 and 5-3-3-6 show how effective capabilities in this game are 
distributed across policy positions. The biggest position bloc is the moderate position 
coalition, which includes the US, EU, the EU Council, the UN Secretary General and 
France. This shows that world opinion favors a solution that respects Azerbaijan’s 
territorial integrity and self-determination rights for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. 
The second-biggest bloc is comprised of pro-Armenian actors, which includes all 
Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh stakeholders. The third bloc holds a pro-Azerbaijan 
position and consists of the Azeri government, Turkey, Iran, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan. Although the number of actors is high in this group it still falls behind 
the Armenian bloc, for Kazakhstan’s and Turkmenistan’s effective capabilities equal 
almost zero. The fourth group consists of the hardliner Azeri opposition and Georgia, 
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which does not favor the independence movements in the region on account of its 
own domestic ethnic conflicts. Lastly, only Russia favors the status quo, holding 10 
percent of the effective power.  
 
5.3.4 Position Min-Max and Averages   
The expected utility analysis for the Iranian nuclear issue was completed in eleven 
rounds. The model is based on the following logical implication: If the status quo 
appeared to be more preferable for all of the involved actors than offering additional 
proposals to the others and continuing the bargaining process, the expected utility 
analysis was ended and the median voter’s position at this point won.  
 The simulation minimum and maximum values explain the range of 
bargaining positions during the simulation. The bargaining began with a position 
range of 80. Armenian nationalists of Nagorno-Karabakh began the bargaining with a 
position of 100 at round 1, while the Azeri nationalist opposition started at 20. After 
round 4, the position range was down to 22 and eventually to 20 at the end of the 
tenth round, as the actors with marginal positions were convinced to shift to more 
moderate positions. At round 10, the position closest to the pro-Armenian takes a 
value of 80, which equals favoring the status quo. The lowest position value is a 59, 
which is very close to the Azeri government’s compromising deal. The position 
average did not show much variance and maintained a value around 65.  
 (Figure 5-3-4-1 about here)  
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5.4 Results  
5.4.1 The Bargaining Process 
The expected utility analysis concluded that the bargaining on the sovereignty 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh region is likely to favor the position of the Azerbaijani 
government. That is, the Azeri government’s proposal, which calls for a return of the 
refugees and the withdrawal of Armenian military from the region in return for a 
plebiscite in ten to fifteen years, is likely to be the resolution of the conflict. At the 
end of round 11, the median voter position 60 exactly equals the position of the Azeri 
government. However, considering how the median voter position changed between 
60 and 70 from round 6 to 11, one might conclude that the US’s position – a return of 
the refugees, pulling out Armenian troops and a plebiscite as soon as possible - is not 
a remote possibility.6  
 The stability analysis of the simulations suggests this prediction is fairly 
stable. An analysis of the joint perceptions shows the conflict perception that might 
indicate instable results is very low. Only 8.82 percent of the total perceptions in this 
analysis contain conflictual perceptions. This means that the likelihood of actors 
pursuing more bargaining in a conflictual manner is quite low. Especially an 
interstate conflict is less likely to happen in the near future for Nagorno-Karabakh.  
   (Table 5-4-1-1 about here) 
 On the other hand, the biggest share of the interacted perceptions fell into the 
‘compel’ category. 33 percent of the total interacted perceptions are ‘compel’. This 
                                                 
6 In fact, the first forecast of the model is the United States position (70) at round 2. The dynamics of 
the game changes substantially as Armenian Government, France and Georgia come closer to the 
Azeri resolution; and Armenian Opposition, Iran and Nagorno-Karabakh de facto government comes 
close to the Russian position. To show these dynamics, all eleven rounds are presented.  
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means that credible proposals offered during the bargaining compelled other actors to 
shift their positions in favor of the proposing actors’ offers. An analysis of the 
changes in the Armenian actors’ positions during the bargaining shows that this result 
is not surprising. The specific shifts will be discussed in the next sections. Another 
interesting result is that 30.14 percent of all perceptions suggest ‘no issue’ among the 
actors at the end of bargaining round 11. This means there is a considerable number 
of actors that agree on each others’ positions, i.e. their positions are identical, which 
suggests the prediction is fairly stable.    
Figure 5-4-1-1 shows how the bargaining on the sovereignty of Nagorno-
Karabakh evolved over several rounds. At the end of round 11, the prediction of the 
model is 60, which equals the Azerbaijani government’s position. Only at round 3, 
the Russian status quo position was dominant. After round 6 until the end of the 
round 11, the median voter forecast changed ranging from 60 to 70.  
   (Figure 5-4-1-1 and 5-4-1-2 about here) 
 Figure 5-4-1-2 shows the forecasts for each round and the linear trend line 
drawn for the forecast values. The linear trend line suggests the more extended the 
bargaining, the better for the Azerbaijani government’s position. That is, beginning 
from the first round, the position trend develops downward, which favors the 
Azerbaijani government; the “no sovereignty” position equaled zero, while the 
position favoring full independence took a value of 100. This shows that 
uncompromising positions of Armenian actors, both in and out of Nagorno-Karabakh, 
are only harmful to their own interests. Towards the end of the bargaining, more 
actors are compelled to support the Azerbaijani position or positions close to it. These 
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actors included the government of the Republic of Armenia, which was compelled to 
shift toward the Azerbaijani government’s position 60 after round 4. A more thorough 
analysis of the bargaining and positions shifts will explain this point further.  
 
5.4.2 Position Shifts 
The expected utility software produced a total of 196 pages of output showing the 
position shifts and specific bargaining proposals of the actors for this simulation. Due 
to space constraints only the most significant proposals and shifts by the actors are 
summarized below.  
 Perhaps the most important shift in this simulation was made by the 
government of the Republic of Armenia. At round 3, the Armenian government 
received a credible proposal from the Azerbaijani administration. This led to a 
considerable shift in the position of the Armenian government from 87.89 to 60 
(numerically 27.89 points shift). After the fourth round, the Armenian government 
did not change its stance and maintained its compromise position. The Armenian 
opposition, on the other hand, already made a significant shift at round 1. Russia 
made a credible proposal to the Armenian opposition to shift to its own position of 
supporting the status quo, and the attempt was successful. These two changes seem 
plausible when considering the real life situation in the conflict. Armenia is 
economically overwhelmed owing to the Azeri and Turkish blockades, and it is 
possible that the Armenian government wants to break the encirclement to become 
involved in regional economic developments. The Armenian opposition, seeing that 
their quest for unification is almost impossible to realize, might want the status quo to 
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continue, a situation in which they still have a de facto union with Nagorno-
Karabakh.  
 The EU and the EU Council’s shifts are remarkable, as well. Between the 
rounds 6 and 10, they switch between their original position of 70 and the Azeri 
government’s position of 60. There are three actors that led to the EU and EU 
Council’s shifting positions. In rounds 7 to 11, the European actors were constantly 
being moved to shift their position back and forth; first the US achieved a change to 
70, which equals the US position, and then in each following round the two European 
actors were impacted to change their position to 60 by Azerbaijan and France. 
Eventually, the EU and the EU Council were compelled by the French and Azeri 
proposal. Although France’s initial position was 70 at round 1, it was convinced by 
the Azeri government to shift to 60. After this shift, France also called for the 
proposal that suggests a future plebiscite in the region.  
 When we analyze the shifts of two very important regional actors, Iran and 
Georgia, the expected utility analysis’ predictions appears to go in line with the real 
politics of the region. At round 2, Iran was given a convincing proposal by Russia, the 
Nagorno-Karabakh government and the Armenian opposition to switch to the status 
quo position. This makes perfect sense in real life when considering the power 
struggle and the blocs of influence in the region. Russia and Iran are trying to break 
the US’s and EU’s influence. Given that Russia favors the status quo and supports 
Armenia economically, and Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are in desperate need of 
Iran’s support due to the economic blockage, it is possible that Iran will take a stance 
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against the position of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia, which have relatively better 
relations with the US and EU.  
 On the other hand, although Georgia favored an even harder line regarding 
Nagorno-Karabakh’s autonomy, the Azeri government’s diplomatic efforts seem 
likely to win Georgia’s support. At round 2, Georgia is compelled by the Azerbaijani 
government to shift to Azerbaijan’s position. Lastly, the UN Secretary General 
accepted a credible proposal from Russia and shifted from a moderate position (70) to 
the status quo position.  
 Azerbaijan, Turkey (pro-Azeri position) and the US (moderate position) did 
not change their position during the bargaining.  
 
5.4.3 Analysis of Perceptions and Stability  
In this part, the evolution of perceptions, as well as the perceptions of the actors 
involved at the end of bargaining, will be discussed.  
Figures 5-4-3-1 and 5-4-3-2 show how the perceptions of each actor i have 
evolved over the bargaining rounds. Note the peak points for the variable i-conflict 
(that represents the percentage of conflict perceptions in total perceptions for each 
actor) can be seen at rounds 4, 5 and 6. The explanation for the occurrence of this 
peak is simple: As the Armenian government decided to compromise with Azerbaijan 
and the rest of the Western and international actors, another group of actors, namely 
the domestic opposition, the Nagorno-Karabakh government, Iran and Russia 
perceived their relation with Armenia as more conflictual.  
(Figures 5-4-3-1 and 5-4-3-2 about here) 
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However, in terms of forecasting conflicts that can turn into diplomatic or 
military crises, the joint perceptions variable is a better estimator. Figures 5-4-3-3 and 
5-4-3-4 represent the evolution of joint perceptions during the bargaining rounds. 
Although in round 4, right after the Armenian government compromises, the joint 
conflict perceptions reach a peak, the joint perceptions percentage as part of the total 
perceptions is the second-lowest at the end of round 10. At this point, the two most 
joint perceptions subscribed to by actors are “compel” and “no issue”. These joint 
perceptions results suggest that the results are fairly stable and conflict is less likely to 
appear in the future regarding Nagorno-Karabakh’s sovereignty issue.  
(Figures 5-4-3-3 and 5-4-3-4 about here) 
 Figures 5-4-3-5 through 5-4-3-12 present the individual actors’ perceptions at 
the time of completion of the expected utility analysis. Reviewing these perceptions is 
valuable for anticipating the future of the Nagorno-Karabakh sovereignty issue. The 
evaluation of the total perceptions gives a general idea about the stability of the 
results. In this case, the total perceptions are less conflictual. However, if an 
important actor, such as Russia, perceives its relations with other actors in a 
conflictual way, depending on changes at the domestic and systemic levels, it might 
decide to challenge the other actors about the issue in the future.  
 (Figures 5-4-3-5 through 5-4-3-12 about here) 
 I will begin with the perceptions of the EU and the governments of 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, France and Turkey (Figures 5-4-3-5 to 5-4-3-9), which are all 
very similar. At the end of the expected utility analysis, these actors were fairly 
satisfied with the outcome. For all five actors, no other actor’s perception falls into 
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the upper right quadrant: i.e. these actors do not perceive a relationship prone to 
conflict with the rest. They see Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as actors that are still 
convincible to shift to their policy position (see Figure 4-4-3-1). On the other hand, 
the EU and the other four actors sharing similar perceptions, observe a stalemate 
position with the Nagorno-Karabakh government, the Armenian opposition, Russia, 
UNSG, Iran and US. Although there is no agreement between the groups of actors, no 
actor rationally considers making a proposal to change the other’s position. Making a 
proposal is more costly than the stalemate position.  
 The perceptions of the Nagorno-Karabakh government (see Figure 5-4-3-10) 
show that the actor is the least satisfied with the result of the bargaining. Naturally, 
Nagorno-Karabakh wants independence or unification, and as the Azerbaijan 
government’s proposal wins the bargaining on the sovereignty issue, the government 
of the region perceives the relationships with all actors but four as conflictual. Those 
four actors are Russia, UNSG, the Armenian opposition and Iran, all of which support 
the continuation of the status quo rather than giving into the Azerbaijani and Western 
demands. The Nagorno-Karabakh government sees itself at odds with the remaining 
twelve actors. The least conflictual relationship it has is with the US government7, 
which suggests a more moderate resolution, while the most conflictual relationship is 
with Azeri opposition.  
 (Figure 5-4-3-10 about here)  
                                                 
7 One can see the mathematical representation of this relationship in figure 20. The US is the closest 
actor to the 0 point where Nagorno-Karabakh perceives “no-issue” with actors. On the other hand, as 
one actor goes to the more upper right points in the “conflict” quadrant, this shows their positions with 
the focal group is most different.  
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 Lastly, the Russian and American perceptions on the issue will be discussed. 
Figure 5-4-3-11 shows the Russian perceptions after the expected utility analysis was 
completed. The figure shows fairly unsatisfied perceptions. Other than the status quo 
powers that share the same policy position, Russia perceives itself at odds with the 
rest of all actors, most of all with the EU, the EU Council and Azerbaijan. Russia also 
sees its relationship with the US as troubled.  
 The American perceptions on the issue also do not show an extremely 
satisfied actor. The US supports a more moderate solution with a plebiscite to be held 
rather earlier than later and disagrees with the Azerbaijani government’s resolution. 
Therefore, it senses a stalemate situation with its usual allies like France, Turkey and 
Georgia, as well as with the Azeri government. The US expects the EU and EU 
council to acquiesce to its demands on the issue. On the more risky side of the story, 
the US has a perception of conflict with Russia, the Nagorno-Karabakh government, 
the Armenian opposition, UNSG and Iran. Hence, the US might prove to be a 
revisionist actor on this issue. The rivalry of these important actors and their joint 
perceptions that suggest conflict leads to the last part of this chapter, where the 
implications of this competition will be discussed.  
 (Table 5-4-3-1, Figure 5-4-3-11 and 5-4-3-12 about here) 
 
5.5 Discussion  
In a comprehensive analysis of the lines of conflict in the South Caucasus and Central 
Asia, Oliker and Szayna (2003) suggest that an interstate armed clash among smaller 
states is one of the most likely types of conflict in a region where the US-Turkey dyad 
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is likely to counter Russia-Iran dyad’s influence.  The results of this chapter confirm 
their analysis and expand on it, finding that the EU will be an actor of vital 
importance in this region, as well.  
 The analysis suggests that the Nagorno-Karabakh sovereignty issue is likely to 
involve a resolution that favors the Azeri government. A second likely outcome could 
involve the US’s position that only differs in favoring an earlier plebiscite in the 
region. Both of these options run contrary to Russian interests in the region. The 
expected utility analysis suggests that Russia will draw a fair amount of support for 
the continuation of the status quo from the states that generally have problematic 
relations with the EU and US. Armenian nationalists and Iran are likely to support 
Russia’s actions in the region. Although the forecast in this chapter proposes a 
peaceful resolution to the problem, one might conclude that the Russian foreign 
policy and military developments will be very influential in the region.  
 Table 5-4-4-3-1 shows the verbal representation of these perceptions by actors 
at the end of round 11. Russia’s “focal view” is one of a “conflict” with US, EU and 
the EU Council. In fact, other than the actors that Russia successfully switched to her 
position, the former perceives a conflictual relationship with the rest of the actors. 
However, the interesting point here is that, the joint perceptions show that Russia 
expects to given in or compromise in favor of the rivals in this bargaining.  
 Azerbaijan, on the other hand, is likely to further develop its relations with the 
EU, US and Turkey for its best interests. Its close military cooperation with Turkey 
and economic collaboration with the US and European countries is resolute. 
Azerbaijan government has a perception of conflict with the Azeri opposition and 
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expects Russia and Iran to given in to her demands at the end of round 11 (See 5-4-4-
3-1). 
The job the Armenian government has is perhaps the most difficult. It seems 
like the Armenian administration will be willing to compromise in order to find a 
resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which would allow Armenia to end the 
economic and border isolation in the region. Achieving this goal, however, would be 
exceptionally difficult due to the nationalist pressures in both Armenia and Nagorno-
Karabakh. Russia and Iran perceives “conflict” with Armenian government as Table 
5-4-3-1 suggests.   
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5.6 Appendix. Information on Involved Azerbaijani and Armenian Actors   
Nagorno-Karabakh Government and Opposition  
Ever since the end of the 1994 war, the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region has 
been under the protection of Armenian soldiers. Its self-declared sovereignty is not 
recognized by any state or entity, including the Republic of Armenia. In 1997, the 
first elected president of the region, Arkady Gukasyan, was installed, and he was 
reelected in 2002. The highest legislative and representative body in the de facto 
independent region is the National Assembly. The Nagorno-Karabakh government’s 
ultimate aim is to join the Republic of Armenia, although the Armenian government 
resisted these pressures for fear of an international backlash and further conflicts with 
Azerbaijan.  
 Currently, there are three political parties in the National Assembly, these are 
the Democratic Party of Artsahk (12 seats), Free Motherland (10 seats) and 
ARF/Movement 888 (3 seats), non partisans (8 seats) (Office of the Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic in the USA, 2006). 
 
Azeri Opposition  
Inspired by the revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan’s 
opposition has been using hostile tactics against the Aliev government since the 
beginning of 2005 (Abbasov and Ismailova 2005). The three main opposition parties 
are the Musavat, the Popular Front and the Democratic Party. They formed a coalition 
for the November 2005 parliamentary elections but did not win against President 
Aliev. Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the issues that pressure the government. The 
                                                 
8 Armenian Revolutionary Federation (HHD) and Movement 88. 
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opposition parties are considerably more nationalistic than the government when it 
comes to Nagorno-Karabakh. They also are more critical of peace proposals and 
argue that some form of autonomy is enough for the region and more concessions 
would only be humiliating (Van der Schriek 2003).  
 
Opposition in the Republic of Armenia 
In recent years, the opposition in Armenia has been pressuring the government and 
President Kocharian to initiate democratic reforms. The Armenian opposition was 
expected to increase their effectiveness of fostering democratization by jumping on 
the bandwagon of  democratic revolutions  in the region, like in Ukraine and 
Georgia,.Yet, the Hanrapetutiun (Republic) Party (23 members), the National Unity 
Party (9 seats), the Ardarutiun (Justice) bloc (14 members) and Orinats Yerkir (12 
members), which are among the most influential parties in the parliament have not 
been very successful in establishing more democratic rights in the country (National 
Assembly of Armenia Website 2006). They tend to take a more hardliner position 
when it comes to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The opposition parties, for example, 
are against troop withdrawals from the region and also against holding another 
plebiscite. They argue that there was one plebiscite held in 1991, in which the 
independence option prevailed. They also claim that further referenda will only help 
Azerbaijanis, who have higher birthrates (Khathacrian 2005).  
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Table 5-3-1-1 The Expert Generated Data.  
 
Actor 
Resource 
(1-100) 
Position 
(0-100) 
Salience 
(1-100) 
Azeri Government 
(Aliyev) 
80 60 100 
Azeri Opposition 
Bloc (Azadlıq) 60 20 100 
Armenian 
Government 
(Kocharyan) 
80 90 100 
Armenian 
Opposition 60 100 100 
De facto N-K 
Government 
(President 
Ghukasian) 
80 100 100 
N-K Opposition 
(Babayan) 
60 90 100 
Russia 100 80 100 
United States 100 70 100 
France 100 70 90 
Turkey 60 60 100 
UN Secretary 
General 80 70 80 
EU (Other than 
France) 60 70 60 
EU Council(High 
Representative 
Havier Solana) 
60 70 60 
Iran 40 60 70 
Georgia 50 45 90 
Kazakhstan 10 60 10 
Turkmenistan 10 60 10 
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Table 5-4-1-1 Stability Summary Tables for Round 11 
Perceptions (percent): Expected proportion by the model for relationship between 
actors based on perceptions.  
No Issue9 Conflict Compromise Status Quo Compel 
30.14706 30.88235 0.735294 23.52941 14.70588 
 
 
Interaction of Perceptions (percent): Predicted proportion by the model for 
relationship between actors based on interaction of perception.  
No Issue Conflict Compromise Status Quo Compel 
30.14706 8.823529 22.79412 5.147059 33.08823 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 No issue denotes the percentage of relationships in that actors already agree on policy positions and 
see no conflict issue.  
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Table 5-4-3-1 Verbal Summary of Perceptions at Round 11 
FocalGroup RivalGroup FocalView RivalView JointView 
Russia     NKGov         No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Russia     ArmeOpp       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Russia     UNSG          No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Russia     Iran          No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Russia     USA         - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
Russia     EUCouncil   + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compel      
Russia     EU          + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compel      
Russia     AzerGov     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
Russia     ArmeGov     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
Russia     Turkey      - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
Russia     NKOpp       - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
Russia     France      - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
Russia     Georgia     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
Russia     Turkmen     + Conflict     + Compel       + Compromise  
Russia     Kazakhstan  + Conflict     + Compel       + Compromise  
Russia     AzerOpp     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
NKGov      UNSG          No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
NKGov      Iran          No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
NKGov      USA         - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
NKGov      EUCouncil   + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compel      
NKGov      EU          + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compel      
NKGov      AzerGov     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
NKGov      ArmeGov     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
NKGov      Turkey      - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
NKGov      NKOpp       - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
NKGov      France      - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
NKGov      Georgia     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
NKGov      Turkmen     + Conflict     + Compel       + Compromise  
NKGov      Kazakhstan  + Conflict     + Compel       + Compromise  
NKGov      AzerOpp     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
ArmeOpp    Russia        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
ArmeOpp    NKGov         No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
ArmeOpp    UNSG          No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
ArmeOpp    Iran          No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
ArmeOpp    USA         - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
ArmeOpp    EUCouncil   + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compel      
ArmeOpp    EU          + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compel      
ArmeOpp    AzerGov     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
ArmeOpp    ArmeGov     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
ArmeOpp    Turkey      - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
ArmeOpp    NKOpp       - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
ArmeOpp    France      - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
ArmeOpp    Georgia     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
ArmeOpp    Turkmen     + Conflict     + Compel       + Compromise  
ArmeOpp    Kazakhstan  + Conflict     + Compel       + Compromise  
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FocalGroup RivalGroup FocalView RivalView JointView 
ArmeOpp    AzerOpp     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
UNSG       Russia        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
UNSG       NKGov         No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
UNSG       ArmeOpp       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
UNSG       Iran          No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
UNSG       USA         - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
UNSG       EUCouncil   + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compromise  
UNSG       EU          + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compromise  
UNSG       AzerGov     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
UNSG       ArmeGov     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
UNSG       Turkey      - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
UNSG       NKOpp       - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
UNSG       France      - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
UNSG       Georgia     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
UNSG       Turkmen     + Conflict     + Compel       + Compromise  
UNSG       Kazakhstan  + Conflict     + Compel       + Compromise  
UNSG       AzerOpp     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
Iran       Russia        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Iran       NKGov         No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Iran       ArmeOpp       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Iran       UNSG          No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Iran       USA         - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
Iran       EUCouncil   + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compromise  
Iran       EU          + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compromise  
Iran       AzerGov     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
Iran       ArmeGov     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
Iran       Turkey      - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
Iran       NKOpp       - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
Iran       France      - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
Iran       Georgia     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
Iran       Turkmen     + Conflict     + Compromise  + Compromise  
Iran       Kazakhstan  + Conflict     + Compromise  + Compromise  
Iran       AzerOpp     - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compromise  
USA        Russia      + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
USA        NKGov       + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
USA        ArmeOpp     + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
USA        UNSG        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
USA        Iran        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
USA        EUCouncil     No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
USA        EU            No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
USA        AzerGov     - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
USA        ArmeGov     - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
USA        Turkey      - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
USA        NKOpp       - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
USA        France      - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
USA        Georgia     - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
USA        Turkmen     + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
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FocalGroup RivalGroup FocalView RivalView JointView 
USA        Kazakhstan  + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
USA        AzerOpp     - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
EUCouncil  Russia      - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Give In     
EUCouncil  NKGov       - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Give In     
EUCouncil  ArmeOpp     - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Give In     
EUCouncil  UNSG        - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Compromise  
EUCouncil  Iran        - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Compromise  
EUCouncil  USA           No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
EUCouncil  EU            No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
EUCouncil  AzerGov     - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EUCouncil  ArmeGov     - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EUCouncil  Turkey      - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EUCouncil  NKOpp       - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EUCouncil  France      - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EUCouncil  Georgia     - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EUCouncil  Turkmen     + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
EUCouncil  Kazakhstan  + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
EUCouncil  AzerOpp     - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EU         Russia      - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Give In     
EU         NKGov       - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Give In     
EU         ArmeOpp     - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Give In     
EU         UNSG        - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Compromise  
EU         Iran        - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Compromise  
EU         USA           No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
EU         EUCouncil     No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
EU         AzerGov     - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EU         ArmeGov     - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EU         Turkey      - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EU         NKOpp       - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EU         France      - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EU         Georgia     - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EU         Turkmen     + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
EU         Kazakhstan  + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
EU         AzerOpp     - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
AzerGov    Russia      + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
AzerGov    NKGov       + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
AzerGov    ArmeOpp     + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
AzerGov    UNSG        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
AzerGov    Iran        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
AzerGov    USA         + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
AzerGov    EUCouncil   + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
AzerGov    EU          + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
AzerGov    ArmeGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
AzerGov    Turkey        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
AzerGov    NKOpp         No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
AzerGov    France        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
AzerGov    Georgia       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
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FocalGroup RivalGroup FocalView RivalView JointView 
AzerGov    Turkmen       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
AzerGov    Kazakhstan    No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
AzerGov    AzerOpp     + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
ArmeGov    Russia      + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
ArmeGov    NKGov       + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
ArmeGov    ArmeOpp     + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
ArmeGov    UNSG        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
ArmeGov    Iran        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
ArmeGov    USA         + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
ArmeGov    EUCouncil   + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
ArmeGov    EU          + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
ArmeGov    AzerGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
ArmeGov    Turkey        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
ArmeGov    NKOpp         No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
ArmeGov    France        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
ArmeGov    Georgia       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
ArmeGov    Turkmen       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
ArmeGov    Kazakhstan    No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
ArmeGov    AzerOpp     + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
Turkey     Russia      + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
Turkey     NKGov       + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
Turkey     ArmeOpp     + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
Turkey     UNSG        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
Turkey     Iran        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
Turkey     USA         + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
Turkey     EUCouncil   + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
Turkey     EU          + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
Turkey     AzerGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Turkey     ArmeGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Turkey     NKOpp         No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Turkey     France        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Turkey     Georgia       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Turkey     Turkmen       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Turkey     Kazakhstan    No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Turkey     AzerOpp     + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
NKOpp      Russia      + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
NKOpp      NKGov       + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
NKOpp      ArmeOpp     + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
NKOpp      UNSG        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
NKOpp      Iran        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
NKOpp      USA         + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
NKOpp      EUCouncil   + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
NKOpp      EU          + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
NKOpp      AzerGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
NKOpp      ArmeGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
NKOpp      Turkey        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
NKOpp      France        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
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FocalGroup RivalGroup FocalView RivalView JointView 
NKOpp      Georgia       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
NKOpp      Turkmen       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
NKOpp      Kazakhstan    No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
NKOpp      AzerOpp     + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
France     Russia      + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
France     NKGov       + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
France     ArmeOpp     + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
France     UNSG        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
France     Iran        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
France     USA         + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
France     EUCouncil   + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
France     EU          + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
France     AzerGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
France     ArmeGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
France     Turkey        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
France     NKOpp         No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
France     Georgia       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
France     Turkmen       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
France     Kazakhstan    No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
France     AzerOpp     + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
Georgia    Russia      + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
Georgia    NKGov       + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
Georgia    ArmeOpp     + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
Georgia    UNSG        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
Georgia    Iran        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
Georgia    USA         + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
Georgia    EUCouncil   + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
Georgia    EU          + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
Georgia    AzerGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Georgia    ArmeGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Georgia    Turkey        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Georgia    NKOpp         No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Georgia    France        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Georgia    Turkmen       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Georgia    Kazakhstan    No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Georgia    AzerOpp     - Conflict     - Conflict     + Conflict    
Turkmen    Russia      - Give In      - Conflict     - Compromise  
Turkmen    NKGov       - Give In      - Conflict     - Compromise  
Turkmen    ArmeOpp     - Give In      - Conflict     - Compromise  
Turkmen    UNSG        - Give In      - Conflict     - Compromise  
Turkmen    Iran        - Compromise  - Conflict     - Compromise  
Turkmen    USA         - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
Turkmen    EUCouncil   - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
Turkmen    EU          - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
Turkmen    AzerGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Turkmen    ArmeGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Turkmen    Turkey        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
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FocalGroup RivalGroup FocalView RivalView JointView 
Turkmen    NKOpp         No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Turkmen    France        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Turkmen    Georgia       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Turkmen    Kazakhstan    No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Turkmen    AzerOpp     - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
Kazakhstan Russia      - Give In      - Conflict     - Compromise  
Kazakhstan NKGov       - Give In      - Conflict     - Compromise  
Kazakhstan ArmeOpp     - Give In      - Conflict     - Compromise  
Kazakhstan UNSG        - Give In      - Conflict     - Compromise  
Kazakhstan Iran        - Compromise  - Conflict     - Compromise  
Kazakhstan USA         - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
Kazakhstan EUCouncil   - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
Kazakhstan EU          - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
Kazakhstan AzerGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Kazakhstan ArmeGov       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Kazakhstan Turkey        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Kazakhstan NKOpp         No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Kazakhstan France        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Kazakhstan Georgia       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Kazakhstan Turkmen       No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Kazakhstan AzerOpp     - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
AzerOpp    Russia      + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
AzerOpp    NKGov       + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
AzerOpp    ArmeOpp     + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
AzerOpp    UNSG        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
AzerOpp    Iran        + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
AzerOpp    USA         + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
AzerOpp    EUCouncil   + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
AzerOpp    EU          + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
AzerOpp    AzerGov     - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
AzerOpp    ArmeGov     - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
AzerOpp    Turkey      - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
AzerOpp    NKOpp       - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
AzerOpp    France      - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
AzerOpp    Georgia     + Conflict     + Conflict     - Conflict    
AzerOpp    Turkmen     + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
AzerOpp    Kazakhstan  + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
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Figure 5-1-1-1 Azerbaijan’s Oil Production, 1992-2005 (EIA Website) 
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Figure 5-1-1-2 Azerbaijan’s Gas Production, 1994-2004 (EIA Website) 
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Map 5-1-2-1 Caspian Region Pipelines and the BTC (EIA Website) 
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Map 5-1-2-2 Caspian Region Natural Gas Pipelines (EIA Website)  
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CHAPTER 6 
SOUTH OSSETIAN SEPARATISM AND THE BAKU-TBILISI-
CEYHAN (BTC) PIPELINE 
 
 
 
Plan of the Chapter  
This chapter focuses on the conflict in an autonomous unit that is part of Georgia, i.e. 
South Ossetia and this conflict’s possible influences on the BTC pipeline’s security. 
Section one discusses Georgia’s energy needs and resources and the importance of 
the pipeline to secure the supply of energy. Section two gives an introduction to the 
subject of South Ossetia’s independence highlighting its brief history and various 
dimensions. In the next section, I present expert-generated data and discuss the 
positions of the actors and their capabilities. Section four includes an in-depth 
discussion of the results derived from different methods of analyses. Forecasts, policy 
implications and the future of the Russian-Georgian rivalry are analyzed in the last 
section.  
 
6.1 Introduction 
6.1.1 Georgia, Energy Security in the Region and the BTC Pipeline 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the development of energy resources in the 
Caspian basin has benefited Georgia’s economy and political development. As a 
country pledged to increase its ties with the US, EU, NATO and Turkey and to 
establish democratic rule with a market economy, Georgia has been involved in 
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substantial energy transportation deals, including the BTC and Baku-Supsa1 oil and 
the South Caucasus and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipelines. However, ethnic 
clashes, interstate conflicts and a lack of cooperation in the region create obstacles to 
the further development of energy projects in the South Caucasus, as well as in 
Georgia. Western investors have been reluctant to launch new projects due to the fear 
of further instabilities in transit countries and a lack of security of the pipelines in the 
region. This also applies to Georgia. As a relatively small country with a territory of 
69,700 square kilometers (slightly smaller than South Carolina) and a population of 
4.6 million (CIA World Factbook 2006), Georgia bears two frozen ethnic conflicts in 
its Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Tskhinvali) regions where it lost control in the early 
1990s. Map 6-1-1-1 presents Georgia and its administrative regions such as South 
Ossetia, Abkhazia and Ajaria. 
 (See Map 6-1-1-1 about here) 
 Georgia, as an ethnically diverse country, also faces ethnic tensions with its 
Armenian population in Javakhetia (in southern Georgia), as well as Muslims in 
Ajaria (borders Turkey in the southwest) (Cutler 2004). Map 6-1-1-2 shows the 
locations of various ethnicities of Southern Caucasia. These conflicts and minority 
problems are major factors preventing Georgia from fulfilling its potential and 
consolidating its democracy. This chapter focuses on the South Ossetia conflict, 
which threatens the security of the BTC pipeline mostly due to its geographic 
proximity.  
 (Map 6-1-1-2 about here) 
                                                 
1 It is an oil pipeline that carries Azeri oil to the Georgian port of Supsa, also called the “Western 
Early” pipeline.  
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6.1.2 Georgia’s Energy Production, Consumption and Transit Routes 
After the breakup of the USSR, Moscow left Georgians with artificially-drawn state 
borders and a centrally planned economy dependent on Russia. The Georgian 
administration sees energy transit deals and the incoming rent resulting from them as 
a way to break this vicious cycle (EIA 2004). Table 6-1-2-1 shows Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan’s economic indicators, displaying the small size of these economies 
and their low GDPs per capita.  
  (Tables 6-1-2-1, 6-1-2-2 and 6-1-2-3 about here)  
 Georgia is a comparatively small energy producer and consumer, especially 
due to the economic difficulties it has been experiencing since its independence. Oil 
consumption, which was 26,900 bbl/d in 1992, fell sharply (about 70 percent) and hit 
rock bottom in 1994 and 1995 with only 7,400 and 7,600 bbl/d, respectively. Georgia 
reached its 1992 oil consumption level again only in 1998 (EIA 2004). Since then the 
consumption has been increasing gradually. The country’s proven oil reserves are 
estimated to be only 0.3 billion barrels, but the exploration continues. In 2004, 
Georgia produced 2,000 barrels of crude oil per day (bbl/d), whereas it consumed 42, 
200 bbl/d in the same year. Most of its oil imports come from Azerbaijan and Russia 
(EIA 2004).  
 Natural gas represents the second-biggest portion of energy consumption in 
Georgia with about 25 percent, following hydroelectric resources, which constitute 
about 50 percent of the consumption. See Table 6-1-2-2 for energy consumption 
statistics in the region. Georgia does not have significant gas resources, which makes 
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it dependent on Russian and Turkmen gas (with a pipeline via Russia). Russia’s 
change of the independent supplier Itera to the state-owned Gazprom in 2004 and the 
long-term supply deal signed between Gazprom and Georgia in 2003 have especially 
increased the influence of Russia on the Georgian economy and politics and put at 
risk the security of supply for Georgia (EIA 2004). 
 Lastly, Table 6-1-2-3 presents brief energy statistics for Georgia and two key 
actors in the region, Armenia and Azerbaijan. As shown in the table, Georgia has a 
substantial hydroelectric power generation capacity of 7.3 billion kW hours per year 
(EIA 2004).  
 All in all, this discussion shows that Georgia is an energy production-
dependent country and has not achieved a secure supply to its energy markets. The 
energy crisis in January 2006, caused by the bombing of the oil and gas pipeline from 
Russia by Ossetian separatists, showed that even a small disruption of supply from 
Russia leads to a big energy crisis in Georgia. Consequently, the Georgian 
government values export projects from the Caspian to the West both for its 
economic gains and for Georgia’s own energy security.  
 
6.1.3 The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline: How BTC’s Security Affects 
Georgia  
A more comprehensive presentation of the BTC pipeline appears in Chapter 5. In this 
part, I will briefly discuss the specific effects of the pipeline for Georgia.  
The BTC pipeline has an enormous importance for the Georgian economy. 
According to some economists, the construction of the Georgian part of the pipeline 
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alone (250 km from the Azeri to the Turkish border) has contributed to 2 percent of 
the country’s GDP (Peuch 2005). Georgia will gain from transit fees and will also 
benefit from the free oil it will get as a transit country, which might lessen its 
dependency on Russian energy. The main beneficiary of the pipeline is of course 
Azerbaijan, which is expected to earn 29 billion dollars per year in oil revenues, while 
Georgia and Turkey will get 600 million and 1.5 billion dollars from transit fees, 
respectively (hydrocarbons-technology.com 2006). It is a substantial amount of 
revenues for Georgia, having a GDP of only 6.4 billion dollars (CIA World Factbook 
2006).  
Due to security risks in the region, Georgia and the contractors took extreme 
precautions to protect the pipeline. The US Military’s Special Forces trained about 
1,500-2,000 Georgian forces in anti-terrorism techniques. 64 million dollars were 
spent to provide the necessary security, including training and surveillance systems 
(hydrocarbons-technology.com 2006).  
 
6.2 The South Ossetia Crisis 
Georgia is a multiethnic country with various minorities, such as Ossetians, Abkhaz 
and Armenian people. The Ossetians are generally tribal people who have lived a part 
of the Caucasus called North Ossetia (today a part of the Russian Federation) and 
South Ossetia, which is legally part of Georgia but de facto independent since 1992 
(Ozhiganov 1997). For Georgians, calling the region South Ossetia is unacceptable, 
they argue the only Ossetia “North Ossetia”, which belongs to the Russian 
 198
Federation. What the separatists call “South Ossetia” is the Tskhinvali region of 
Georgia.      
 
6.2.1 History and the Present Situation of South Ossetia’s Autonomy Issue 
Towards the end of the 1980s, with Perestroika felt in the Soviet Republics, the 
Georgian nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia began an ideological campaign against 
non-Georgian ethnic groups. The slogan was “Georgia for Georgians” (Ozhiganov 
1997). As a result, organizations in South Ossetia that were mainly concerned with 
economic policies, such as Adamon Nykhas (People’s Assembly), started becoming a 
nationalistic force opposing the Georgian authorities (Ozhiganov 1997).  
In 1989, the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast2, located within the Georgian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, declared itself as part of the Russian Soviet Federated 
Socialist Republic. This meant joining North Ossetia, which is a part of Russia. In 
August 1990, South Ossetia declared its sovereignty, which led the Georgian 
government to abolish its autonomous status at the end of the same year.  The first 
armed conflicts began after the abolishment of the region’s autonomy. On November 
28 1991, South Ossetia declared its independence. In June 1992, Russia and Georgia 
made a cease fire deal that led to a brief halt of violence in the region (Cutler 2004).  
Ethnic violence rose again in 1992 and 100,000 refugees fled to Russia. Being 
overwhelmed by the number of refugees, Russians brokered a deal deploying 
tripartite forces (Georgian, Russian and Osset) to guarantee order in the region 
(Cutler 2004). The fighting continued until the nationalist President Gamsakhurdia 
fell and South Ossetians supported by the North advanced against Georgian forces. 
                                                 
2 Oblast was a large scale administrative division or province in the USSR.  
 199
This led to a population exchange between the parties. Ossetians from different parts 
of Georgia had to go back to South and North Ossetia, while almost all ethnic 
Georgians returned to Georgia. Only four Georgian villages are left in South Ossetia 
today. A Joint Control Commission (JCC) was created in 1994 to direct the tripartite 
peace-keeping forces, integrate South Ossetia into the Georgian economy and 
cooperate with the OSCE to achieve a resolution of the conflict (Matveea 2002).   
The stalemate situation has been weakening the region since 1992. South 
Ossetia’s independence was never recognized, not even by Russia. Although Russia 
does not recognize the republic, it supports the Ossetian population and the region’s 
economy. South Ossetians are usually issued Russian passports and also use the ruble 
in their homeland.  
Beginning in late 1992, the OSCE has become actively involved in conflict 
resolution attempts. Its mission’s mandate was extended to monitor peacekeeping 
operations. According to Matveea (2002), the relationship between OSCE and the 
peacekeeping forces has been good, and the former agreed to a reduction of 
peacekeeping forces, since hostilities in the region were slowly decreasing.  
After the Rose Revolution3 in Georgia and the election of Mikhail 
Saakashvili, he pledged to resolve the conflicts with breakaway regions like South 
Ossetia. He offered autonomy to South Ossetia, but the nationalists in the region still 
do not accept his proposal. Both in 2004 and 2005 armed fights broke out between 
Ossetian militia and Georgian soldiers. In each case, Georgia and Russia experienced 
small crises. Russia uses the South Ossetia question and its energy exports to Georgia 
                                                 
3 Rose Revolution refers to the peaceful protests that led President Eduard Shevardnadze to be 
democratically displaced.  
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as tools to maintain its control over the region, while Georgia tries to avoid Russian 
pressure by making alliances with the US, EU, Turkey and Azerbaijan. 
 
6.3 Analysis with the Expected Utility Model 
6.3.1 Expert-Generated Data 
Two experts, one specializing on ex-Soviet Republics in the Caucasus and the other 
focusing on politics in the region in general independently produced the coding of the 
actors, positions, capabilities and issue salience scores for South Ossetia’s autonomy 
issue. I received the coding results from the senior academic on December 27, 2005. 
The experts were asked the following question: What are the attitudes of stakeholders 
toward South Ossetia’s autonomy issue? The senior analyst coded the issue as 
follows:  
  (Table 6-3-1-1 about here) 
 
6.3.2 Positions of the Actors       
Figure 6-3-2-1 is a graphical representation of policy positions actors subscribe to on 
South Ossetia’s autonomy issue. The senior expert determined fourteen actors who 
have something at stake in this bargaining and are actively involved in the process.  
 (Figure 6-3-2-1 about here) 
 The South Ossetian administration’s view is represented by its unrecognized 
President Eduard Kokoiti’s (a.k.a. Kokoyev). Kokoiti causes Georgian uproar by 
publicly claiming that the ultimate aim of his administration is to unite with North 
Ossetia or at the very least achieve independence. Kokoyev is a big believer in 
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Russia’s “stabilizing” effect in the region and maintains very good relations with 
Moscow. As a result, his administration’s position was assigned a value of (100).  
 The only actor with an identical position is Abkhazia, the other breakaway 
region of Georgia. Abkhazia naturally favors Ossetian independence because it has 
the very same aim for itself. Therefore, the Abkhazian administration supports the 
South Ossetian quest for independence and also maintains better relations with 
Russia.  
 On the opposite side of the continuum are the nationalist Georgian actors. The 
“hawks” in the Georgian government, like Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili and 
Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili, support a harder line against the breakaway 
regions. Also the Georgian Parliament, although it does not have a substantial 
influence in controlling the executive, is pledged to bring South Ossetia back under 
Georgia’s control. Note that their position is a 20 in a 0-100 continuum where 0 
means full centralization and without giving any rights to South Ossetians. That is, 
even the Georgian nationalists are aware that some sort of self-rule is a necessity if 
Georgia wants to gain control over the region. Their position, with a value of 20 
represents a policy aiming at returning to pre-1990 conditions when South Ossetia 
was granted very little autonomy as a sub-political unit (oblast). 
 Besides to the hard-liner position, there are the Georgian Government’s more 
compromise-oriented members, who actually have the most say in the bargaining, 
such as President Mikheil Saakashvili, Prime Minister Noghaideli, Conflict 
Resolution Minister Khaindrava, Minister of Foreign Affairs Bezhuashvili and the 
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GUAM countries4. The Georgian position on this issue became clearer when 
President Saakashvili took office in 2004 and pledged to solve the problems of the 
breakaway regions. Saakashvili offered a fairly generous autonomy plan for Georgia 
in 2005 and 2006. But South Ossetians insist that only independence is acceptable to 
them.  
 Although the plan’s final version and details - if negotiated at all - are 
unknown, it is clear that Georgia demands concessions from Russia and South 
Ossetia in return for what it calls “broad autonomy”. As of late 2005, the Georgian 
plan suggested immediate demilitarization of the conflict zone and imposing strict 
border controls over the Roki tunnel that links South Ossetia with Russia in order to 
curtail Russian control of and aid to the region and to prevent the influence of 
organized crime. Saakashvili’s plan included a three-year transition period and aimed 
at the resolution of the conflict by the end of 2007. This schedule was strongly 
rejected by the Russian and Ossetian authorities. The plan also proposed that the US, 
EU and OSCE should reach a political settlement with Russia (Fuller 2005).  
 Whenever the plan’s details are discussed, one can observe that President 
Saakashvili offers South Ossetia a degree of self-governance that would be higher 
than what North Ossetia enjoys within Russia. It would include a legislative body 
elected by Ossetians and an executive government branch with responsibilities for 
key domestic issues, such as local administration and public order, as well as 
economic and social policies, culture and education. South Ossetian administrators 
would have senior posts in the Georgian government, and the Ossetian language 
                                                 
4 GUAM is an intergovernmental organization in the region composed of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan 
and Moldova that was established to strengthen the independence of these former Soviet Republics. 
For more information on GUAM and some other less-known actors, see the appendix of this chapter.  
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would be given an official status. In return, Georgia would be responsible for foreign 
policy and defense, and within three years, the Ossetian armed forces would be 
integrated into the Georgian military (EIU 2005).  
 What Georgia claims to offer is a generous package with a broad autonomy. 
However, if you look at Figure 6-3-2-1, the Georgian Doves’ position value is (45), 
which does not seem high enough to represent the outlined offer. The senior expert, 
Dr. Tanrısever explained his decision by emphasizing that, a publicly stated position 
often differs from an actor’s actual goals. The coding refers to the actor’s “real” 
position, as opposed to what the coder interprets as only a publicity stunt. This is 
exactly what Bueno de Mesquita suggests, arguing if an area expert’s knowledge goes 
beyond an actor’s public statements, that coding is much more reliable. The outlined 
Georgian offer is therefore not deemed to represent the actual position of the 
Georgian President. This broad autonomy offer actually would be more preferred by 
actors like the EU, US, OSCE and the UN, whose position value therefore represents 
broad autonomy at 65. Also, the GUAM countries support Georgia’s less than 
complete autonomy offer for regional stability and the argument to create a power 
balance at the expense of Russia.  
 On the other hand, the EU, US, OSCE, UN Secretary General and the Open 
Society Foundation5 support the large autonomy option. Although none of these 
actors has proposed a specific peace plan yet, they announced their support of 
President Saakashvili’s plan in principle. These institutions are especially interested 
                                                 
5The  Open Society Institute and Soros Foundation support countries experiencing transitions in their 
public policy making that facilitate democratization. These institutions are involved in Georgia’s 
democratization and specifically support policy making that brings about political and economic 
change.   
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in limiting the destabilizing effects of Russian influence in the region for their own 
specific reasons.   
 Lastly, Russia, North Ossetia and Organized Crime actors all favor the 
continuation of the status quo. Although Russia occasionally claims that it wants 
peace and prosperity in the region, the reality suggests that the South Ossetia problem 
is another regional cleavage that Russia can use to maintain its own interests in the 
region. For Russia, the current status quo and position of uncertainty are the most 
beneficial situation, for they create a power vacuum that the Russians can fill to 
influence Georgia according to their own interests. As our expert coded, the clout of 
the North Ossetian administration is extremely limited, and they have to act according 
to Russia’s interests. Lastly, organized crime constitutes an important actor in the 
region. Benefiting from the conflict, criminal organizations smuggle narcotics and are 
involved in human trafficking and money laundering in the region. Their relations 
with terrorist organizations are also of great concern for the United States. These 
organizations prevent the flourishing of political and economic reforms and take 
advantage of the political ambiguity and power vacuum. The Georgian government 
accused Russia of letting these groups operate between Russia and South Ossetia.  
 
6.3.3 Capabilities Distribution and Position Min-Max and Averages  
 
Figure 6-3-3-1 shows the absolute capability distribution in this simulation. Naturally, 
Russia has a very dominant position, a quarter of all capabilities owned by the actors. 
Russia is followed by other influential foreign actors, such as US, OSCE and UN, 
each having 9 percent of the power. The South Ossetian administration and the 
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moderate wing of the Georgian government (i.e. Georgian Doves) each hold 7 percent 
of the total capabilities.  
 (Figure 6-3-3-1 and 6-3-3-2 about here) 
 An inclusion of the salience variable in addition to the absolute capabilities of 
the actors changes the results. Figure 6-3-3-2 shows that the issue at hand is not of the 
greatest importance for some of the significant actors, such as the EU, GUAM, OSF 
or UNSG.  Therefore, the actors whose absolute power and salience scores are both 
high gain a larger portion of the effective capabilities. Russia, for example, has 25 
percent of the absolute capabilities and the utmost salience an actor can attach to the 
issue. As a result, its share of the effective power is very high at 32 percent. Similarly, 
the US’ effective capabilities are boosted to 11 percent. 
Figure 6-3-3-3 shows the effective power distribution in a different way. The 
actors who have more than 10 percent of the power are represented in the pie chart, 
while the rest of the actors are combined in a stacked bar. This figurative 
representation shows the disproportionate balance of power in this bargaining. Russia 
holds almost a third of the total effective capabilities. The US’ capability is only a 
third of Russia’s, even as the second most influential actor.  
  (Figures 6-3-3-3, 6-3-3-4 and 6-3-3-5 are about here) 
 The effect of this uneven distribution of capabilities can be seen in figures 6-
3-3-4 and 6-3-3-5. Due to Russia’s enormous weight, effective power distribution by 
position shows the dominance of status quo position. The second largest position that 
the actors subscribed to is the large autonomy position that is supported by the 
Western states and international institutions.  
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 Lastly, Figure 6-3-3-6 shows the maximum, minimum and average position 
values over the rounds. In this simulation, the expected utility model completed the 
analysis in two rounds. After two rounds there is almost no bargaining dynamic and 
no variance in the min, max and average values. Only in the second round did Russia 
convince some of the pro-South Ossetian actors to switch to the status quo position, 
which caused the maximum position value to drop from 100 to 80.  
 (Figure 6-3-3-6 about here) 
 
6.4 Results  
6.4.1 The Bargaining Process 
The expected utility analysis concluded that the bargaining about South Ossetia’s 
autonomy issue is likely to maintain the status quo position originally favored by 
Russia. That is, a solution for the conflict does not seem likely to be implemented in 
the near future. The software concluded the bargaining in two rounds. At the end of 
two rounds, the forecast of the model is 80, which equals the status quo position. The 
simulation shows, once again, the disproportionate influence of Russia in the 
negotiation process. Although originally only three of the two actors with a low level 
of influence favored the status quo position, Russia’s great impact on the bargaining 
results led to the maintenance of the status quo. For the same reason, the model also 
did not produce a high level of dynamics. Mathematically, it is very difficult for any 
actor to make a credible proposal to Russia or other actors since the Russian position 
is so influential and unchanging. This is a reasonable approximation to the real nature 
of international politics in the region.  
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 (Figures 6-4-1-1 and 6-4-1-2 about here)  
 Lastly, I will discuss the stability analysis of the forecast. Table 6-4-1-1 shows 
the expected proportion of the actor’s perceptions (i’s perceptions) and the model’s 
predicted proportion regarding the interactions of different perceptions (Joint 
perceptions). The actors’ perceptions suggest that there does not exist a possible 
compromise about the issue, with none of the perceptions in this simulation denoting 
a possible compromise. The two largest perception categories are status quo and 
conflict. The status quo perception constitutes about 43 percent, which is in line with 
the model’s forecast. The conflict category, with about 33 percent, indicates the risk 
of instability in the region due to the issue at hand.  
 (See Table 6-4-1-1 about here) 
 The joint perceptions analysis is a more accurate estimator of the simulation’s 
stability, given that in an international relations context, actors’ perceptions of the 
others’ behavior are often fairly different. Sometimes, even in severe situations like 
crises, one of the parties involved in the conflict may not perceive the situation as 
such (Akbaba, James and Taydas 2006). In the stability analysis based on joint 
perceptions, the model forecasts less ‘conflict’ (19.7 percent) and more ‘compel’ 
situations (31.8 percent) between the actors.   
 Figures 6-4-1-3 thorough 6-4-1-6 presents the single actor i’s and joint 
perceptions over the two rounds of bargaining. Two interesting results are the conflict 
perception’s (both i’s and joint) tendency to increase and status quo perceptions 
persistence both of which does not bode well for a peaceful resolution to the issue. 
 (Figures 6-4-1-3 through 6-4-1-6 are about here) 
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6.4.2 Position Shifts 
Since the model did not produce much in the way of dynamics, position switches 
during the short simulation were rare as well. There are only four significant position 
switches by four actors during the bargaining. These actors are Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, GUAM and the moderate Georgian actors (i.e. Georgian Doves).  
 In Round 1, Russia makes a credible proposal to South Ossetia to switch its 
position from pro-independence 100 to status quo 80. This makes perfect sense given 
the realpolitik dynamics in the region. Russia favors maintenance of the status quo 
and protects South Ossetia as long as it does not raise its independence demands to an 
unmanageable degree. Similarly, Russia already controls the foreign policy of North 
Ossetia, which is why the area expert coded the initial position for both the same way.  
  Along with the Organized Crime and North Ossetia actors, Russia makes a 
similar proposal to Abkhazia. Abkhazia is in a very similar situation as South Ossetia. 
They get support from Russia as long as they do not cause further turmoil in the 
region. As a result, Abkhazia shifts from 100 to 80.  
 Similar proposals and consequent switches also occurred on the opposite side 
of the dispute. At round 1, the US made two credible proposals to the moderate wing 
of the Georgian Government and the GUAM organization. This convincing offer 
caused substantial shifts. The Georgian government’s position shifted from limited 
autonomy (45) to broader autonomy (65), GUAM also switched to 63.  
 These two shifts are processes in line with our conclusion on Azerbaijan in the 
last chapter. As stated, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue can develop in a way favored by 
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the US rather than Azerbaijan6. As the regime theory suggests, a hegemonic power 
that has a vested interest in maintaining a certain order or regime in an area will push 
other actors to comply with those rules. And the actors that are most easily 
convincible for a hegemon are its allies rejecting a regime’s foreign policy goals that 
can have unfavorable effects for the hegemon. Therefore, one can observe substantial 
bargaining between politically closer actors, rather than between those with opposing 
goals. On matters like energy security, the US, and to some degree the EU, need to 
maintain a security regime capable of producing and providing transit areas. The 
analysis shows how energy security issues influence the US’ and European foreign 
policy. These two important actors shape the preferences of locally important actors 
to prevent further crises in the regions that are vital for energy security.  
 There were no other significant policy position shifts in this simulation.  
 
6.4.3 Analysis of Perceptions and Stability    
Figures 6-4-3-1 to 6-4-3-7 show the perceptions of the most important actors involved 
in this bargaining graphically. Table 6-4-3-1 presents the verbal summaries of the 
same perceptions at the end of the bargaining. 
  Figures 6-4-3-1 and 6-4-3-2 present the almost identical Russian and South 
Ossetian perceptions at the end of round 2. Russia’s and South Ossetia’s perception is 
diametrically opposed to the position of the Georgian Hawks and the Georgian 
Parliament. But this divergence might not entail a conflict, because the joint 
perceptions fall into the stalemate quadrant.  Interestingly, Russia and South Ossetia 
                                                 
6 The forecast for the last six rounds of bargaining zigzagged between Azeri and American positions 
that led us to conclude one of these two positions is likely to occur.  
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and their rivals do not appear to have conflictual perceptions, such as the US or EU. 
However, this is not surprising considering that at the end of the bargaining process 
the Russian position prevails. The US and the EU are not satisfied with the outcome 
but accept the stalemate.  
 (Figures 6-4-3-1, 6-4-3-2 and Table 6-4-3-1 about here) 
 There are three separate Georgian actors whose perceptions completely differ 
from those of the other actors. The Georgian Doves, i.e. President Saakashvili and his 
supporters who support the moderate position, have a perception equaling that of the 
US and the OSCE in that the US made them shift to the moderate position in round 2.  
The moderate Georgian actors have a stalemate perception of all the other actors but 
three. This result is plausible, since the bargaining process ended with the Russian 
position, which is undesirable and also unchallengeable for Georgia.  This type of 
relationship causes a stalemate perception. An interesting result is also the Georgian 
moderates’ perception of conflict with the EU (i.e. Georgian Doves). Although their 
policy positions are quite similar at the end of round 2, Georgia views its relations 
with the EU as difficult. An analysis of the actors’ opportunities seems to resolve this 
puzzle. The expected utility model also provides an analysis of used and missed 
opportunities during a bargaining round. One can observe that all pro-South Ossetian 
actors and Russia attempt a position shift of the EU toward the Ossetian or the status 
quo positions. In fact, the EU sees the proposals from South Ossetia, Abkhazia and 
North Ossetia proposals as credible, although they were not sufficient in making the 
EU switch to a pro-Ossetian position. However, the bargaining between the EU and 
breakaway or hostile regions might have skewed the Georgian perceptions of the 
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Union. The same results can be observed regarding the EU’s perceptions when it 
perceives actors like the Georgian moderates and the US as ‘being in the conflict 
quadrant’.  
 (See Figure 6-4-3-3 about here) 
 The perceptions of the Georgian Hawks and the Georgian Parliament are not 
as complex. As figures 6-4-3-4 and 6-4-3-5 suggest, these two hardliner actors are 
fairly unsatisfied with the outcome and perceive the entire range of other actors in a 
conflictual way. One difference lays in the conflict perception values with South and 
North Ossetia - Abkhazia’s and Russia’s values are more distant from the center than 
those of the Georgian Doves or the US. The US does not have a stalemate relation 
with Russia and pro-Russian actors, as was the case in the two conflicts analyzed in 
the previous chapters. The US and Russia are in an apparent power struggle in the 
region; this conflict primarily revolves around issues related to energy resources 
matters. This rivalry will be discussed more in detail in the next part. All things 
considered, the analysis of perceptions confirms the model’s prediction of the status 
quo’s perseverance.  
 (Figures 6-4-3-4 through 6-4-3-7 are about here) 
 
6.5. Discussion  
What does this simulation with no dynamics and gridlock perceptions tell us? This 
expected utility analysis, combined with the latest developments of Georgian-Russian 
relations and the South Ossetia issue, suggests that the conflict short of diplomatic 
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crisis or war will continue in the region. In this situation, Russia and its smaller 
adherents will play hardball with Georgia, supported by the US and EU.   
 The Georgian-Russian relations in the last two years can serve as an example 
for the kind of relationship one can expect in the future. Specific issues that have led 
to the conflicts in the past can emerge again.  
 First of all, Russia is likely to continue using its energy exports as a powerful 
leverage on Georgia, just the way they controlled Ukraine at the beginning of 2006. 
In January 2006, the gas and electricity lines from Russia were bombed, allegedly by 
terrorists. It left Georgia in a severe energy crisis, where even citizens in the country’s 
capital Tbilisi had to endure electricity outages for several weeks. President 
Saakashvili quickly interpreted the situation as a Russian conspiracy against Georgia 
because of the Caspian pipelines (e.g. BTC) that go through Georgia. In fact, Russia 
did neither repair the cut off lines immediately nor increased it the gas supply to 
Azerbaijan, which could have been transported to Georgia.  
 The second point of contention between Georgia and Russia concerns the 
Russian peacekeeping troops in South Ossetia. Georgia tries to get rid of the Russian 
soldiers in its territory and South Ossetia. The Russians started stationing troops in 
Georgia since the early 19th century, and although Russia agreed to pull out its troops 
in 1999, it still has not completed the process. In addition to that, Georgia makes the 
Russian troop withdrawal from South Ossetia a prerequisite to the resolution of the 
issue. However, neither Russia nor South Ossetia agrees. The troop withdrawal issue 
is one of the most contentious matters between Russia and Georgia.  
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 The political problems mentioned led to a new low point in the relationship of 
the two countries in May 2006. Russia banned two large import products from 
Georgia: wine (a matter of national pride for Georgians) and mineral water, both due 
to safety concerns. The Georgian government denies safety problems and declared 
Russia’s acts were politically motivated. The wine and water crisis has become so 
profound that the Georgian Parliament openly discusses to quit the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. Russia quickly declared such a step would be a disaster for 
Georgia’s economy. Given the intention of Georgia to join the NATO and EU, this 
could be a big blow to Russian foreign policy.  
 All these disagreements between Georgia and Russia are likely to continue, as 
the Georgia attempts to get closer to West, while Russia tries hard to establish its lost 
authority on Georgia. In fact, the last issue causing a small crisis between the two 
occurred when Russian President Vladimir Putin declared the vote on Montenegro’s 
independence could serve as an example for the frozen conflicts7 in the region. 
Naturally, this caused a tremendous outcry by governments in countries like Georgia 
and Azerbaijan. If Russia seriously pushes for referenda in the breakaway regions that 
it fully supported in the last decade, the conflict could get out of control.  
 As mentioned above, all these issues can increase the severity of the conflict 
between the two countries. In this power struggle, the US and Turkey are very likely 
to support Georgia. President Bush recently wrote a letter to the Kazakh President in 
                                                 
7 Frozen conflict refers to a conflict where parties involved stopped fighting despite no resolution to 
the conflict is achieved. Although a legal resolution is not present, the outright hostilities and casualties 
are stopped. There are many such conflicts in ex-Soviet republics such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria.  
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order to begin a pipeline project that is planned to take place on the Caspian seabed 
and would carry Kazakh oil and gas to BTC. Turkey supports the US in this process.  
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6.6 Appendix to the Chapter: Information on Involved Actors   
The South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoiti 
In December 2001, one-time wrestling champion and Russian citizen Eduard Kokoiti 
won the presidency of the unrecognized republic of South Ossetia in an unrecognized 
election. He received 53 percent of the run-off ballot. Kokoiti (or Kokoyev), is a 
businessman and a pro-Russian politician with a communist background. He was 37 
years old when he was elected. He openly admits that he is in favor of uniting with 
North Ossetia to become a part of the Russian Federation. Kokoiti supports the 
Russian presence in the region and perceives Russia as the sole protector of the South 
Ossetian unrecognized republic. Naturally, he maintains good relations with 
Abkhazia, since their independence aims and problems with the Georgian 
government are almost identical (BBC News 2006).  
 
North Ossetia and President Taymuraz Mamsurov 
North Ossetia is one of the smallest and most industrialized autonomous regions in 
the South Caucasus. It has a potential for energy resources yet to be revealed. It has 
also suffered from the spillover effects of the neighboring conflicts in the Caucasus. 
The Beslan attack in 2004 killed more than 400 people, most of which were school 
children. It is also faced with thousands of refugees from South Ossetia who came to 
the North in the early 1990s because of the conflict. President Mamsurov was 
suggested by Russian President Putin and approved by the North Ossetian parliament 
in 2004, after the resignation of former President Dzasokhov. Mamsurov is a Russian 
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loyalist and a staunch supporter of the unity of North and South Ossets. He tries to 
strengthen ties with the South Ossetian people (BBC News 2006).  
 
The Open Society Institute and the Soros Foundation 
OSI was established by investor George Soros to help countries to succeed in their 
transition from communism to democracy. The Institute and the Foundation both aim 
at shaping public policy to promote democratization and democratic governments, 
human rights, and help the initiation of economic, legal, and social reforms. These 
two institutions also promote the rule of law, education, public health, and 
independent media in former Communist countries or countries transiting to 
democracy. At the same time, OSI works on issues such as combating corruption and 
rights abuses (OSI Website 2006). 
 
GUAM  
The GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development is composed 
of four CIS states: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. This organization, 
although not very effective, has the goal of creating a counterweight to the Russian 
influence on CIS countries and is perceived as hostile by Russia. This year, the 
organization discussed setting up a peacekeeping force in the region. GUAM is 
supported by the US.  
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Table 6-1-2-1 Caucasus Region Economic Indicators (From the EIA Website)  
 
Country 
2005 GDP 
($US billion 
dollars)* 
2005 Real 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
2006F Real 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
2005E Per 
Capita GDP 
(US$) 
2005 
Population 
(Millions) 
Armenia 4.9 13.9 8.5 1495 3.26 
Azerbaijan 13.0 26.4 21.6 1488 8.44 
Georgia 6.5 9.2 8.0 993 4.99 
 
*Billion 1995 $US at Market Exchange Rate, Source: Global Insight 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 218
 
Table 6-1-2-2 Caucasus Region Energy Consumption, CO2 Emissions, 2003 (From 
the EIA Website) 
 
 
*Quadrillion Btu  
**Million metric tons of carbon dioxide, ~% of electricity consumption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Total 
Energy 
Cons.* 
Oil  Natural 
Gas 
Coal Nuclear Hydro Other Electricity 
Consumption* 
Electricity 
Imp(-)  
Exp(+) 
CO2 
Emmis.** 
Armenia 0.172 49% 28% 0% 12% 10% 0%          0.0198  4.16% 8.99 
Azerbaijan 0.634 42% 54% 0% 0% 4% 0%          0.0593  -8.89% 36.48 
Georgia 0.139 18% 27% 0% 0% 53% 0%          0.0232  -12.48% 3.76 
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Table 6-1-2-3 Caucasus Region Energy Statistics, 2004 (From the EIA Website). 
 
OIL 
Country 
Reserves 
 (in billion bbl/d) 
Production 
(1,000 bbl/d) 
Consumption 
 (1,000 bbl/d) 
Armenia 0.0 0.0  42.0  
Azerbaijan 0.7-1.3 328.0 114.0 
Georgia 0.3 2 12.5 
NATURAL GAS 
Country Reserves (Tcf) Production (Bcf) Consumption (Bcf) 
Armenia 0 0.0  47.0  
Azerbaijan 30 180.0 330.0 
Georgia 0.3 0.71 35.3 
ELECTRICITY 
Country Capacity (GW) Generation (Bill. kwh) Consumption (Bill. kwh) 
Armenia 2.6 5.7  5.8  
Azerbaijan 5.4 21.3 17.4 
Georgia 4.4 7.3 9.7 
 
Source: CIS & E. European Energy Databook, CIA, EIA, IEA, Oil and Gas Journal 
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Table 6-3-1-1 The Expert Generated Data.  
 
Actor Resource (1-100) 
Position 
(0-100) 
Salience 
(1-100) 
European Union 80 65 20 
United States 100 65 100 
Georgia-Doves 
(President 
Saakashvili, PM 
Noghaideli, 
Conflict Resolution 
Minister 
Khaindrava, MFA 
Bezhuashvili) 
80 45 100 
Georgia-Hawks 
(Defense Min. 
Okruashvili, 
Interior Min. 
Merabishvili)  
60 20 100 
Georgian 
Parliament  60 20 100 
Russia 300 80 100 
South Ossetia 
(Kokoiti) 80 100 100 
OSCE 100 65 80 
Open Society 
Foundation (Soros) 40 65 60 
North Ossetia 30 80 80 
Abkhazia 50 100 80 
United Nations 
Secretary General 100 65 40 
GUUAM countries 20 45 60 
Organized Crime  
(Transnational: 
Russian, Georgian, 
South and North 
Ossetian)  
60 80 100 
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Table 6-4-1-1 Stability Summary Tables for Round 2 
Perceptions (percent): Expected proportion by the model for relationship between 
actors based on perceptions.  
No Issue Conflict Compromise Status Quo Compel 
15.38461 
 
32.96703 
 
0 
 
42.85714 
 
8.791209 
 
 
 
Interaction of Perceptions (percent): Predicted proportion by the model for 
relationship between actors based on interaction of perception.  
No Issue Conflict Compromise Status Quo Compel 
15.38461 
 
19.78022 
 
8.791209 
 
31.86813 
 
24.17583 
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Table 6-4-3-1 Verbal Summary of Perceptions at Round 2 
 
 
Focal Group Rival Group Focal View Rival View Joint View 
Russia     SOssetia      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Russia     OrgCrime      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Russia     Abkhazia      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Russia     NOSsetia      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Russia     USA         - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
Russia     GeorgiaDov  - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
Russia     OSCE        + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
Russia     UNSG        + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
Russia     EU          + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
Russia     GUUAM       + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
Russia     OSF         + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
Russia     GeorgiaPar  + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
Russia     GeorgiaHaw  + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
SOssetia   Russia        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
SOssetia   OrgCrime      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
SOssetia   Abkhazia      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
SOssetia   NOSsetia      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
SOssetia   USA         - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
SOssetia   GeorgiaDov  - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
SOssetia   OSCE        - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
SOssetia   UNSG        + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
SOssetia   EU          + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
SOssetia   GUUAM       + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
SOssetia   OSF         + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
SOssetia   GeorgiaPar  + Stalemate    - Conflict     - Give In     
SOssetia   GeorgiaHaw  + Stalemate    - Conflict     - Give In     
OrgCrime   Russia        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
OrgCrime   SOssetia      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
OrgCrime   Abkhazia      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
OrgCrime   NOSsetia      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
OrgCrime   USA         - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
OrgCrime   GeorgiaDov  - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
OrgCrime   OSCE        - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
OrgCrime   UNSG        + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
OrgCrime   EU          + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
OrgCrime   GUUAM       + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
OrgCrime   OSF         + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
OrgCrime   GeorgiaPar  + Stalemate    - Conflict     - Give In     
OrgCrime   GeorgiaHaw  + Stalemate    - Conflict     - Give In     
Abkhazia   Russia        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Abkhazia   SOssetia      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Abkhazia   OrgCrime      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Abkhazia   NOSsetia      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
Abkhazia   USA         - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
Abkhazia   GeorgiaDov  - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
Abkhazia   OSCE        - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
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Focal Group Rival Group Focal View Rival View Joint View 
Abkhazia   UNSG        + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
Abkhazia   EU          + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
Abkhazia   GUUAM       + Stalemate    + Stalemate    - Stalemate   
Abkhazia   OSF         + Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
Abkhazia   GeorgiaPar  - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Give In     
Abkhazia   GeorgiaHaw  - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Give In     
NOSsetia   Russia        No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
NOSsetia   SOssetia      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
NOSsetia   OrgCrime      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
NOSsetia   Abkhazia      No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
NOSsetia   USA         - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
NOSsetia   GeorgiaDov  - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
NOSsetia   OSCE        - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
NOSsetia   UNSG        + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
NOSsetia   EU          + Compel       + Compel       + Compel      
NOSsetia   GUUAM       + Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
NOSsetia   OSF         - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
NOSsetia   GeorgiaPar  - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Give In     
NOSsetia   GeorgiaHaw  - Stalemate    - Conflict     - Give In     
USA        Russia      + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
USA        SOssetia    + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
USA        OrgCrime    + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
USA        Abkhazia    + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
USA        NOSsetia    + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
USA        GeorgiaDov    No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
USA        OSCE          No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
USA        UNSG        + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
USA        EU          + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
USA        GUUAM       + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
USA        OSF         + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
USA        GeorgiaPar  + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
USA        GeorgiaHaw  + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
GeorgiaDov Russia      + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
GeorgiaDov SOssetia    + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
GeorgiaDov OrgCrime    + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
GeorgiaDov Abkhazia    + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
GeorgiaDov NOSsetia    + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
GeorgiaDov USA           No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
GeorgiaDov OSCE          No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
GeorgiaDov UNSG        + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
GeorgiaDov EU          + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
GeorgiaDov GUUAM       + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
GeorgiaDov OSF         + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
GeorgiaDov GeorgiaPar  + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
GeorgiaDov GeorgiaHaw  + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
OSCE       Russia      - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
OSCE       SOssetia    + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
OSCE       OrgCrime    + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
OSCE       Abkhazia    + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
OSCE       NOSsetia    + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
OSCE       USA           No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
OSCE       GeorgiaDov    No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
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Focal Group Rival Group Focal View Rival View Joint View 
OSCE       UNSG        + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
OSCE       EU          + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
OSCE       GUUAM       + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
OSCE       OSF         + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
OSCE       GeorgiaPar  + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
OSCE       GeorgiaHaw  + Stalemate    + Conflict     - Give In     
UNSG       Russia      - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
UNSG       SOssetia    - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
UNSG       OrgCrime    - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
UNSG       Abkhazia    - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
UNSG       NOSsetia    - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
UNSG       USA         - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
UNSG       GeorgiaDov  - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
UNSG       OSCE        - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
UNSG       EU          - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
UNSG       GUUAM       - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
UNSG       OSF         - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
UNSG       GeorgiaPar  - Give In      - Conflict     - Compromise  
UNSG       GeorgiaHaw  - Give In      - Conflict     - Compromise  
EU         Russia      - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EU         SOssetia    - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EU         OrgCrime    - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EU         Abkhazia    - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EU         NOSsetia    - Give In      - Give In      - Give In     
EU         USA         - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
EU         GeorgiaDov  - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
EU         OSCE        - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
EU         UNSG        + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
EU         GUUAM       - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
EU         OSF         - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
EU         GeorgiaPar  - Give In      - Conflict     - Compromise  
EU         GeorgiaHaw  - Give In      - Conflict     - Compromise  
GUUAM      Russia      - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
GUUAM      SOssetia    - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
GUUAM      OrgCrime    - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
GUUAM      Abkhazia    - Stalemate    - Stalemate    + Stalemate   
GUUAM      NOSsetia    + Stalemate    - Stalemate    + Stalemate   
GUUAM      USA         - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
GUUAM      GeorgiaDov  - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
GUUAM      OSCE        - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
GUUAM      UNSG        + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
GUUAM      EU          + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
GUUAM      OSF         - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
GUUAM      GeorgiaPar  - Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
GUUAM      GeorgiaHaw  - Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
OSF        Russia      - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
OSF        SOssetia    - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
OSF        OrgCrime    - Stalemate    - Stalemate    - Stalemate   
OSF        Abkhazia    + Stalemate    - Stalemate    + Stalemate   
OSF        NOSsetia    + Stalemate    + Stalemate    + Stalemate   
OSF        USA         - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
OSF        GeorgiaDov  - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
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Focal Group Rival Group Focal View Rival View Joint View 
OSF        OSCE        - Conflict     - Conflict     - Conflict    
OSF        UNSG        + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
OSF        EU          + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
OSF        GUUAM       + Conflict     + Conflict     + Conflict    
OSF        GeorgiaPar  - Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
OSF        GeorgiaHaw  - Stalemate    + Conflict     - Compromise  
GeorgiaPar Russia      - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaPar SOssetia    + Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaPar OrgCrime    + Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaPar Abkhazia    + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaPar NOSsetia    + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaPar USA         - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaPar GeorgiaDov  - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaPar OSCE        - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaPar UNSG        + Conflict     + Compel       + Compromise  
GeorgiaPar EU          + Conflict     + Compel       + Compromise  
GeorgiaPar GUUAM       - Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compromise  
GeorgiaPar OSF         - Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compromise  
GeorgiaPar GeorgiaHaw    No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
GeorgiaHaw Russia      - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaHaw SOssetia    + Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaHaw OrgCrime    + Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaHaw Abkhazia    + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaHaw NOSsetia    + Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaHaw USA         - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaHaw GeorgiaDov  - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaHaw OSCE        - Conflict     - Stalemate    + Compel      
GeorgiaHaw UNSG        + Conflict     + Compel       + Compromise  
GeorgiaHaw EU          + Conflict     + Compel       + Compromise  
GeorgiaHaw GUUAM       - Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compromise  
GeorgiaHaw OSF         - Conflict     + Stalemate    + Compromise  
GeorgiaHaw GeorgiaPar    No Issue       No Issue       No Issue    
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Map 6-1-1-1 Georgia and its regions: South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Ajaria. (Taken from 
UNICEF Website)  
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Map 6-1-1-2 Ethno linguistic Groups in Caucasus: South and North Ossetia (From the 
University of Texas Website) 
 Fi
gu
re
 6
-3
-2
-1
 S
ou
th
 O
ss
et
ia
 C
ris
is
 P
os
iti
on
s 
                             
20
 
65
10
0 
G
eo
rg
ia
 H
aw
ks
 
G
eo
rg
ia
n 
Pa
rli
am
en
t 
EU
 
U
S 
O
SC
E 
O
pe
n 
So
ci
et
y 
F.
 
U
N
SG
 
45
G
eo
rg
ia
 D
ov
es
 
G
U
U
A
M
R
us
si
a 
N
or
th
 O
ss
et
ia
 
O
rg
an
iz
ed
 
C
rim
e 
So
ut
h 
O
ss
et
ia
 
A
bk
ha
zi
a 
 
80
228
 Fi
gu
re
 6
-3
-3
-1
 A
bs
ol
ut
e 
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
Ab
kh
az
ia
4%
E
U
7%
G
U
U
A
M
2%
G
eo
rg
ia
D
ov
7% G
eo
rg
ia
H
aw
5%
G
eo
rg
ia
Pa
r
5%
N
O
Ss
et
ia
3%
O
SC
E
9%
O
SF 3%
O
rg
C
rim
e
5%
R
us
si
a
25
%
S
O
ss
et
ia
7%
U
N
SG
9%
U
S
A
9%
 
229
 1
Abkhazia
EU
GUUAM
GeorgiaDov
GeorgiaHaw
GeorgiaPar
NOSsetia
OSCE
OSF
OrgCrime
Russia
SOssetia
UNSG
USA
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
91
Salience Values
Fi
gu
re
 6
-3
-3
-2
 S
al
ie
nc
e 
Sc
or
es
 
230
 Fi
gu
re
 6
-3
-3
-3
 E
ffe
ct
iv
e 
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
by
 A
ct
or
s
A
bk
ha
zi
a
4%
EU 2% G
U
U
AM
1%
G
eo
rg
ia
D
ov
8%
G
eo
rg
ia
H
aw
6%
G
eo
rg
ia
P
ar
6%
N
O
Ss
et
ia
2%
O
S
C
E
8%
O
S
F
2% O
rg
C
rim
e
6%
R
us
si
a
32
%
S
O
ss
et
ia
8%
U
N
SG
4%
U
SA 11
%
O
th
er
57
%
 
231
 Fi
gu
re
 6
-3
-3
-4
 E
ffe
ct
iv
e 
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
by
 P
os
iti
on
s
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
12
%
S
ta
tu
sq
uo
40
%
La
rg
e 
Au
t.
27
%
In
cr
ea
se
d 
Au
t.
9%
H
aw
ks
12
%
In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
S
ta
tu
sq
uo
La
rg
e 
Au
t.
In
cr
ea
se
d 
A
ut
.
H
aw
ks
 
232
 In
de
pe
nd
en
ce
St
at
us
qu
o
La
rg
e 
Au
t.
In
cr
ea
se
d 
Au
t.
H
aw
ks
S1
0
0.
51
1.
52
2.
53
3.
54
Po
w
er
Fi
gu
re
 6
-3
-3
-5
 E
ffe
ct
iv
e 
C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
by
 P
os
iti
on
s,
 T
ot
al
 C
ap
ab
ili
ty
 V
al
ue
s
 
233
 Fi
gu
re
 6
-3
-3
-6
 S
im
ul
at
io
n 
M
in
-M
ax
-A
ve
ra
ge
 V
al
ue
s
02040608010
0
12
0
1
2
R
ou
nd
s
Position Values
P
os
iti
on
 M
in
im
um
P
os
iti
on
 M
ax
im
um
P
os
iti
on
 A
ve
ra
ge
 
234
 Round 1
Round 2
Abkhazia
EU
GUUAM
GeorgiaDov
GeorgiaHaw
GeorgiaPar
NOSsetia
OSCE
OSF
OrgCrime
Russia
SOssetia
UNSG
USA
Fore
0102
030405
060708
09010
0
Po
si
tio
n 
Va
lu
e
Ti
m
e
Ac
to
rs
Fi
gu
re
 6
-4
-1
-1
 C
ris
is
 F
or
ec
as
t
Ab
kh
az
ia
EU G
U
U
AM
G
eo
rg
ia
D
ov
G
eo
rg
ia
H
aw
G
eo
rg
ia
Pa
r
N
O
Ss
et
ia
O
S
C
E
O
S
F
O
rg
C
rim
e
R
us
si
a
SO
ss
et
ia
U
N
SG
U
S
A
Fo
re
 
235
 Fi
gu
re
 6
-4
-1
-2
 C
ris
is
 F
or
ec
as
t
0102030405060708090
1
2
R
ou
nd
s
Position Values
Fo
re
 
236
 1
2
I's
 V
ie
w
--N
o-
Is
su
e
I's
 V
ie
w
--
C
on
fli
ct
I's
 V
ie
w
--
C
om
pr
om
is
e
I's
 V
ie
w
--
St
at
us
-Q
uo
I's
 V
ie
w
--
C
om
pe
l
051
015202
530354
045
Percentages
Ti
m
e
Fi
gu
re
 6
-4
-1
-3
 I
's
 V
ie
w
 O
ve
r T
im
e
 
237
 Fi
gu
re
 6
-4
-1
-4
 I
's
 V
ie
w
 o
ve
r T
im
e
051015202530354045
1
2
R
ou
nd
s
Percentages
I's
 V
ie
w
--
N
o-
Is
su
e
I's
 V
ie
w
--
C
on
fli
ct
I's
 V
ie
w
--
C
om
pr
om
is
e
I's
 V
ie
w
--
St
at
us
-Q
uo
I's
 V
ie
w
--
C
om
pe
l
 
238
 1
2
Jo
in
t V
ie
w
--
N
o-
Is
su
e
Jo
in
t V
ie
w
--
C
on
fli
ct
Jo
in
t V
ie
w
--
C
om
pr
om
is
e
Jo
in
t V
ie
w
--
S
ta
tu
s-
Q
uo
Jo
in
t V
ie
w
--
C
om
pe
l
051
0152
0253
035
Percentages
R
ou
nd
s
Fi
gu
re
 6
-4
-1
-5
 J
oi
nt
 V
ie
w
 o
ve
r T
im
e 
(3
D
)
 
239
 Fi
gu
re
 6
-4
-1
-5
 J
oi
nt
 P
er
ce
pt
io
ns
 o
ve
r T
im
e
05101520253035
1
2
R
ou
nd
s
Percentage
Jo
in
t V
ie
w
--
N
o-
Is
su
e
Jo
in
t V
ie
w
--
C
on
fli
ct
Jo
in
t V
ie
w
--
C
om
pr
om
is
e
Jo
in
t V
ie
w
--
St
at
us
-Q
uo
Jo
in
t V
ie
w
--
C
om
pe
l
 
240
 Fi
gu
re
 6
-4
-3
-1
 E
xp
ec
te
d 
U
til
ity
 A
ss
es
m
en
ts
: R
us
si
a'
s 
Pe
rc
ep
tio
ns
-4
0
-3
0
-2
0
-1
00102030
-2
5
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Fo
ca
l V
ie
w
Rival View
G
eo
rg
ia
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t 
G
eo
rg
ia
 H
aw
ks
G
eo
rg
ia
 D
ov
es
U
SA
O
S
C
E
G
U
AM
 
O
SF
U
N
SG
 
EU
SO
ss
et
ia
 
O
rg
C
rim
e 
Ab
kh
az
ia
 
N
O
ss
et
ia
  
 
241
 Fi
gu
re
 6
-4
-3
-2
 E
xp
ec
te
d 
U
til
ity
 A
ss
es
m
en
ts
: S
ou
th
 O
ss
et
ia
n 
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
io
ns
' P
er
ce
pt
io
ns
-3
5
-2
5
-1
5-55152535
-2
5
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
FO
ca
l V
ie
w
Rival View
G
eo
rg
ia
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t 
G
eo
rg
ia
 H
aw
ks
U
SA
G
eo
rg
ia
 D
ov
es
O
SC
E G
U
AM
 
O
SF
U
N
SG
 
E
U
R
us
si
a 
O
rg
C
rim
e 
Ab
kh
az
ia
 
N
O
ss
et
ia
  
 
242
 Fi
gu
re
 6
-4
-3
-3
 E
xp
ec
te
d 
U
til
ity
 A
ss
es
m
en
ts
: G
eo
rg
ia
n 
D
ov
es
' P
er
ce
pt
io
ns
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0-505101520
-1
5
-1
0
-5
0
5
10
15
Fo
ca
l V
ie
w
Rival View
G
eo
rg
ia
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t 
G
eo
rg
ia
 H
aw
ks
R
us
si
a
So
ut
h 
O
ss
et
ia
 
O
rg
an
iz
ed
 C
rim
e
Ab
kh
az
ia
 N
or
th
 O
ss
et
ia
EU
 
U
N
S
G
 
O
S
F
U
SA
 
O
S
C
E
 
243
 Fi
gu
re
 6
-4
-3
-4
 E
xp
ec
te
d 
U
til
ity
 A
ss
es
m
en
ts
: G
eo
rg
ia
n 
H
aw
ks
' P
er
ce
pt
io
ns
-1
5
-1
0-5051015
-1
8
-1
3
-8
-3
2
7
12
17
22
Fo
ca
l V
ie
w
Rival View
U
S
A
G
eo
rg
ia
 D
ov
es
O
S
C
E
O
SF
 
G
U
U
AM
U
N
S
G
EU
R
us
si
a
S
O
ss
et
ia
O
rg
C
rim
e
A
bk
ha
zi
a N
O
ss
et
ia
 
244
 Fi
gu
re
 6
-4
-3
-5
 E
xp
ec
te
d 
U
til
ity
 A
ss
es
m
en
ts
: G
eo
rg
ia
n 
Pa
rli
am
en
t's
 P
er
ce
pt
io
ns
-1
5
-1
0-5051015
-1
8
-1
3
-8
-3
2
7
12
17
22
Fo
ca
l V
ie
w
Rival View
U
S
A
G
eo
rg
ia
 D
ov
es
O
S
C
E
O
SF
 
G
U
U
AM
U
N
S
G
EU
R
us
si
a
S
O
ss
et
ia
O
rg
C
rim
e
A
bk
ha
zi
a N
O
ss
et
ia
 
245
 Fi
gu
re
 6
-4
-3
-6
 E
xp
ec
te
d 
U
til
ity
 A
ss
es
m
en
ts
: E
U
's
 P
er
ce
pt
io
ns
-1
0-8-6-4-20246810
-1
0
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Fo
ca
l V
ie
w
Rival's View
Se
rie
s1
G
eo
rg
ia
 H
aw
ks
 
G
eo
rg
ia
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t R
us
si
a O
rg
C
rim
e
A
bk
ha
zi
a
N
os
se
tia
U
SA
G
eo
rg
ia
D
ov
 O
SC
E
U
N
SG
G
U
AM
 O
SF
 
246
 Fi
gu
re
 6
-4
-3
-7
 E
xp
ec
te
d 
U
til
ity
 A
ss
es
m
en
ts
: U
S'
 P
er
ce
pt
io
ns
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0-505101520
-1
0
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Fo
ca
l V
ie
w
Rival View
G
eo
rg
ia
 P
ar
lia
m
en
t 
G
eo
rg
ia
 H
aw
ks
R
us
si
a
So
ut
h 
O
ss
et
ia
 
O
rg
C
rim
e
Ab
kh
az
ia
 
N
O
ss
et
ia
G
eo
rg
ia
D
ov
 
O
SC
E
U
N
SG
   
EU
 
G
U
AM
 O
SF
 
247
 248
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
 
Plan of the Chapter 
 
This chapter presents a summary of the dissertation’s conclusions in three parts. Part 
one begins with a discussion of the results from the three empirical analysis chapters. 
Also, the paths of strategic action based on the expected utility analysis for the EU 
and US will be discussed in terms of competition, confrontation, cooperation and 
negotiation. Part two presents more general policy recommendations targeted at 
European and American foreign policy related to energy security. Part three presents 
ideas for future research.  
 
7.1 The Three Conflicts and European and US Foreign Policy 
This dissertation analyzed four major questions: 1. What effects will conflicts in Iran, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia have on global energy security? 2. What are the forecasts as 
to the future of the three conflicts in these countries? 3. What are the available foreign 
policy options for the EU and US to prevent these conflicts from escalating and 
threatening global energy security? 4. How do these conflicts affect the great power 
rivalry in the Eurasia region? I will recapitulate the answers to these questions.  
 The enormous importance of Iranian oil and gas production for the global 
energy markets is an indisputable fact. As one of the top global producers and the 
possessor of the second-largest oil and gas reserves in the world, a political turmoil in 
Iran can disrupt the energy production, supply and transit and might lead Iran to 
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initiate embargos on certain adversaries’ economies. Such events have the potential to 
double oil and gas prices in the short run. The effects of such price shocks on global 
and national economies will most likely be exceptionally harmful and can lead to 
long-term recession and high inflation.  
 The EUM’s forecast of the future of the Iranian nuclear program is fairly clear 
and stable: Iran is not likely to give in to the international pressures about its uranium 
enrichment program.1  
 There might be several reasons for Iran’s persistence. One of them, which will 
be discussed further below, is the support of Russia and China for Iran, based on 
economic reasons, which makes an international effort to prevent the nuclear 
proliferation of Iran by the UN Security Council virtually impossible. Another reason 
lies in the position of the George W. Bush administration in American domestic 
politics. The current government faces low levels of support, for public opinion 
turned against the Iraq war. The 2006 Congressional elections also constitute a factor 
that will probably lead the Republican Congress not to support spending for yet 
another foreign military invasion. Also, Iran will be considering the fact that the 
American military is spread thin due to its global involvement. Allocating a 
substantial amount of force against Iran looks difficult at this point in time.  
 The analysis in this study also suggests that the “conflict” perception is fairly 
low at the end of the bargaining. The dominant perception is one of a stalemate. This 
means that in the short term, no diplomatic or military crisis is expected. Many 
                                                 
1 In fact, the Iranian Supreme Leader Khamanei is coded as the veto player in the analysis who did not 
change his pro-uranium enrichment position during all rounds of the bargaining. Therefore, the 
conclusion of the expected utility analysis was certain all along that Iran is very likely to continue 
enriching uranium.  
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important actors in the bargaining, such as the EU, US, IAEA and Israel, are 
“unsatisfied” with the resolution of the issue. However, their joint perceptions of the 
Iranian political leaders can be summarized as a standoff. A review of the Iranian 
leaders’ joint perceptions shows that the same holds true vice versa. These results do 
not indicate the emergence of a “hot” conflict about this issue in the near future.  
 What are the foreign policy options available to the EU and US to resolve the 
Iranian conflict? Competition and confrontation with the rival does not seem to be an 
option that will bring success, because Russia’s and China’s huge support for Iran tips 
the balance of power in favor for Iran. The Iranian leaders play a very clever game: 
By being one of the largest energy exporters to China2 and nuclear technology 
importers from Russia, they create a situation of interdependence in which China and 
Russia will continue to support Iran. The EUM also concludes that challenging the 
rivals (i.e. Iran, Russia and China) is more costly for the EU and US than maintaining 
the stalemate position.   
 This gridlock situation leaves the EU and US foreign policy makers with only 
two viable options: cooperation and negotiation. Regarding the possibility of 
cooperation, the simulation has shown that if the EU and US policies diverge on the 
Iranian nuclear program issue, like in the 2003 war on Iraq, it will be much less likely 
for them to prevent the nuclear proliferation of Iran. Again, the tremendous impact of 
Russia’s and China’s capabilities on the bargaining plays an important role. To 
counterbalance this influence, the EU and US must act together. That is, a 
strengthened common stance should be pursued against Iran. In fact, this analysis was 
produced in December 2005, and the conclusions were drawn in January 2006, before 
                                                 
2 About 14 percent of Chinese oil imports are from Iran.  
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the Iranians rejected the first proposals from the EU3. The events of May and June 
2006 support the conclusions. The EU and US drew support from Russia and China 
for a peaceful resolution of the issue and mobilized the UN Security Council. In mid-
June 2006, the UN Security Council Nations plus Germany made another offer to Iran 
to stop their uranium enrichment in return for guaranteeing the availability of nuclear 
fuel for their reactors, along with various trade advantages and security guarantees 
(BBC News). Iran has yet to respond to the proposal, presumably in mid-August.  
 Also, this kind of move was predicted by the analysis in chapter 4, where 
opportunities were discussed that might not look obvious to the policy makers. An 
interesting point in the analysis of the EU, US and IAEA’s perceptions is that they all 
see China, India, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as flexible enough to still be convinced. 
This means that the US, EU3 and the IAEA still perceive these three countries as 
being persuadable to support an international response against Iran.  
 As stated in chapter 4, Iran is trying to achieve more international recognition 
and bargaining power by making the EU, US and international community believe 
that it has advanced its nuclear program. As our forecast graph over time suggests, the 
extension of the negotiations is only beneficial for Iran’s purposes (Figure 4-5-5).  
 Chapter 5 analyzed the possible conflict escalation in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
region of Azerbaijan that can threaten the physical security of the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline. The American and European efforts to build the pipeline and 
Russian counter- efforts to prevent its construction provided the first example of the 
redux of the Great Game in the region (Kleveman 2003). The Western governments 
and oil companies strongly supported the construction of the BTC pipeline for one 
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major reason: It is the first step in realizing further projects that will provide a 
diversity of energy supply from the Caspian Basin countries. Specifically, this 
pipeline provides a basic infrastructure for even more oil and gas transit from 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Europe and the US via Turkey.   
 The results of the analysis are not as confident as in the Iranian case. Although 
the model concluded that a pro-Azeri position is likely to win the bargaining, a 
careful analysis of the dynamics of the model suggests a solution that respects 
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity; at the same time, a support of self-determination 
rights for Armenians appears to be highly plausible. This is the position stated by the 
US, France, the EU and UN, and more support can be drawn for it from international 
circles.  
 The good news for the peoples of the region and the energy security of the 
Western economies is that the interacted conflict perception is very low, about 8 
percent of all joint perceptions. Therefore, one can infer that a regional war is 
unlikely to appear in the near future. The most important position shift in the 
bargaining was made by the Republic of Armenia, which came closer to the 
resolutions suggested by Azerbaijan, Europe and the US. The reason for this could be 
the government’s determination to end the long-term economic isolation in the 
region. Hence, policies of “carrots” (i.e. economic cooperation, aid and international 
inclusion) towards Armenia are more likely to work.  
 The biggest obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the issue can result from the 
Russia-Iran cooperation against the Azerbaijan-US-EU-Turkey stance. In the 
simulation, despite its relative weakness to influence the overall resolution to the 
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issue, Russia was able to draw support for its status quo position from regional 
powers, like Iran and smaller but important actors, such as the opposition in Armenia 
and the de facto Armenian government of Nagorno-Karabakh. Especially the Russian 
perceptions denote that there is a risky situation in the region regarding the conflict. 
Russia perceives itself at odds with all other actors but the status quo powers that 
share the same policy position. The Russian perceptions suggest that the positions of 
the EU, the EU Council, US and Azerbaijan are the farthest from its preferred 
position in the Euclidian distance (Figure 5-4-4-3-11). That is why I suspect that 
Russia is likely to increase pressure on the Republic of Armenia not to reach an 
agreement with Azerbaijan and might be able to stir the de facto peace in the region 
by mobilizing nationalist Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.  
 What does this analysis tell us about available American and European 
foreign policy options? First of all, a limited conflict between two groups, i.e. 
between pro-Russian and pro-Western alliances, is likely to continue. The EU and US 
should maintain their unified stance against the Russian influence in the region in 
order to keep the Azeri and Caspian energy resource production and transit alive. The 
foreign policy option that is most likely to work is to support the economic and 
political development of Azerbaijan and to prevent military conflict in the region by 
deploying peace-keeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh until the issue is resolved. The 
political and economic stability of Azerbaijan is essential, and foreign economic aid 
and political influence is necessary to let Azerbaijan grow as a stable, friendly 
government in this important region. Building military alliances and improving 
 254
economic cooperation3 with Azerbaijan look like feasible options.  Otherwise, a weak 
Azerbaijan can easily be stirred or even absorbed by Russia, like in 1920.    
 Lastly, the EU and US should offer similar help to Armenia in return for its 
support of a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Such support can break the 
dependency of Armenia on Russia and lead to a workable resolution to the conflict.  
 Chapter 6 analyzed the South Ossetia conflict and its importance for the 
transit of energy from the Caspian region to Europe and the US via the 
Mediterranean. Despite its net energy importer status, the political stability of 
Georgia is of greatest importance for its position as a pro-Western transit energy 
country.  
 The main forecast from the expected utility analysis is that the Russian 
influence in the region is so enormous that the continuation of the status quo is the 
most likely option. With the current dynamics in place, a resolution to the issue is not 
likely to occur in the short run. The status quo is favored by the Russians, who 
effectively control South Ossetia. The US’ influence will probably not be high 
enough to persuade Russia to change its position. Therefore, the US will continue the 
bargaining to muster support for a moderate resolution to the issue, which entails 
great autonomy for South Ossetia. The simulations show that the US is likely to be 
successful in persuading the Georgian government to shift to a more moderate 
position.  
 According to the analysis, the EU might get credible proposals from the 
breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to change its stance in favor of the 
                                                 
3 Especially via Turkey, that has already been giving such assistance to Azerbaijan since the last 15 
years. 
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independence of these regions. Although in the bargaining simulation, the offers are 
not convincing enough to change the EU’s position, they appear to be “credible” in 
the simulation’s terms. This suggests that if the dynamics of the conflict change, the 
EU will be able to somehow increase its support for the South Ossetian position. 
Regarding such a change one can speculate that after the incidents in the winter of 
2006, the EU understands that it is completely energy-dependent on Russia. This can 
lead the EU to be more pro-Russian in the region.  
 This scenario entails a real danger for the peace, security and specifically 
energy security in the region. If the EU deviates from its current position towards 
South Ossetia, another transatlantic divide can cause serious damages to the energy 
security of Western economies. More specifically, the EU might be better off not to 
defect to the US and other regional powers like Turkey in this rivalry against the 
Russian influence. 
 Similar to our discussion about Azerbaijan, I suggest that the EU and US 
should support Georgia’s democratization and economic growth wholeheartedly. A 
domestically stronger Georgia backed by the EU, US and Turkey is less likely to lose 
South Ossetia to Russia or to become involved in an armed conflict with the South 
Ossetian paramilitary forces. Especially initiatives like civil society organizations’ 
promotion of Georgian democratization processes is noteworthy and should be 
encouraged by the EU and US. The possibility of a Georgian membership in NATO 
and the EU looks remote but should be considered as an important opportunity.  
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7.2 General Conclusions and Policy Recommendations  
In this part, I attempt to make more general conclusions based on the research and 
draw some further foreign policy recommendations for the EU and US.  
 I conclude - as geologists, engineers, economists and energy security 
researchers suggest - that the threats to energy security in the near future are likely to 
arise only from political instabilities. Related to this is the fact that the Caspian 
energy resources appear to be one of the few “hopes” to diversify oil and gas supply 
for the EU and US, although it cannot replace the Middle Eastern oil due to the 
latter’s cheapness and vast reserves.  
 The results of this project confirm the hypothesis from various literatures that 
the EU and US should pursue proactive foreign policies to prevent regional conflicts 
that might disrupt the production and transportation of Caspian energy. If the EU and 
US do not pursue such foreign policies, the region can easily slide into turmoil, which 
will only deepen the existing dependency of Western economies on Middle Eastern 
energy.  
 Third, a new type of “Great Game” is likely to develop further in the region. 
That is, a great power struggle for the control of energy resources in the Eurasia 
region should be expected. In this struggle, the most important rivalries will be 
between two groups of countries: Russia, China and Iran (and maybe India in the 
future) will use political tools to control the region’s political economic developments 
against the penetration of the US, EU and Turkey. These conflicts are likely to occur 
among China, Russia and United States and their allies. This is what I mean by the 
“emergence of tripolarity” in the title of this study.   
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 This struggle for the control of politics in the region is likely to take the shape 
of a limited form of the Cold War. I use the noun limited here for two reasons. First, 
the intensity of the conflict is less likely to be as high as during the Cold War.4 
Second, the scope of the “New Great Game” is narrower than that of the Cold War. 
That is, the current struggle in Eurasia is mainly motivated by economic gains, rather 
than physical security, ideological rivalry and the existential concerns of the Cold 
War.  
 But one characteristic of the Cold War is still relevant and will shape this 
struggle, namely that many of the players are also nuclear powers, i.e. the US, Russia, 
EU (France and UK), China, and India. There is a growing suspicion that Iran wants 
to ‘go nuclear’, which might trigger the development of a nuclear program for 
military purposes in Turkey, as well. This characteristic, in a way, is the insurance for 
the prevention of military confrontation due to obvious reasons, such as Mutually 
Assured Destruction. 
 As it appears almost impossible to deter Russia and China with military 
means, the conclusion suggests that the EU and US would be better off using 
international economic relations, the promotion of democratization and economic 
growth as foreign policy tools in this struggle.  
 Some signs of these efforts already exist. For the last half decade, the EU has 
been trying to convince Russia to reach an EU-Russian energy cooperation 
agreement. This agreement would guarantee a stable supply of energy for Europe, and 
an assured access to European technology and investments for Russia. However, as 
                                                 
4 Proxy wars and possibilities of military confrontation between great powers will be less likely than 
they were during the Cold War. 
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the Russian administration aimed to use energy as leverage in its foreign policies in 
the bargaining simulation, the EU did not succeed in convincing Russia.  
 With the goal to support its fast-growing economy, China is the second 
challenging player in the quest for energy security for the EU and US. The Chinese 
foreign and economic policies to guarantee energy supply to its market are global 
efforts that are not confined to Eurasia. In a recent summit in June 2006, the top EU 
policy makers worried about China’s “aggressive courting” of oil-producing African 
nations for energy (Islam 2006). One way to deal with China’s support for Iran could 
be using trade quotas and negotiations at the WTO. As much as the Western 
economies enjoy cheap imports from China, the Chinese economy also depends on 
those exports. Using international trade as a mechanism of influence can be one way 
of dealing with China’s aggressive energy security policies.  
 Lastly, the EU and US should support the nascent democracies and economies 
of the Caspian basin and the Caucasus states. This is one way to make these nations 
more stable to withstand domestic and foreign meddling.  
 
7.3. Future Research 
This dissertation attempted to answer an important question: How will three conflicts 
in the Eurasia region develop and what are the foreign policy options that are 
available for the EU and US to provide energy security to their markets? Due to 
pragmatic constraints this dissertation did not include some other important conflicts 
in the region that can threaten global energy security. That is, funding availability and 
time concerns have limited the scope of the study. The Caspian Sea legal regime 
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issue, the ethnic conflict in Southeastern Turkey (i.e. the conflict with the PKK), and 
the future of Northern Iraq are other relevant issues that can be analyzed in an 
extended version of this study.  
 Also, in future research more area experts will be asked to code additional 
data at different times for the three issues at hand. This will increase the reliability of 
the results and provide a larger range of outcomes that are available to the actors.  
 Finally, I plan to conduct statistical tests of the results of the formal analysis 
for sensitivity analysis purposes. This way, an advanced research piece that combines 
case studies, area expertise, mathematical modeling and statistical tests of the 
modeling can be developed.  
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APPENDIX 1: OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE VARIABLES 
(INFORMATION DOCUMENT ABOUT THE MODEL THAT 
WAS RECEIVED BY THE CODERS ALONG WITH 
QUESTIONNAIRES) 
 
 
 MODEL, ISSUE CONTINUUM AND AN EXAMPLE 
The model I use to analyze various issues related to the energy security in the Eurasia 
region was developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1999, 2002 and 2003). This 
model, sometimes also referred to as the Expected Utility Model (EUM), might be 
described as a dynamic median voter model with coercion. It is an example of applied 
modeling designed for practical application. 
The expected utility model makes calculations about interactions of the actors 
involved in a bargaining situation. The final output of the model predicts whether 
there is a solution to the bargaining; and if there is, it forecasts what the solution will 
look like. 
Each actor in a bargaining is associated with three variables: the actor’s resources, 
policy position and the salience that the actor associates with the issue.  The data for 
these three variables are collected from area experts who have an outstanding 
knowledge of the issue at hand. Therefore the model and its success completely 
depend on the area experts’ knowledge of the issues.  
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One assumption of this model is very important: the issues are defined as 
unidimensional. Let me further clarify the model, issue continuum and data 
collection by providing an example from a study on the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999.  
1.1. An Example of What the Issue Continuum and Data Look Like 
The issue investigated here centers on autonomy for Kosovo. The main question 
asked is: “What is the attitude of stakeholders toward autonomy in Kosovo and the 
composition of troops deployed after the bombing stops?” Running the data collected 
from area experts, the forecasting model predicts the result of this bargaining, that is, 
the future of Kosovo’s autonomy.  
The data was collected during the height of the air war in Kosovo by Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita (1999). The issues of autonomy and troop composition are one and the 
same; those stakeholders that prefer more autonomy necessarily prefer foreign troops, 
NATO in particular. Those that prefer less autonomy prefer local troops, or unarmed 
foreign troops.  
Let me explain to you how the study is conducted, step by step: 
 
Step 1:  
First, the researcher carefully defines a position scale. Major positions that actors can 
take on Kosovo’s autonomy issue were defined as follows:  
Position Scale:  
0 = No self-rule;  
50 = Limited autonomy;  
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80 = Autonomy for Kosovo;  
100 = Full Independence for Kosovo 
 
 
 
Step 2:  
After defining the issue continuum, the researcher asks the area expert to review it. 
Of course, if necessary, the area expert can change actors’ position scale 
according to their expertise.  
For example, in the Kosovo study, the area expert defined the actors and their 
positions on the issue continuum as such:  
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You can observe how the autonomy issue and the policy positions of relevant actors 
are defined in Figure 1. Milosevic, Serbian extremists, the Yugoslav Army, the 
Orthodox Church, US Congress anti-war faction and some other actors are 
completely against the autonomy for Kosovo; so, their policy position score is 0. At 
the other extreme of the issue continuum, the Kosovo Liberation Army, the Albanian 
government, US government, NATO, France, Germany, UK and the other actors 
favor the full independence of Kosovo: thus, their position score is 100. The UN 
Security Council and Secretary General present a median position, meaning limited 
autonomy with a score of 50. Russia is close to the UN position, yet closer to the 
Serbian stance than the rest of the actors with a position value of 42.   
 
Step 3:  
After the scale is reviewed, the experts are asked to fill in values for the three 
variables for each actor (i.e. resource, position, and salience).  
 
Actual data from Professor Bueno de Mesquita’s Kosovo study is illustrative here. 
The area experts coded the resource, position and salience data for the 33 actor 
involved in the Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999 as illustrated in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Data for the Kosovo Crisis, 1999.  
Actor  Resource Position Salience 
Berisha (Albania)           1 100 70 
Albanian Government 20 100 100 
Bulatovic (Montenegro)    1 0 70 
Djukanovic (Montenegro)                50 55 100 
US Congress - Pro-War Faction      20 100 50 
US Congress - Anti-War Faction     25 0 50 
US Executive/Government              300 100 90 
France      75 100 90 
Germany             75 100 90 
Italy              75 100 90 
Macedonia   100 100 100 
NATO         100 100 100 
Russia          100 42 80 
UK 80 100 90 
UN Security Council   5 50 90 
UN Secretary General   10 50 90 
Democratic Opposition    1 0 100 
Serbian Extremists 40 0 100 
Milosevic           200 0 100 
Serbians in Kosovo    5 0 100 
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Seselj (Radical Party)       20 0 100 
Yugoslav Army    50 0 100 
Orthodox Church    10 0 100 
Albanian Diaspora    5 100 100 
Kosovo Liberation Army 30 100 100 
Rugova (LDK)        1 100 100 
Greece         40 80 90 
Bulgaria    15 100 95 
Romania     10 100 85 
Hungary             15 100 85 
Croatia          10 100 85 
Serbians in Bosnia     10 35 90 
Federated Bosnia         10 100 80 
 
Interestingly, although most of the powerful actors were in favor of Kosovan 
independence at the height of the air bombardment, the forecasting software’s 
prediction of the bargaining about Kosovo’s autonomy was the “centrist 
position”, after three rounds of bargaining. That is, many powerful actors who 
started the negotiations with a policy position of 100 (i.e. full independence), such as 
USA, UK, Germany, France etc, ended up shifting to the United Nations’ centrist 
position of limited autonomy. Of course, the final resolution of the issue is expected 
to be achieved in the next years and we will have another opportunity to review the 
predictive power of the model once again.  
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2. Definitions of Variables 
In this section, I will give you the precise operational definitions of the three variables 
as defined in Bueno de Mesquita (1999).1 Clarity of these definitions is extremely 
important for the development of the data and sound forecasts. If there is anything 
that needs further clarification, please don’t hesitate to contact me; I would like to call 
you and clarify such issues. 
Variable 1: Stated Position   
This variable represents the current negotiating position on the issue for each 
stakeholder. The information regarding each stakeholder’s position represents the best 
available estimate of their current bargaining stance.  This position is not the 
outcome the stakeholder expects or is prepared to accept, but is the 
stakeholder’s current negotiating stance.   
When the position has not been stated by actors, it is best thought of as the answer to 
the following mind experiment: If the stakeholder were asked to write down his or her 
current position, without knowing the values being written down by other 
stakeholders, what would he or she write down as the stated position on the issue 
continuum?  
                                                 
1 IMPORTANT COPYRIGHT NOTICE: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita who holds the copyright of this 
model and the educational website for it (bdm.cqpress.com) has verbally given a permission to use the 
instructions at the website for the preparation of this document. Some of the information and text after 
this point –specifically the variables part- are directly taken by Bueno de Mesquita’s (1999) 
educational website. Some are rephrased by me. Therefore the reader can consider all instructions and 
examples (i.e. Kosovo example) in this document in quotation (i.e. “ “) from the author’s website for 
all copyright and academic integrity purposes.  
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It is important that the numerical values assigned to different positions (and they can 
range between any values) reflect the relative distance or proximity of the different 
solutions to one another.   
Variable 2: Salience 
Salience refers to how important the issue is to the actor. Salience is not a measure of 
how hard someone will try to accomplish their goal, nor is it the percentage of time or 
effort they are prepared to put into an issue. Rather, as the definition above tries to 
make clear, salience is a measure of their preparedness to focus on the issue when 
it comes up, even if it means putting aside some other issue. For this reason, few 
actors should be expected to have a salience of 100 on an issue. Of course, scores 
close to 100 may be more common. By the same token, no actor can be a player in a 
decision and have a salience of zero for the issue in question. Therefore, salience 
must fall between 1 and 100. Examples of what salience scores mean are as follows:   
90-100: This is my most important issue. I would drop whatever I am doing and turn 
to this issue whenever asked. 
70-80: This issue is very important to me. It is certainly one of my most important 
issues. I would try very hard to reschedule to handle this issue when it arises. 
50-60: This is one of several important issues. Others are more important. I would 
have to drop this if one of those others arose, but otherwise I will try to focus on this 
issue. 
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30-40: This is an issue I care about, but it is not that important to me.  I have many 
more important issues to deal with and so generally would not drop what I am doing 
to deal with this and generally would focus on something else. 
10-20: This is a minor issue to me. I rarely pay attention or make much effort. 
Less than 10: I really don’t care about this issue. 
Variable 3: Resources 
A player’s potential influence on the issue depends on how much power and 
resources this actor can allow on the issue concerned. For instance, if the actors are 
nation states, the power or potential influence of the country on the issue might not 
include all of the resources the country has available. It is rather the pool of 
resources that a country can allocate to the specific issue. 
100:  The most powerful stakeholder on this issue. There can be more than one 
group at this score or at any other score.  The value 100 is illustrative and is 
convenient to use, but the Policy Forecaster does not restrict resource 
estimates to be between 0 and 100, the values can be larger than 100 (but 
should not be less than zero). So when you code, please assign 100 to the 
most powerful actor(s) on an issue, then, all other stakeholders’ resource 
scores can be coded relative to the most powerful actor (in numeric 
terms, relative to 100).  
All other values:            
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A stakeholder’s value must be positive and must be evaluated relative to 
100 (or the maximum score assigned) and relative to the values other 
stakeholders. So, two stakeholders with 40 and 60 would equal the one 
stakeholder at 100 in a head to head contest with no one else involved if 
everyone tried as hard as they could. The resource scores should not be 
thought of as percentages. A decision maker with a score of 100 does not have 
100 percent of the resources and may, in fact, have only a small percentage of 
the total. The total, of course, is the sum of all of the resources across all of 
the groups or decision makers.   
 
An Important Point: Veto Power and Outcomes 
It is often useful to distinguish between an actor’s resources and veto power.  Though 
the model does not make direct use of veto power information, one can. An actor has 
veto power if his or her failure to accept a proposed issue resolution means there is no 
agreement. For example, the Irish Republican Army is not one of the most powerful 
actors in the data sets on Northern Ireland. On most issues it has neither many 
resources nor a veto. On the issue of disarming paramilitary groups in Northern 
Ireland, however, the IRA, as a well-armed paramilitary group, can veto the 
decommissioning of paramilitary actors. If they walk away from the table on this 
issue, there is no agreement even if all others agree. So, if you think there is a veto 
player in the issues you are asked to comment on, please let me know. It is very 
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important to know about the veto players in order to achieve accurate 
predictions.
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APPENDIX 2 
QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
 
 
Questionnaire 1 
Issue 1- Iran  
Introduction: 
This questionnaire includes two parts. Part I presents a background of the crisis in 
focus. In part II, 3-steps instructions for coding is explained. In order to facilitate your 
coding, I have already completed substantial parts of steps 1 and 2. Please review step 
1 and step 2. If you think steps 1 and 2 are ready to go, you can do only step 3 (i.e. 
coding of the three variables.  
1. Background: Iran’s Nuclear Quest 
In August 2002, Iranian exiles announced Iran has a secret nuclear program. When 
the existence of sites was confirmed by satellite photographs, Iran announced its 
nuclear program has peaceful aims and would allow IAEA inspections. The United 
States insists that Iran’s nuclear program ultimately aims to produce nuclear weapons.   
In October 2003, French, German and UK [the EU (3)] foreign ministers traveled to 
Iran. The ministers asked Iran to stop enriching uranium; suggested Iran sign an 
additional protocol to the NPT; and provide full cooperation with the IAEA. The EU 
(3) offered economic concessions to Iran if these conditions were met. In August 
2005, Iran rejected the EU (3) proposal and talks were stopped. As of early December 
2005, the talks between the EU (3) and Iran have not resumed and the latter is 
reportedly continuing its nuclear program.   
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Various Iranian and international actors are involved in this issue with diverse policy 
positions: The IAEA declared that real aims of the Iranian nuclear program are 
ambiguous. The United States administration has repeatedly suggested referring the 
issue to the UN Security Council and initiating economic sanctions to Iran. Israel 
seems to agree with the US position. Russia and China have extensive cooperation 
and trade with Iran which eliminates a UNSC decision against this nation. Russia 
declared its determination to continue transferring nuclear technology to Iran, while it 
also proposed “returning the spent nuclear fuel to Russia for reprocessing and 
storage” so that it cannot be used to produce nuclear weapons (BBC News).  
Iranian views on the issue also seem to differ. The so-called ‘hard-liner’ President 
Ahmedinejad and his administration seem to be more determined to continue nation’s 
nuclear program than their predecessors, i.e. President Khatemi and his team. Some 
other regional actors, such as Gulf Cooperation Council, also stated that a nuclear 
Iran could negatively affect the precarious stability in the region.  
Iran’s vast oil and gas resources are extremely important for the security of the energy 
supply to the EU as well as to the world. Iran was the fourth largest producer of oil 
and sixth natural gas in the world last year. Using force or imposing sanctions can 
seriously threaten global oil and gas prices. Being aware of this, an Iranian cleric 
recently threatened to use the oil weapon should the UNSC sanction Iraq.   
 
2. Coding and Instructions 
Issue  
What are the attitudes of stakeholders toward Iran’s uranium enrichment?  
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Step 1.  
The following scale, from no uranium enrichment (0) to enriching weapon grade 
uranium (100) represents the range of possible outcomes for the Iranian nuclear 
question.  
I have defined the following policy positions and the values associated with them as a 
guideline. The position scale might not be complete. It may be subject to change in 
accordance with your expertise. Please feel free to change the nodes, add/subtract 
more positions.  
Policy Position Scale 
 
Position What it actually means 
0 No uranium enrichment at all; strict IAEA inspections. (US and Israel’s positions) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
40 Stop enrichment, allow IAEA control; in return political and economic benefits offered to Iran (EU Position) 
  
  
  
  
  
60 Continue negotiations with the EU, if there is a deal, stop enrichment (Khatemi position) 
  
  
  
  
70 Continue transferring of nuclear technology to Iran but uranium enrichment made in Russia (the stated Russian position)  
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85 Suspension of nuclear activity for a limited time by Iran 
  
  
  
  
100 Continue developing nuclear technology that can be used to produce nuclear weapons 
 
Step 2 
Assuming that the dialogue and negotiations between Iran and the international 
community will continue in the near future, please identify all the relevant actors (i.e. 
this can include governments, parties, international organizations, individuals, non-
governmental or organized crime groups – inside and outside of Iran) and mark them 
in the left column of the table below.  
(To facilitate the processes, I have included the following actors who might have a 
stake in the bargaining processes. Please feel free to add and subtract actors. For 
example if any actor below have no relevance, please simply delete it, or leave data 
cells blank for the actor.) 
Step 3 
Using the policy scale for Iranian uranium enrichment issue that you reviewed and 
updated, please assign each actor: 
1. A number for group resources between 1 and 100 (You can assign 100 for the 
most powerful actor in this bargaining and rate other actors relative to the most 
powerful and each other. (Please note there may be more than one actor with 
resources equal to 100); 
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2. A number to indicate each stakeholder’s policy position from 0 to 100 (Please note 
there maybe more than one actor with the same policy position value); 
3. A number to each stakeholder's salience for the issue, between 1 and 100 (Please 
note there maybe more than one actor with the same salience value).   
  
 
 
Actor 
Resource 
(1-100) 
Position 
(0-100) 
Salience 
(1-100) 
EU (3) 
(Represented by France, 
Germany and UK) 
 
   
EU Council 
(High Representative 
Havier Solana) 
   
Russia    
United States    
Israel    
China    
India    
Pakistan    
Turkey    
Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council 
   
IAEA    
UN Secretary General    
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Iranian Government 
(President Ahmadinejad 
and MFA Mottaki) 
   
Supreme Leader 
Ali Khamanei 
   
Ali Larijani 
(Secretary of the Supreme 
Council of National 
Security of Iran, Iranian 
Negotiator) 
   
Iranian Parliament     
Iranian Opposition, 
Moderates 
(Khatemi) 
   
Iranian Opposition 
Pragmatists  
(Rafsanjani) 
   
Guardian Council 
(Mullahs) 
   
Revolutionary Guard of 
Iran 
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Questionnaire 2 
 
Issue 2 – Nagorno-Karabakh  
 
Introduction: 
 
This questionnaire includes two parts. Part I presents a background of the crisis in 
focus. In part II, 3-steps instructions for coding is explained. In order to facilitate your 
coding, I have already completed substantial parts of steps 1 and 2. Please review step 
1 and step 2. If you think steps 1 and 2 are ready to go, you can do only step 3 (i.e. 
coding of the three variables.  
 
Background: Nagorno-Karabakh Ethnic Conflict 
 
Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K), an autonomous region in the Soviet Republic of 
Azerbaijan with predominantly Armenian population, declared itself as independent 
in late 1991. De facto independence of the region was never recognized. War (1991-
1994) followed the declaration of independence caused 30,000 lives and created more 
than a million refugees. Armenian-Russian backed N-K ethnic Armenians defeated 
Azerbaijan forces supported by Turkey. 1994 cease-fire was brokered by Russia that 
solved no problems such as the territorial dispute or the refugee problem.  
United States sponsored Key-West talks in 2001 did not produced an agreement. 
There are some signs of peace efforts for Armenian President Kocharian and Azeri 
counterpart Aliyev met in August 2005. However, these talks in Kazakhstan did not 
succeed in finding a solution to the problem (BBC News).  
Various regional and global actors are involved in seek for a resolution to the 
problem. OSCE’s Minsk Group that includes American, Russian and French 
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ambassadors are responsible for mediating negotiations between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. The U.S. supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and peaceful 
solution to the problem while Russia seems to be closer to Armenian position. The 
UN also called for withdrawal of Armenian troops from the region in 1994. Turkey 
supports ethnically close Azerbaijan and since the war, closed its border with 
Armenia that puts a heavy economic burden on Armenian government.  
Armenia and the de facto government of N-K refuse any possibility of N-K remaining 
in Azeri jurisdiction and declared that independence of the region is not liable to 
bargaining. According to a report distributed by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in 
2005, one compromise would include Armenian withdrawal from at least 5 of the 7 
occupied regions and return of the Azeri refugees to N-K. In return, Azerbaijan would 
accept a referendum or plebiscite to determine the future of N-K. These positions 
were not officially confirmed by Azeri or Armenian governments and the conflict is 
yet to be solved.  
 
Issue Question  
 
What are the attitudes of stakeholders toward Nagorno-Karabakh’s autonomy issue?  
 
 
Instructions for the Area Expert 
Step 1.  
 
The following scale, from no self-rule (0) to Nagorno-Karabakh’s unification with 
Armenia (100) represents the range of possible outcomes for the autonomy issue.  
I have defined the following policy positions and the values associated with them as a 
guideline. The position scale might not be complete. It may be subject to change in 
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accordance with your expertise. Please feel free to change the nodes, add/subtract 
more positions.  
 
Position Scale 
 
Position What it actually means 
0 No self-rule for the region, regaining control of N-K and centralization by Azerbaijan 
  
  
  
20 Withdrawal of all Armenian troops, refugees return to N-K, little autonomy granted to the region 
  
  
  
  
  
45 Territorial integrity of Azerbaijan protected, large autonomy granted to  N-K 
  
  
  
60 Armenians withdraw from at least 5 territories of N-K they occupy now, refugees return, Azerbaijan accepts a plebiscite within 10-15 years.   
  
  
70 Armenians withdraw from at least 5 territories of N-K they occupy now, refugees return, Azerbaijan accepts a plebiscite immediately.   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
80 Status-quo maintains 
  
  
90 Independent N-K recognized by the international community 
  
  
100 N-K unites with Armenia 
 
 
Step 2 
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Assuming the dialogue and negotiations between Azerbaijan, Armenia and the 
international actors will continue in the near future, please identify all the relevant 
actors (i.e. this can include governments, parties, international organizations, 
individuals, non-governmental or organized crime groups – inside and outside of 
Nagorno-Karabakh).  
(To facilitate the processes, I have included the following actors who might have a 
stake in the bargaining processes. Please feel free to add and subtract actors. For 
example if any actor below have no relevance, please simply delete it, or leave data 
cells blank for the actor.) 
 
Step 3 
 
Using the policy scale for Nagorno-Karabakh issue that you reviewed and updated, 
please assign each actor: 
1. A number for group resources between 1 and 100 (You can assign 100 for the 
most powerful actor in this bargaining and rate other actors relative to the most 
powerful and each other. Please note there may be more than one actor with resources 
equal to 100); 
2. A number to indicate each stakeholder’s policy position from 0 to 100 (Please note 
there maybe more than one actor with the same policy position value);  
3. A number to each stakeholder's salience for the issue, between 1 and 100 (Please 
note there maybe more than one actor with the same salience value).   
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Actor Resource (1-100) 
Position 
(0-100) 
Salience 
(1-100) 
Azeri Government  
(Aliyev)    
Azeri Opposition Bloc 
(Azadlıq)    
Armenian Government  
(Kocharyan)    
Armenian Opposition     
De facto N-K 
Government (President 
Ghukasian) 
   
N-K Opposition 
(Babayan)    
Russia    
United States    
France    
Turkey    
UN Secretary General    
EU (Other than France) 
    
EU Council 
(High Representative 
Havier Solana) 
   
Iran    
Georgia    
Kazakhstan    
Turkmenistan    
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Questionnaire 3  
Issue 3 – South Ossetia  
 
Introduction: 
 
This questionnaire includes two parts. Part I presents a background of the crisis in 
focus. In part II, 3-steps instructions for coding is explained. In order to facilitate your 
coding, I have already completed substantial parts of steps 1 and 2. Please review step 
1 and step 2. If you think steps 1 and 2 are ready to go, you can do only step 3 (i.e. 
coding of the three variables.  
 
Background: Crisis in Georgia: South Ossetia Region. 
 
In the twilight of the USSR, South Ossetia, a region in the Soviet Republic of 
Georgia, declared its intention to secede from Georgia and join the neighboring North 
Ossetia, a republic in the Russian federation. Tbilisi government rejected the 
secessionist demands and an inter-ethnic armed conflict began. In 1991, South 
Ossetia declares independence but never recognized by the international community. 
In the civil war of 1991-1992, up to a thousand people were killed and 80,000 
refugees were created. In July 1992, Russia brokered a cease fire and Russian-
Georgian-Ossetian (South and North) peace-keepers were deployed in the region. The 
conflict was frozen until 2004 (BBC News 2005).  
In May 2004 tensions rose and conflict flared up again. New President of Georgia 
Mikhail Saakashvili, who declared his intention to bring breakaway regions of 
Georgia to heel, stated Georgia did not recognize the parliamentary elections in South 
Ossetia and moved troops there, allegedly to fight against organized crime. In August 
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2004 fighting began between Georgian soldiers and South Ossetian militia. A cease-
fire was agreed soon (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2005).  
 
In early 2005, Georgian President Saakashvili offered a peace proposal to South 
Ossetia. This offer grants some autonomy to the region within Georgia. But the South 
Ossetians rejected this offer for they aim nothing but full independence. In October 
2005, President Saakashvili announced the most recent peace proposal that not only 
grants South Ossetia a “broad autonomy”, but also suggests including US, EU, OSCE 
into the search for a political settlement and resolution of the issue by 2007 (RFE-
Radio Liberty 2005) 
The conflict is very important for the security of the energy supply to Europe and the 
US since it is located only 15 kilometers away from Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (Turkey) 
pipeline that is politically much supported by the Western powers (Amineh and 
Houweling 2004).  
 
Issue  
What are the attitudes of stakeholders toward autonomy in South Ossetia?  
 
Instructions for the Area Expert 
Step 1.  
The following scale, from extreme centralization (0) to outright independence (100) 
represents the range of possible outcomes for the South Ossetian crisis.  
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I have defined the following policy positions and the values associated with them as a 
guideline. The position scale might not be complete. It may be subject to change in 
accordance with your expertise. Please feel free to change the nodes or to indicate 
positions along the continuum. (I.e., if necessary, please change the assigned numbers 
for represented positions according to your expertise and/or add more positions to the 
blank cells that could represent some actors’ positions. 
 
 
Position Scale 
 
Position What it actually means 
0 No self-rule, extreme centralization 
  
  
  
20 Return to pre-1990 very limited autonomy for South Ossetia as a sub political unit 
  
  
  
  
45 Limited but increased autonomy granted to South Ossetia 
  
  
  
65 
“Broad autonomy” granted to South Ossetia, suggested timeframe for 
resolution is 2007 (As proposed by President Saaskahvili in October 
2005) 
  
  
  
80 Status Quo (South Ossetia’s declared independence is not recognized by the international community; problem is not resolved) 
  
  
  
100 Full independence for South Ossetia 
  
 
Step 2 
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Assuming the peace proposal offered by Georgian President Saakashvili in October 
2005 is the focus of the bargaining for autonomy of South Ossetia; please identify all 
the relevant actors (i.e. this can include governments, parties, international 
organizations, individuals, non-governmental or organized crime groups – inside and 
outside of Georgia).  
 
To facilitate the processes, I have included the following actors who might have a 
stake in the bargaining processes. Please feel free to add and subtract actors. For 
example if any actor below have no relevance, please simply delete it, or leave data 
cells blank for that irrelevant actor.  
 
Step 3 
 
Using the policy scale for autonomy issue for South Ossetia, please assign each actor: 
1. A number for group resources between 1 and 100 (You can assign 100 for the 
most powerful actor in this bargaining and rate other groups relative to the most 
powerful and each other. Please note there may be more than one actor with resources 
equal to 100); 
2. A number to indicate each stakeholder’s policy position from 0 to 100 (Please note 
there maybe more than one actor with the same policy position value); 
3. A number to each stakeholder's salience for the issue, between 1 and 100 (Please 
note there maybe more than one actor with the same salience value).   
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Actor Resource (1-100) 
Position 
(0-100) 
Salience 
(1-100) 
European Union    
United States    
Georgia-Doves 
(President Saakashvili, 
PM Noghaideli, 
Conflict Resolution 
Minister Khaindrava, 
MFA Bezhuashvili) 
   
Georgia-Hawks 
(Defense Min. 
Okruashvili, Interior 
Min. Merabishvili)  
   
Georgian Parliament     
Russia    
South Ossetia (Kokoiti)    
OSCE    
Open Society 
Foundation (Soros)    
North Ossetia    
Abkhazia    
United Nations 
Secretary General    
GUUAM countries    
Organized Crime  
(Transnational: 
Russian, Georgian, 
South and North 
Ossetian)  
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